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  2Abstract 
 
 
Within the global phenomenon of the (re)emergence of religion into issues of public 
debate, one of the most salient issues confronting contemporary Muslim societies is how 
to relate the legal and political heritage that developed in pre-modern Islamic polities to 
the political order of the modern states in which Muslims now live. 
 
This study seeks to develop a framework for addressing this issue by drawing upon two 
sources. The first is an interpretative understanding of the history of Muslim contexts 
emphasising, in particular, the diversity of views about what Islam mandates that have 
always been a part of Muslim experience and the distinction between political and 
religio-legal authority that developed in practice in these environments. The second 
source is a variety of contemporary liberal theory which this study develops and calls 
‘justice as discourse’.  
 
The central argument is that liberal theory, and justice as discourse in particular, though it 
may have emerged in a different social and cultural milieu, can be normatively useful in 
Muslim contexts for relating, religion, law, state and society. It is argued first, that 
Muslim contexts are facing issues similar to those out of which liberal theory emerged.  
Additionally, it is argued that both Muslim contexts and liberal theory are dynamic and 
continually developing and that this shared dynamism means that there may be space for 
convergence of the two. Just as Muslim contexts have developed historically (and 
continue to develop today) the same is the case with the requisites of liberal theory and 
this may allow for liberal choices to be made in a manner that is not a renunciation of 
Muslim heritage. 
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Introduction 
i. The  challenge 
One of the most prominent issues facing contemporary Muslim societies is how to relate 
the legal and political heritage that developed in pre-modern Islamic polities to the 
political order of the modern states in which Muslims now live.   This challenge arises 
from a number of different factors.  On the one hand, Muslim contexts have witnessed 
the rise of so called ‘political Islam’
2 in movements that have sought to re-shape the 
state, society and politics along what have been asserted to be ‘Islamic’ lines (as this is 
understood by the putative reformers themselves).  These movements often call for the 
establishment of ‘Islamic states’ and the rule of ‘Islamic law’ and thus propose a 
dominating, even domineering, role for religious outlooks in the polity.  The Iranian 
Revolution headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and its legacy in the current 
Iranian regime, and the Taliban regime that existed in Afghanistan serve as examples of 
this trend that achieved, for some time and to some extent at least, their political ends.  
Alternative perspectives, however, question not only the desirability but also the means 
by which an Islamic identity can be projected. 
 
Second, as several states of the Muslim world emerged out of the old colonial empires 
their evolution has seen them seek out new forms of political identity and legitimacy, a 
process which has, for some, led them to re-consider the role of Islam in the polity.  
Moreover, both from within and outside Muslim contexts, hard questions are being asked 
about how Islam interacts with human rights doctrines and norms, about religious 
                                                 
2 The discussions of this are legion but one might look for example at Ayubi (1991) or Roy (1994). 
  8pluralism, both intra-Muslim and more generally, about rights of non-Muslim minorities 
within majority Muslim populations and, conversely, about the Muslims living as 
minorities among majority non-Muslim populations.  Issues arise about what it means in 
practical terms to live in accordance with Islam, in terms, for example, of personal law, 
banking or community relations.  These questions arise both in Muslim majority 
situations as well as where there are Muslim minorities.  While the full gamut of these 
questions is beyond the scope of any one study, the fact that these issues are percolating 
within Muslim societies indicates that Muslims are facing a challenge.  Put simply, it is 
the challenge of relating Islam – however interpreted and understood – to the 
contemporary life and society of Muslims.  One critical aspect of this challenge is the 
relationship of religion, the state and the public sphere.  This challenge is reflected, more 
concretely for example, in the discussions about the appropriate role for religion in 
national constitutional structures.  For instance, in both Afghanistan’s new constitution
3 
and Iraq’s interim constitution
4, to give just two recent and news-grabbing examples, the 
issue of the place of Islam, and the role of Islamic law, was a much debated topic.   
 
This study seeks to participate in these discussions by developing a framework for 
structuring the relationship between religion, the state and public discourse, with a focus 
on what I will call ‘Muslim contexts’ and, in particular, these contexts in countries of 
Muslim majority.  This means that I will focus on the place of Islam in the ‘public 
                                                 
3 See http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/The%20Constitution.pdf for the unofficial English translation  of 
the Afghan Constitution. 
4 See http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html for text of the Law of Administration for the State of 
Iraq for the Transitional Period. 
  9sphere’ the conceptualisation of whiche owes much to the work of Jurgen Habermas.
5  
Charles Taylor in a recent work has explained that the public sphere is: 
…a common space in which members of society are deemed to meet 
through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face 
encounters; to discuss matters of common interest and thus to be able to 
form a common mind about these…It’s a kind of common space…in which 
people who never meet understand themselves to be engaged in discussion 
and capable of reaching a common mind.
6 
 
Crucial to the construction of any such framework also will be the need to reflect upon 
and address issues which may be considered generally under the rubric of ‘law and 
religion’ and in this respect they are relevant to all societies, be they Muslim or 
otherwise.  A focus on Muslim contexts, then, is merely a type of case study, although, as 
with any case study, it yields particular factors that must be taken into account. 
 
One of the salient issues that arises is, broadly stated, how society should deal with a 
diversity of views.  This is the ‘simple-to-state-but-difficult-to-address’ challenge of 
pluralism: the challenge of society needing some basic principles in order to function 
while recognising that with great diversity of opinions and values held by individuals, 
finding the points of agreement will be difficult at best.  Religious beliefs and 
commitments will of course be one clear source of diversity of outlooks and values 
amongst individuals and groups.  Indeed, religious beliefs might be especially important 
in this regard because they can be constitutive of a comprehensive sense of ‘the good life’ 
for their adherents and thus impacting outlooks on a wide spectrum of social issues.  
                                                 
5 See Habermas (1989). 
6 Taylor (2004) at 83 and 85. 
  10Thus, religious beliefs can be firmly linked to different conceptions of public good that 
must be brought into some modus vivendi for any society to function. 
 
A second related question is what the appropriate role for religion is in public discourse 
as a source of different conceptions of the good life in public discourse.  It is one thing to 
recognise religious beliefs are a source of diversity and that diversity must be brought 
into a sort of social modus vivendi, but this might be achieved by regulating, and 
relegating, religious commitments to the margins of social life.  But this is only one 
alternative and herein lies the question: can religion be brought into discussion on public 
issues or is it, as Stephen Carter has wondered, “something you should leave behind 
when you come to serious public debate or into the workplace; something that you should 
be willing to split off from yourself if you want to be taken seriously?”
7   
 
The ultimate aim of this study, then, is to propose a model that will be both appropriate 
and useful in Muslim contexts to structure the relationship between religion, the state and 
the public domain: appropriate in as much as it will be sensitive to the particular 
characteristics of Muslim contexts and useful in that it will provide a fresh perspective on 
an issue of contemporary importance. 
 
The study is based on a few key premises and animating ideas.  The first is that there has 
been an unfortunate and ultimately misleading dichotomy that has become prevalent in 
Muslim contexts suggesting that the only options available to society with respect to a 
public role for religion are between becoming a theocracy on the one hand, or a kind of 
                                                 
7  Carter (1993) at 18. 
  11anti-religious secular state on the other.  This dichotomy is false because the available 
options are not necessarily diametrically opposed and presenting them as such deals too 
simply with the idea of the secular, which, while it is not always a clear concept (and 
perhaps easier to identify than define), offers much more by way of possibilities than 
simply being defined as ‘anti-religious’.  Indeed, by looking at the development of the 
term ‘secular’ we will see that, while it may define an ‘areligious’ space, this does not 
mean it defines an ‘anti-religious’ space.  A secular context within which religion might 
operate robustly is a viable option.  And it has reasons to commend itself. 
 
Second, it will be argued that Muslim contexts have particular characteristics derived 
from a mixture of their historical evolution as well as conceptions of the role and place of 
Islam and its relationship to social and political affairs that distinguish them from other 
contexts, notably from Western Europe and North America.  This means that, as noted 
above, a framework developed for these contexts must take account of these features 
especially in the presentation of options and ideas. However, this does not mean that 
some of the principles and even structures developed in other societies, including in the 
‘West’
8, are of no value and relevance in Muslim contexts. Indeed, quite the contrary is 
the case as this study will show that, though mediated through different cultural lenses 
and historical experiences, there is a substantial commonality of concerns, values and 
aspirations with respect to the relationship of religion, the state and the public life in and 
                                                 
8 I use the term the ‘West’ to denote Western Europe and its ‘successor’ civilisations in North America and 
Australasia etc.  While common enough, this is a problematic term as it implies a certain essential and 
consistent character across this range of countries that is difficult to establish.  As such, I embrace the term 
only grudgingly.  At the same time, if there is as I argue below something to the idea of ‘Muslim contexts’ 
and a sense of ‘family resemblance’, the same might be said of the West. 
  12between Muslim contexts and those of the West (and indeed perhaps of other societies as 
well). 
 
Thirdly, this study assumes that the law plays a critical role in defining the relationship 
between religion, the state and public discourse.  This is because it is through law that 
these relationships will be determined.  For example, constitutional law governs the 
establishment of an official religion and the extent and impact of such an establishment; it 
also determines the provision or limits of rights of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, and freedom of speech, expression or assembly all of which may impact 
religious expression or practice in private and public spheres or in state structures such as 
legislatures and courts.  In short, any framework that is constructed will have its beams 
made of legal timbers. 
 
ii.  The structure 
This study proceeds in three parts.  The first part constructs the theoretical framework for 
the role of religion in public discourse.  I call this framework ‘justice as discourse’.  
Justice as discourse owes much to the work of John Rawls and in particular his Political 
Liberalism, a work which has become a ‘classic’ in positing how we may deal politically 
with diversity.  Specifically, justice as discourse follows the general contours of a 
‘liberal’ outlook for which Rawls is considered a major theorist.  Liberal theory, 
however, has many more voices than just that of Rawls and in the end I do not adopt a 
fully Rawlsian perspective but rather consider responses and critiques of Rawls, notably, 
but not exclusively, those of Jurgen Habermas and Paul Weithman in the formulation of 
  13the position of justice as discourse.   The essential departure of justice as discourse from 
Rawls (and also from Habermas) is that it removes the restrictions that each of these 
thinkers would apply – albeit in different ways – on reasoning coming from a religious 
basis in public debate and discussions.  On the contrary, justice as discourse, while 
conscious of the challenges that arise with unshared reasons confronting each other in 
public deliberations, argues that it is only in embracing the right of all reasons to be 
expressed in their own terms, no matter how divisive they may be that we can fully 
realise our plurality – a key goal of liberal theory.  The discussion of these issues takes 
place in chapter one.  Chapter two continues to elaborate justice as discourse, though now 
not against the other theoretical alternatives but rather conceptually and in particular with 
respect to the concept of the ‘secular’, which is discussed at some length.  As this chapter 
makes clear, justice as discourse does rest on having a secular state but the secularity that 
it invokes must be understood in a way that is different from its most common meaning 
of being ‘anti-religious’.  Chapter two also describes the non-secular politics that justice 
as discourse envisage, and the space it allows for religiously-based reasons and 
discussions to impact decision-making and general political exchanges. 
 
With the theoretical framework constructed, the second part of this study, chapters three 
and four, then turns to an elaboration and analysis of ‘Muslim contexts’.  This term is 
somewhat unusual and indeed the very idea of looking at Muslim contexts per se requires 
elaboration and some justification.  I begin by explaining what I mean by Muslim 
contexts and why this category of analysis – which after all encompasses a vast diversity 
of peoples and societies – makes sense.  Most of the effort of these chapters, and 
  14especially of chapter three, however, is devoted to an interpretive and analytical reading 
of the history of these contexts and, in particular, the religio-legal heritage which 
permeates Muslim contexts.  Significantly, a distinction is made between the loci of 
religio-legal authority and political authority in Muslim history, and the interpretational 
diversity which has characterised Muslim history since its early days is emphasised.  As 
these chapters illustrate, the consequences of these two observations, in short, is that 
attempts to speak in ‘Islamic’ terms are disingenuous at best and misleading at worst and 
thus that any theorising for Muslim contexts must recognise as central to their heritage 
the de facto separation between political and religio-legal authority on the one hand and 
the plurality of religio-legal opinions on the other hand.  In chapter four, the largely 
historical analysis is brought into a more contemporary focus as the discussion explores 
attitudes in Muslim communities today. 
 
Finally, the third part of the study seeks to illustrate how and why the liberal framework 
of justice as discourse is useful in light of the heritage and contemporary reality of 
Muslim contexts.  While the overall argument that justice as discourse, qua a variety of 
liberal theory, represents a desirable model for Muslim contexts is developed and 
suggested throughout parts one and two, it is in part three – chapter five – that I try to 
finalise the argument.  I emphasise here how and why the theory of part one fits the 
contexts elaborated in part two.  This uniting chapter thus both completes the analysis 
and finalises the argument.  The final argument presented in this study can be stated 
simply: a framework built from liberal theory is the appropriate model for structuring the 
relationship between religion, the state and the public sphere for Muslim contexts 
  15because it both suits the division between religio-legal and political authority which has 
developed in these contexts as well as, and more importantly, the plurality of 
interpretations in these contexts.  At the same time, a particular version of liberal theory 
is emphasised, which gives due space and scope to the expression of religious reasons in 
public discourse, which, it is argued, is important for societies with a Muslim heritage. 
 
iii.  The approach 
All of the above enables the construction of a model that, it is hoped, will be seen as 
appropriate to Muslim contexts in particular (though it may have relevance for other 
contexts as well).  The framework creates a discursive space that will allow the 
expression of religion (whether Islam or any other) and respect its importance to 
individuals and to communities in a way which allows open discourse between those of 
faith (in all their varying interpretations), and those of no faith.  I locate this discursive 
space in politics writ large, by which I mean national political debates and processes 
whether in parliaments, the media, the academy or civil society where public issues are 
discussed and debated -- in short in the public sphere.  In this way, the approach defended 
in this work neither succumbs to the marginalisation and exclusion of religious voices, 
nor, on the contrary, allows public life be driven entirely by religion.  At the heart of the 
enterprise is a similar process: a discursive political sphere open to foundational and 
normative input coming from various sources, including religion, while the state stands 
independent from any particular religious tradition.  Religion is allowed to express itself 
politically in the public sphere, but is kept separate both formally and institutionally, 
from the state and the state’s capacity to act coercively. 
  16 
iv.  The contribution 
Some may ask if the formula advanced in this study covers any new ground.  Is it not the 
case, it might be claimed, that existing structures already allow this?  If we look at the 
United Kingdom, for example, is it not the case that we have a secular state on the one 
hand as well as a public sphere that is open enough to a range of voices, including for 
those who wish to raise the voice(s) of religion?  Indeed, might the same not be said for 
several societies in Western Europe, or for Canada, the US, and Australia?  Is it then the 
case that what is merely being done is to ground this model in a Muslim framework, to 
make explicit that its threads are also found, or at least findable, in Muslim experiences? 
 
In light of the challenges articulated above that face Muslim contexts, elaborating a 
theory that will fit these contexts and analysing the heritage of these contexts to make this 
argument is, however, to make a contribution.  I refer in the title of this study and below 
to (re)imagination and I use this phrase deliberately to make two points: first, that what 
this study is doing is not presenting  these issues for the first time in Muslim history but 
rather considering them in a fresh way and in light of contemporary discourses.   Second, 
that what is proposed here is a possibility for re-imagining Muslim contexts which has 
much to commend itself practically, even if it is not reflected in current reality.  This 
contribution also points to the limits of this study.  The framework and principles 
articulated here are developed in general terms, not in terms of a specific country and 
their particular application will require a nuanced and sensitive adjustment to the specific 
circumstances of any one country or society.    Just as liberal theory is a moving form, so 
  17also is the digestion of the heritage of Muslim contexts and this points to the on-going 
evolution of political land legal norms in these contexts as well as outside of them.  That, 
however, is as it should be. 
  18Chapter 1.  Liberal theory I: Developing the concept of ‘justice as discourse’ 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical perspective that can be a useful normative 
framework for identifying the role of religion in public political discourse and its impact 
on the making of law in Muslim contexts.  This perspective will be a type of ‘liberal 
theory’.  I put this term in quotations because, as will be seen below, this phrase 
represents not so much a position as a range of positions, albeit a range that is united by 
certain concerns and normative principles and, more loosely, by certain specific views.  
The first part of this chapter thus critically discusses a range of liberal outlooks to distil 
and construct from them a version (since it can only be a version) of liberal theory upon 
which I will rely for the remainder of this study:  a set of principles which I call ‘justice 
as discourse’.   
 
In the chapter to follow, I draw out the implications of these principles for the 
relationship of religion to the state, to civil society, to and for general political discourses 
and in relation to law and law-making.  Justice as discourse also implies a version of a 
secular state to a certain extent and what this means will also be discussed in the next 
chapter.  Together these two chapters provide the theoretical framework for my project.  
In subsequent chapters I explain and justify why I believe a framework based on liberal 
theory is an appropriate framework for political and legal realms Muslim contexts. 
 
 
  191.1  The challenge of diversity: liberal theory’s normative commitment  
John Rawls noted that a modern society: 
…is characterized not simply by a pluralism of…comprehensive 
doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  No one of these doctrines is affirmed by 
citizens generally.   Nor should one expect that, in the foreseeable future, 
one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever been affirmed 
by all or nearly all citizens.
9 
 
By ‘comprehensive doctrines’, Rawls means doctrines that cover “…all 
recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system.”
10  
In other words, it is Rawls’ contention that we live in modern societies defined by 
a diversity of worldviews or basic outlooks. 
                                                
 
One of the key sources of comprehensive doctrines is religion.  Indeed, it is 
religious (as well as philosophical and moral) doctrines that Rawls has in mind 
when he talks about comprehensive doctrines.  While for analytical purposes 
religious comprehensive doctrines may be treated in the same manner as other 
comprehensive doctrines, the discussion below will focus on religious convictions 
and differences for two reasons; firstly, because to talk about Muslim contexts is 
to talk of contexts defined in religious terms and because of a religious heritage. 
In the chapters that follow I discuss the problematic of such definitions and why I 
believe, notwithstanding these problems, that one can reasonably talk about 
‘Muslim contexts’.  The second reason for focussing upon religious 
 
9 Rawls (1993) at xvi. 
10 Rawls (1993) at 152, n17.  The definition of comprehensive doctrines in n17 goes on to say: “…whereas 
a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises a number of non-political values and virtues 
and is rather loosely articulated.” 
  20comprehensive doctrines is because Muslim communities today face critical 
issues of the place in their societies of religious outlooks and religious law. 
 
While seemingly stated as a matter of descriptive fact, Rawls’s characterisation of a 
modern society also contains a challenge.  The challenge is one of recognising pluralism, 
which Christopher Beem has called the central political problem for liberal-democratic 
regimes.  Recognising pluralism means, Beem notes, that society can no longer be 
organised around any one conception of the good.
11  The launching point for liberal 
theory is the fact of our diversity as to matters of values and principles and a willingness 
to accept this diversity.  The commitment to respecting diversity and embracing pluralism 
is a key component of a liberal outlook and represents the essential, normative, 
commitment of liberal theory. 
  
Thus, the central liberal question is, as Rawls has stated: 
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines?  This is a problem of political justice, not 
about the highest good.
12 
 
As a short hand, we might refer to this as the challenge of diversity.  
 
The first step in addressing this challenge of diversity is recognising the fact of the 
irreducible pluralism of comprehensive doctrines.  A democratic polity must find a way 
of choosing a course to follow from among the range of different principles, perspectives, 
values and opinions coming from comprehensive doctrines that may exist among its 
                                                 
11 See Beem (1998) at 16. 
12 Rawls (1993) at xxv. 
  21people.  The question is how this might be done given that the outlooks of citizens may 
be based on incompatible comprehensive doctrines.  In other words, how can we seek to 
develop some consensus out of possible incompatibility?  And, if we cannot develop 
consensus, then how should decisions be made and directions chosen? 
 
More directly for our purposes we may ask how and to what extent different outlooks 
coming from different religious traditions should be allowed to influence decisions about 
public policy.  This is an issue of particular relevance at this moment because, as José 
Casanova has demonstrated, the (re)emergence of religion into issues of public 
importance and of public debate, and of political choices, is a widespread phenomenon.  
It is Casanova’s thesis, in fact, that religions are no longer accepting their confinement to 
the private realms of life and are seeking to play a more robust role in public affairs.  
Casanova calls this the deprivatisation of religion and finds examples of it in different 
locations around the world.
13  
 
Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff have also identified the question of religion’s 
political role as both fundamental and intractable in contemporary societies. They say: 
The relation between religion and politics is a perennial concern of political 
philosophy, but it has never been more important than it is now…There is a 
growing conviction that religious ideals should play a larger role in leading 
modern societies through the crises of our age, and there is – sometimes 
among the same people – a widespread fear that the religious zeal of some 
may abridge the freedom of others.
 14 
 
                                                 
13 Casanova (1994).  See generally and at 3 and 66. 
14 Audi and Wolterstorff (1997) at ix. 
  22Incompatibility is not, therefore, restricted to the incompatibility of different religious 
doctrines or convictions, though it does include different religious convictions as sources 
of comprehensive doctrines, but includes also the potential incompatibility of religion 
with secular space.  Religion may thus be seen as a particular genre of comprehensive 
doctrine and addressed as such. 
 
1.1.1  Liberal  and theological responses 
Audi and Wolterstorff have outlined two broad approaches to identifying the role of 
religious convictions in public debate.  One view they call the ‘liberal’ view; the other 
they call the ‘theologically oriented’ position.  Each of these will be discussed in turn, 
beginning with the liberal view. 
 
It is simple but not inaccurate to say that at the heart of the liberal view, is the idea that 
religion and politics should be separated institutionally.
15  This is not to say that citizens 
of religious conviction must resist those convictions impacting their political views, but 
rather it asks for citizens’ public political participation to be separated from their (by 
implication, private) religious convictions. 
 
The mainstream liberal answer to the question of diversity, therefore, is essentially two-
fold. On the one hand, doctrines that are unreasonable because they are socially 
deleterious must be excluded.  More interesting, however, is the case of diversity of 
reasonable doctrines.  Here standard form liberalism takes the position that in the face of 
diversity, it is not reasonable to expect others to support reasons (let alone positions) 
                                                 
15 This view of liberalism is expressed, for example, by Kause (2008) at 1-2. 
  23coming from one’s own religious tradition and therefore these arguments need to be 
excluded from public political debate.
16  There are, as we shall see, different institutional 
models that seek to give expression to the liberal theory’s normative commitment to 
pluralism.  Not all of these are always described as ‘liberal’ because they do not all, or 
always, share the view of mainstream liberalism that arguments from religious 
convictions should not be made in public political debate or at least they moderate such 
requirements.  In spite of these practical differences, (most) alternatives to the 
mainstream position, and certainly the alternatives that we will consider herein, still share 
liberal theory’s normative commitment to pluralism and to allowing the full diversity of 
our thoughts and opinions to be expressed, though, because of the limits that are applied, 
not necessarily to shape all of our public decisions.  It is in this important sense that 
‘liberal theory’ can encompass a variety of different institutional positions, which, 
nonetheless may still be labelled as liberal because of their shared ‘committed-to-
pluralism’ perspective.  Audi and Wolterstorff’s distinction between liberal and 
theological positions is thus a distinction not between the normative commitments which 
underlie these positions but rather with the institutional forms that these positions assert. 
 
In its mainstream institutional position, the liberal outlook owes much to the particular 
challenge that religious diversity poses to a modern state.  In his On the Jewish 
Question
17  Marx saw what he called ‘political emancipation’ as the solution to the 
tensions that arise when a confessional state has within it religious adherents of another 
faith tradition (in this case German Jews within a Christian state).  Political emancipation 
                                                 
16 Though there is variation on how broad these limits are.  The debate may be just on constitutional 
essentials and matters of justice (themselves contested definitions) or more general issues. 
17 See text available at http://marx.eserver.org 
  24would emerge when “…the state as state emancipates itself from religion by 
emancipating itself from state religion – that is to say by the state not professing any 
religion, but on the contrary asserting itself as a state.”  In saying this, Marx further 
recognised that “It is possible for the state to have emancipated itself from religion even 
if the overwhelming majority [of the population] is still religious.  And the overwhelming 
majority does not cease to be religious though being religious in private.”  In this 
situation, “Religion is not the spirit of the state…Religion has become the spirit of civil 
society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes…Political 
emancipation is thus the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, 
to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, to a juridical 
person.” The goal of this process of political emancipation is limited to the political 
sphere, it “…neither abolishes the real religiousness of man, nor strives to do so”.  
 
Writing in response to earlier theoretical works, Marx’s work presages two important 
elements of contemporary liberal theory.  First, it identifies the tension that can arise in a 
situation of religious diversity within a population, on the one hand, and religious 
commitments by the state qua state, on the other.  It then distinguishes the solution for 
resolving these tensions from having to affect individual, private, religious belief, which 
can happily remain intact.  In so doing, Marx’s work also makes the point that the 
solution occurs at the ‘political’ level – i.e., the level of our public affairs -- by separating 
out individual religious convictions from state religious convictions.  As we will see 
below, contemporary liberal theory draws much from these Marxian lines in recognising 
  25tension that religious diversity can engender vis-à-vis the state and positing a ‘political’ 
level solution to this tension. 
 
1.1.2  Rawls’ Political Liberalism 
Perhaps the most prominent contemporary work which discusses and in fact establishes 
the liberal position as a theory of public reasoning is John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. 
 
In answering the liberal question posed above, it is Rawls’ contention that:  
 
…we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of 
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of 
science when these are not controversial…we are not to appeal to 
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines – to what we as 
individuals see as the whole truth – or to elaborate economic theories of 
general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute.
18 
 
This outlook has been called the ‘standard approach’
19 of liberalism. 
 
Rawls argues that we need to rely on a particular type of reasoning in public life that he 
calls ‘public reason.’  Since our comprehensive doctrines are various and varied, Rawls 
posits that they cannot be endorsed by citizens generally and as such cannot serve as the 
basis for our decisions.  What we need instead is a way to determine another basis for 
society and for this we require a type of reasoning that does not rely on our 
comprehensive doctrines.  This is the core element and distinguishing feature of ‘public 
reason’.  Public reason would deal with matters that are public inasmuch as they would 
be matters that have broad effect.  For Rawls, these matters include what he calls 
                                                 
18 Rawls (1993) at 224.  See also Rawls (1997). 
19 This is a phrase used by Paul Weithman.   See Weithman (2002). 
  26constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice including the basic structure of a 
society’s main political, economic and social institutions and how they fit together.
20  
Public reason would address these public matters through principles and values that are 
independent from comprehensive doctrines, and that are principles and values that all 
citizens can endorse. 
 
Rawls explains that public reason is public in three ways: (i) it is the reason of citizens as 
such and thus the reason of the public; (ii) its subject is the public good, and; (iii) its 
nature and content is public being given by society’s conception of the public good and 
conducted on a open basis.
21 At the heart of the idea of public reason is the understanding 
of the democratic premise that all citizens have the right to participate equally in deciding 
the directions of the polity;  public reason is the exercise, as a collective body, of final 
political and coercive power over one another.
22  Rawls’ public reason applies to citizens 
when they are engaging in public fora and advocating politically or to those, such as 
candidates for public office, who engage in public political debate.  The demands of 
public reason do not encompass considerations of political questions that we might 
undertake personally or those that are conducted by members of an association, or in 
universities or religious organisations (Rawls refers to ‘churches’ but this would of 
course apply to other religious organisations as well).  In all of these elements of ‘civil 
society’, as it is known, it is perfectly acceptable to use non-public reasons and Rawls 
recognises and acknowledges that these non-public reasons will exist as the basis of 
actions.  Public reason is thus a particular type of reason that Rawls would have us use 
                                                 
20 Rawls (1993) at 11. 
21 Rawls (1993) at 213. 
22 Rawls (1993) at 214. 
  27when we engage in political discussions touching on subjects in the ‘domain of the 
political’ when we discuss these in public fora.   
 
The boundaries of public reason are drawn in this manner because of the concern about 
how we make decisions in common and with decisions that affect us collectively.   Where 
the line is drawn between actions that affect and do not affect others is of course highly 
contestable.   In an apparent effort to allow as much of our different and very particular 
views of the good life to be realisable in how we live on a day-to-day basis, Rawls 
circumscribes the boundary around the ‘political’ at a minimal level.   He does not mean 
to restrict us holding preferences or acting out of particular motivations when these do 
not have general impact and general effect on others.  Thus, we can have our associations 
and our communities and act within them and out of motivations that, on Rawls’ theory, 
we should not be allowed to bring into the political level.  This in turn means that Rawls’ 
theory seeks to allow, as much as it deems possible, for our plurality – especially in our 
diverse conceptions of the good life – to be given wide expression at many levels of our 
existence.  It is thus a pluralism enhancing theory inasmuch as we must constrain 
ourselves only when we seek to make claims that are applicable to all of us collectively.  
Thus Rawls presents public reason as a mechanism for achieving what he calls a political 
conception of justice which rests on the above two noted vectors, namely: (i) it is political 
because it applies to political, social and economic institutions, and; (ii) it is freestanding 
because it is not presented or derived from a comprehensive doctrine.  To these Rawls 
add a third vector, which is that (iii) the content of the political conception is expressed in 
  28terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society. 
 
In fairness to Rawls’ argument, and for analytical purposes, it is important to note here 
that Rawls is addressing himself to a modern constitutional democratic society and a 
modern democratic state, indeed, some may say particularly to the United States.  The 
question of the generalisabilty of Rawls’ framework – and of the liberal position more 
generally – to other contexts that may not reflect the standards of a modern constitutional 
democracy is not something that he explicitly addresses. 
 
Rawls’ framework is premised on ascribing to people two moral powers: first, a capacity 
for a sense of justice, and; second, a capacity for a conception of the good.  These two 
moral capacities make it important to recognise and respect each other’s individual 
sovereignty and rights of participation in political deliberation - precisely because we all 
have the capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good.  That is to say that 
Rawls’ ascription provides a philosophical grounding and explanation for the equal 
sovereignty through equal political participation that democracy provides for all of its 
citizens.  This connects to the concern about comprehensive doctrines in that, as we shall 
see more fully below, because we all have these moral powers, Rawls believes that we 
must all be allowed to exercise them by being able to understand public political speech, 
and we can only do this if it is not premised on comprehensive doctrines that we do not 
share or fully understand.  Rawls’ claim here is ontological: it is about human nature and 
a moral capacity inherent in humans as such.  This would apply across human societies 
  29and cultures and is therefore universal even if this capacity is not recognised or indeed 
nurtured by the political order. 
 
Another important element of Rawls argument concerns the realms in which decisions 
must be made.  Rawls distinguishes a well-ordered democratic society from both an 
association and a community.  He posits that democratic societies are closed entities that 
one enters by birth and leaves by death.  Democratic societies are not like associations, 
Rawls asserts, because they are not directed to any final ends or aims.  At the same time a 
democratic society is also distinct from a community in the Rawlsian sense of the term, in 
that unlike a community it has no shared comprehensive doctrine.
23  So, democratic 
society is a significant, but not encompassing, part of our social life and our life-in-
common with others.  And Rawls wants to create rules for decision-making that will 
apply in this sphere but not necessarily in associations or communities, notwithstanding 
that these are also important parts of life.  This is a sphere where citizens do not affirm 
any one reasonable political, religious, philosophical or moral doctrine.  The conception 
of justice, therefore, must be restricted to what is outside of the zones of comprehensive 
doctrine.  Rawls calls this the ‘domain of the political’.  Through public reason we would 
develop values for the domain of the political -- that is to say for the constitutional 
essentials and questions of basic justice, including questions such as ‘Who has the right 
to vote?’ and ‘Which religions should be tolerated by the state?’.  
 
At the heart of Rawls’ theory is this: since we take for granted that in a democratic 
society people can hold a variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines which would 
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  30inform their political views and their conceptions of justice and the good, and since we 
further acknowledge that these comprehensive doctrines, though reasonable, may be 
incompatible, therefore we must not use reasons stemming from any of these doctrines 
(which we can now see as having a ‘personal’ or ‘private’ character) to take political 
decisions because these reasons are not shared by all citizens.  It would be unfair to rely 
on reasons in public fora to which all citizens did not have access, precisely because they 
did not share the comprehensive doctrine(s) that are the basis of these reasons.   Public 
reason therefore requires us to limit ourselves, when we engage in political discussion in 
public, to using only those reasons to which all may have access; these may not be our 
only reasons for our political convictions, indeed, there seems to be a prima facie case for 
saying that they will not be, but they are the only ones we should discuss publicly.   
Political liberalism, which has at its heart the idea of public reason, declares that political 
power, with its potential to coerce us as individuals, is only justifiably exercised when it 
is exercised according to a system which “all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational”.
24  
This, Rawls declares, is the liberal principle of legitimacy.   
 
Clearly, the Rawlsian position and its limitations imposed by public reason entails a 
restriction on the use of religious reasons in public discussions.  Rawls acknowledges 
this.  Knowing that they hold a variety of reasonable but different (to the point of possible 
incompatibility) doctrines, citizens should be willing to explain the basis of their actions 
or convictions in the domain of the political to each other in a language that others might 
                                                 
24 Rawls (1993) at 217. 
  31understand and endorse.  This for Rawls is the duty of civility.
25  The duty is really 
nothing more than the duty to articulate public reasons for our political views, as distinct 
from the many non-public reasons that may otherwise govern our various civil society 
communities, organisations, and associations.  The duty of civility is connected to the 
basis of political legitimacy that requires, in Rawls’ formulation, that on matters of 
constitutional essentials, public policies are justifiable to all citizens.  Thus: 
 
…we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of 
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of 
science when these are not controversial…we are not to appeal to 
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines – to what we as 
individuals see as the whole truth – or to elaborate economic theories of 
general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute.
26 
 
 
This further means that in a democratic system, we must accept that our public political 
life can never be guided by the ‘whole truth’ as we see it, as these larger conceptions 
would come from our various comprehensive doctrines.  So, Rawls’ theory is not about 
how we might choose among, and deliberate about, what we see as ultimate ends – or the 
‘whole truth’ -- but only about how we might reasonably and fairly choose workable 
principles to govern our political interactions and the essentials of our political 
organisation.  It is, to use Rawls’ term, therefore only about ‘political justice’. 
 
1.1.3  Responses to and critiques of Rawls 
                                                 
25 Rawls (1993) at 218. 
26 Rawls (1993) at 224. 
  32Paul J Weithman
27 elaborates in sharper detail the implications of Rawls’ framework 
specifically for the role of religion in the public sphere.  Philosophical liberals who 
advocate the standard (Rawlsian) view see religion as a threat to political stability, having 
the capacity for both political and social disruption as well as for actual political violence.  
Given these concerns, advocates of the standard approach idealise a well-ordered society 
of civility and mutual respect.  To achieve this end, they seek to isolate a set of values 
and principles that reasonable citizens could willingly and publicly endorse.  Religious 
values and principles (qua comprehensive doctrines), are not, as such, members of that 
set of values, because we recognise that these are not shared by everyone in our 
pluralistic political orders.
28 Weithman call this framework the ‘liberalism of reasoned 
respect’, which demands that citizens cooperate on the basis of reasons they can publicly 
endorse to one another – that is to say, that are not dependent upon a comprehensive 
doctrine.  It demands that public reason is conducted on this basis so that each citizen can 
understand and therefore respect the arguments made by others as well as the 
conclusions, in the form of policy and principle that result from deliberations conducted 
in this way.  Liberalism of reasoned respect posits that respect for each other requires 
social cooperation based on terms that citizens can accept based on their common 
reason.
29  To argue from any position or perspective that a fellow citizen cannot 
reasonably be expected to support is not to respect other citizens, and there is a concern 
that a lack of respect may result in political and civil strife and imperil a well-ordered 
society.  Given the fact of plurality, it is not reasonable to expect others to support 
reasons (let alone positions) coming from one’s own religious tradition and therefore 
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  33these arguments should not be made in public political debate.  This, as Weithman says, 
is liberalism’s conclusion.  Nicholas Wolterstorff describes liberalism as not being one 
position but rather a family of positions, but agrees with Weithman that all of the 
positions within the family propose a restraint on the use of religious reasons in deciding 
and deliberating about political issues in public.
30  What distinguishes the individual 
positions in the family from one another is the severity and scope of the restraint that they 
impose.  In this sense, Rawls’ concern to impose the restraint only for ‘constitutional 
essentials’ and matters of basic justice, is a more moderate version of the restraint 
compared to other possibilities.
31  According to Weithman the form of 
liberalism/liberalism as reasoned respect described above has a basis in the philosophies 
of Kant and Rousseau, with the idea that citizens should treat each other as free and equal 
co-holders of power.
32 
 
The Rawlsian liberal position thus described has, of course, been subjected to critiques, 
especially in how it treats those who have religious convictions. Broadly speaking, these 
evaluations fault the liberal position as being politically undesirable, pragmatically 
unworkable or impractical, and finally as being unfair because it imposes a differential 
burden upon those who have religious views compared to those who do not. 
 
                                                 
30 Audi and Wolterstorff (1997) at 75. 
31 Among the varieties of restraint that Wolterstorff mentions are positions that would apply the restraint to 
private as well as political decision-making, a ban on the use of religions reasoning at all, and a position 
that allows religious reasons only so long as there are other non-religious reasons in support of the same 
position. 
32 Weithman  (1997) at  11.   
  34On undesirability, the liberal position is found to be too restrictive and too restraining on 
those who have deep commitments to comprehensive doctrines, of which religious 
convictions are the prime example.  Jean Bethke Elshtain has expressed this critique: 
One enters political life as a citizen.  But if one also has religious 
convictions, these convictions naturally will inform one’s judgement as a 
citizen.  My religious views help to determine who I am, how I think, and 
what I care about.  This is as it should be…it makes no sense to ask people 
to bracket what they care most deeply about when they debate issues that are 
properly political.
33 
 
 
On this line of argument it is not right that we should force people to leave their deeply 
held convictions, religious or otherwise, aside when it comes to political matters.  And 
yet this ‘idling’ of convictions is exactly what the liberal position requires.
34  In fact, 
liberalism forces us to, as it were, ‘abstract’ ourselves as political actors.
35   
 
Our convictions define what we care about and think, and what we think and care about 
is relevant to our political deliberations and choices.  As such, a framework that asks us 
to bracket these cares when we debate and discuss the terms of how we live together 
would lead us to an impoverished politics and thereby a less informed range of policy 
options. 
 
Since religious convictions are the example par excellence of comprehensive doctrines 
the critiques from undesirability can lead easily into a critique of unfairness because it 
imposes a greater burden on those who hold convictions stemming from comprehensive 
doctrines than on those who do not.  Those who have religious convictions would be 
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  35required to fashion an independent ‘artificial’ self, cut off from their real cares and 
concerns, in order to interact in the public area.  Those who do not have religious 
convictions (or convictions coming from another form of comprehensive doctrine) 
however, will not have to create a sort of public alter ego separated from their real beliefs 
and selves.  This results in a ‘dignity harm’ befalling those of religious conviction as they 
may feel silenced because they are only able to present truncated forms of themselves in 
the public arena.
36  Forcing this truncation has been described as rights violating
37 since, 
as Weithman says: 
It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in 
our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental 
issues of justice on their religious convictions.  They do not view it as an 
option whether or not to do it.
38  
 
As Jurgen Habermas says reinforcing the point: “A devout person pursues [his or] her 
daily rounds by drawing on belief.  Put differently, true belief is not only a doctrine…but 
a source of energy…and thus nurtures his or her entire life.”
39  The truncation that is 
demanded of those with religious convictions does not affect those without religious 
beliefs (or convictions derived from another type of comprehensive doctrine) because 
there is nothing to truncate; there is no part of them that is cut off. 
 
Another facet of this same line of critique is that the above-described liberal position goes 
too far to achieve its ends: that its remedy is too draconian for the desired outcomes.  If 
the liberal concern is that an argument will not be assented to by everyone because of the 
                                                 
36 See the discussion of ‘dignity harm’ in Perry (1991) and in Sanford Levison’s review of this work in 
Levinson (1992) at 2077. 
37 See Audi and Wolterstorff (1997) at 116. 
38 Weithman (2002) at 157 (emphasis in original). 
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  36plurality that is manifest in society, or to put it more strongly that some might be coerced 
or duped into accepting an argument that they do not understand because of the diversity 
of comprehensive doctrines, then would it not be enough to accept difference without 
restricting its expression?  Sanford Levison casts this critique in terms that specifically 
address arguments coming from a religious basis when he says: 
...why doesn’t liberal democracy give everyone an equal right, without 
engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or her 
arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the 
arguments should they be unpersuasive?...[I]t seems enough for those of us 
who are secular to disagree vigorously with persons presenting 
theologically-oriented views of politics.  To suggest as well that they are 
estopped from presenting such arguments seems gratuitously censorial 
rather than wise.
40 
 
The critique presented here is that the need for reasonable debate and deliberation of 
public political matters should not necessitate the eradication of religious speech (qua 
speech from a comprehensive doctrine) in public life as this too hastily precludes the 
possibility of an intelligible public discourse including religious speech.  In fact, what 
happens is that this possibility is adjudged untenable before it is tried.  The restriction is 
too strong in two senses: first, because it imposes, in advance, a limitation on those of 
religious conviction that may be more than what is required for intelligible public 
political debate; and second, because it may thereby overly constrain and censor our 
public political life generally -- this type of censorship being anathema whose imposition 
should be permitted only when strictly necessary.
41 
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41 As Lawrence Solum has stated: “There is wide agreement that government should not censor public 
debate about politics, at least not without very good reasons.”  Solum (1993) at 729. 
  37The classical liberal response to this three-fold critique is itself three-fold.  To the claim 
that public political debate is being undesirably constrained, the liberal retort is that it is 
not reasonable to expect that arguments coming from religion, or more likely from any 
one any particular religious perspective, will be accepted by others not sharing this 
perspective, nor that they will be comprehensible in a way that would allow for 
meaningful public political debate and engagement with the issues.  To the charge that 
religious reasons are being unfairly singled out for particular restriction and thus that a 
special burden is being placed on those of religious conviction, Rawls would also add 
another defence, namely that public reasons are not equivalent to secular reasons.   
Reasons from non-religious comprehensive doctrines, e.g., philosophical comprehensive 
doctrines, could be without any religious basis but they would not be public reasons, 
precisely because they rest on comprehensive doctrines.
42  So suggesting that the 
classical liberal position accepts all secular reasons and only excludes religious reasons 
would be an unfair charge based on an erroneous understanding of the claim.  Indeed, 
liberalism’s ‘censorship’ that Levison talks about is broader, but it must be made clear 
that it is not based on a purging of the religious in favour of the secular in a simplistic 
way.  The liberal position may purge (or censor) but it does this to reasons derived from 
religious and secular comprehensive doctrines alike.  Finally, to the argument that it is 
impossible or at least impractical for those holding religious views to leave these aside 
when they come to public political debate, the response is that this is necessary under 
ideal conditions to make these reasons accessible to all. 
 
                                                 
42 Rawls (1997) at 775. 
  38These critiques highlight potential problems in the balance that Rawls’ theory sought to 
achieve between our diversity on the one hand and a generally comprehensible public 
political debate on the other.  They suggest, in short, that when it comes to religious 
convictions a more fine tuned balancing will be required – and one more accommodating 
of religion’s public role.    
 
The above arguments do not, however, exhaust the range of concerns about Rawls’ 
theory.  Another major concern with the Rawlsian liberal position is that the social threat 
that this position sees from religious speech being allowed into the public square is 
exaggerated, or at least is not worth defending with the types of restrictions that the 
liberal position requires.  
 
We can recall that a chief concern of the liberal position is social stability in the face of 
the divisive potential of diversity.  Focussing on religious language, this critique argues 
that it is wrong to see religious language as (any) more threatening to the social order 
than language coming from other sources about which people may disagree.  Wolterstorff 
points out that there has been, and is political passion from arguments over the welfare 
state, which, he might have added, has certainly been divisive.  Moreover, in terms of 
actual political violence, the twentieth century has seen great brutality stemming from the 
non-religious doctrines of nationalism, communism and fascism, so it can hardly be said 
that religious doctrines represent a greater threat or indeed that they are especially 
marked out as zones of political violence.  On the other hand, Abolitionists in the US as 
well as the US civil rights movement, both of which had strong faith-based components 
  39and faith-based leaders have contributed to creating the human rights focus and rights 
based anchors of modern liberalism, as have other faith-based movements resisting 
communism (e.g., Solidarity in Poland) and apartheid in South Africa.  Of course there 
has also been political violence which has come with religious motivations.  We can 
recall with a shudder the so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ that took place in the former 
Yugoslavia where mainly Catholic Christian Croats, mainly Orthodox Christian Serbs 
and mainly Muslim Bosnians turned on each other, as well as the attacks that have been 
and are perpetrated by the entity or entities that operate under the banner of al-Qaeda.  
This, however, only shows that political violence can emerge from a variety of sources, 
religious and non-religious.  This suggests that there is no particular risk from religiously 
inspired political violence as opposed to non-religiously inspired political violence.  And 
this therefore further suggests that there is no especial or particular threat that religion 
poses to peaceful political stability. 
 
Of course, defenders of the liberal position may point out that their concern is not with 
religion to the exclusion of other comprehensive doctrines.  If, for example, communism 
is an example of a philosophical comprehensive doctrine, then citing the risks it poses in 
terms of political violence, or pointing out that it can engender the same types of risk as 
religious based doctrines only strengthens the argument that all of these types of 
comprehensive doctrines should be kept away from public political debate – precisely 
what the Rawlsian liberal model proposes.  Such a defence is vulnerable to the same logic 
behind the ‘undesirability’ critique: namely that it would leave us with an over-sterilised 
politics that in turn would limit the range of policy choices that are generated. 
  40 
A final line of critique attacks the liberal position from the other end.  The restraint 
imposed on reasons from comprehensive doctrines -- and the very idea of public reason – 
posits that by excluding comprehensive doctrines we might develop a reasoning that is 
accessible to all citizens and thereby that forms a reasonable, and indeed the only fair, 
basis for public political debate.  Through this one will achieve free and willing assent to 
a political consensus -- what Rawls called an ‘overlapping consensus -- and therefore to a 
stable society.
43  By an overlapping consensus Rawls means a consensus that is at the 
same time affirmed by holders of different, opposing religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines
44, but that is not formulated in terms of general, comprehensive religious, 
philosophical or moral doctrines but rather in terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas 
viewed as latent in the public political culture of democratic society.
45  Importantly, 
Rawls does not see an overlapping consensus as simply a modus vivendi.  He argues that 
it is a moral conception even though those who produce it may do so from different 
(philosophical, moral and religious) grounds.
46  However, in recognising the fact of 
plurality we have recognised that we have fundamentally different understandings of the 
‘whole truth’ and visions of the good life.  How then can we be so confident that we can 
develop out of this diversity common accessible reasons?  As Weithman points out, the 
claim that we can have common accessible reasons stems from a conviction that we share 
common rational capacity, and the claim that we must have common accessible reasons 
stems from the conviction that it is this common capacity that gives us our dignity.  In 
                                                 
43 See Rawls (1987) at 4-5, and the discussion of what an overlapping consensus consists of in Rawls 
(1997). 
44 Rawls (1987) at 1. 
45 Rawls (1987) at 6. 
46 Rawls (1987)  at 11. 
  41short it “answers our desire for community within pluralism” inasmuch as it supposes 
that we can be held together by mutual respect for one another’s reasons.
47  Laudable and 
comforting as this desire may be it rests on a contradiction in proposing that out of (a 
potentially incompatible) plurality of doctrines, we can find a commonly accessible 
reasoning.  Weithman argues that accessibility is hardly self-explanatory and indeed, that 
accessible reasons cannot plausibly be set out, such that: 
The pluralism to which I have pointed throughout the book entails that there 
are unlikely to be shared grounds for the faith in liberal democracy and 
common humanity that Rawls hopes to vindicate…In a pluralistic society, 
citizens will also have very different reasons for believing that human 
beings have a moral nature.  Yet they may have little to do with the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus or citizens’ responsiveness to public 
or accessible reasons.
48 
 
If indeed we cannot hope to find shared grounds out of, or precisely because of, the very 
plurality that liberals acknowledge, then it is doubtful that we can find a fair (might we 
even say workable?) method of deliberation on public political issues.  Absolute 
certainty, however, eludes us here, as we cannot be sure whether we will be able to 
achieve accessible reasons or not.  Rawls conceded: “Whether justice as fairness (or some 
similar view) can gain the support of an overlapping consensus so defined is a speculative 
question.”
49     It is thus worth distinguishing between the reasons that may be brought to 
public reasoning, which Rawls and classical liberal theory restrict, and the deeper moral 
values that engender commitment to the political order.  The latter may indeed arise from 
comprehensive doctrines, including religious influences.  A believer may thus have deep 
reasons for her political values but can only appeal to the ‘thin’, non-religiously grounded 
reasons, in public discussion.  If we are not certain about the possibility of realising 
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  42actual reasons out of this process, we are also not sure that we cannot and thus we have to 
guard against Weithman’s scepticism as well.  Doubt, however, does no favours to 
principles that advocate social and political arrangements. 
 
The critiques of Rawls’ theory suggest that noble though its goals are, the theory has not 
fully realised it aims with respect, in particular, to religious convictions.  Out of a desire 
for a neutral and shared public reason, the Rawlsian answer has so curtailed the capacity 
of religious convictions to speak that those who hold them may not find a respectable 
place in public political debate from which they feel they actually can participate.   
Without this being attained Rawlsian liberalism becomes exclusionary and limiting, 
rather than pluralism enhancing.  On the other hand, the hope that we might find 
community in pluralism seems to be too uncertain a prospect; it remains a hope but its 
practical achievability admits of no guarantees.  Other options, however, have been 
presented that either rest on different principles to Rawls or that seek to reconstitute 
‘liberal theory’ to overcome the critiques of Rawls. 
 
 
1.2  Alternatives to Rawls’ theory 
1.2.1 Theologically-oriented  positions 
Just as there are varieties of the liberal position, so that Wolterstorff could describe it as 
not so much one position but as a  ‘family of positions’, there is also a family of positions 
in the alternative.  As we noted above, Audi and Wolterstorff refer to the alternative as 
the ‘theologically oriented’ position, or we might now say, family of positions.  Using the 
  43term ‘theological’ may, however, be less than ideal as it suggests that the alternatives are 
connected to the complexities of theology (as this exists within many religious 
traditions).  That is not really the case.  The alternatives are not about a particular 
theological position nor do they argue from any particular theological principles or 
sources.  Instead, we might see the alternative to the liberal position as ‘religiously-
oriented’ or even more modestly as a ‘more religiously oriented’ position than the 
classical or standard liberal position(s).   
 
In these “theological alternatives”, the ‘problem’ we are trying to solve remains the same.  
The issue is the challenge of diversity within a democratic framework and how we can go 
about making decisions about political principles and practices confronted with a 
plurality of views about fundamentals.  In this, the theological position shares the 
essential liberal concern to respect and embrace our diversity.  It is important to keep in 
mind that we are addressing the same challenge and not  that the religiously oriented 
position is seeking to advance the concerns of any particular religious tradition or 
theological stand to change our political structure.  There may be more concern with how 
those of religious conviction can participate in politics, and for the appropriate role that 
religious believers can play, but this is a political concern, not a theological concern per 
se.  It remains a question of what is politically fair.  Indeed, we may frame our question 
in these terms.  Rawls asked: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines?”, to which we may add “And what is the appropriate 
place for  religious convictions as part of answering this first question?”  This position is 
  44concerned to relax or to even remove the restrictions that the Rawlsian liberal position 
places on the use of religious argument in public political debate and deliberation. There 
does not, however, seem to be one locus classicus of the alternative ‘religiously oriented’ 
position like Rawls’ Political Liberalism is for the liberal position.    This may be 
because the religiously-oriented position has developed as a response to the liberal 
position, and perhaps especially to Rawls’ articulation of it. We will, therefore, proceed 
by examining different variations of the ‘theological (or, better, religiously-oriented) 
position. 
 
 
Before examining some these alternative models, however, we must first explore one idea 
that may divide the classical liberal and alternative positions.   This has to do with how 
democracy is conceived.  The liberal model laid great emphasis on democracy being a 
relationship of free equals and was concerned, as we saw above, that a theory of political 
deliberation maintained our mutual equality and freedom vis-à-vis each other.  Thus, 
anything that compromised our capacities to interact with each other in freedom, (for 
example, any coercion), or equitably, (for example, any argument that we could not 
understand as well as others) was prima facie anathema to the liberal position.  Rather, 
liberal theory is often about justifying coercion but on the basis of a respect of the free 
and equal nature of others.  Democracy so conceived rests on these free and equal 
interactions and through them fulfils its promise of decisions being made by and for the 
people.  Ultimately then, democracy is about how we co-operate in reaching political 
decisions. 
  45 
However, there is a different view of democracy as aggregative that sees democracy as a 
competition of interests in which different ideas are floated by individuals or groups 
seeking to achieve interests they believe in or desire.  It is these beliefs and desires that 
are pursued as the ends, not a situation of freedom or equality.  On this view, I would be 
concerned about whether you accepted my point of view morally, but, ultimately, what 
matters is that we freely agree on outcomes, not reasons.  Of course, this does not licence 
actual coercion, such as physical coercion, nor an overt violation of equality, like giving 
some citizens less of a vote than others, but it does treat individuals as having to, and by 
implication being able to, fend for themselves in a competition of interests.  So, ideas and 
principles will be articulated in a ‘self-interested’ way inasmuch as their advocates will 
want these ideas to be realised and these principles to be accepted.  This may be for 
reasons that are personal and parochial or, more generously, because the advocates of the 
ideas will genuinely think these ideas would be best for society.  In any case, however, 
the ideas would be put out into public political debate and in that forum would have to 
compete with all the other ideas.  As people will be able to choose or reject the ideas, by 
supporting or rejecting their advocates for office, say, or supporting or rejecting a 
proposition in a referendum, only those ideas and principles that the majority of the 
people favour will receive democratic sanction.  To win support, advocates of ideas and 
principles will of course have to be pragmatic and present their views in ways that are 
attractive to at least a plurality of the voters.
50  Thus, the principle of political legitimacy 
is the acceptance of an idea or principle by a majority of citizens through a fair electoral 
                                                 
50 Though of course this may not necessarily be to a plurality of the eligible electorate depending on voter 
turn out. 
  46process, rather than political legitimacy resting on the idea of the co-sovereignty of free 
equals. The liberal position was concerned with the potential instability that an 
unregulated competition might engender and the risk of social tension that might result, 
and sought to mitigate these risks through a process that removed the greatest source of 
these tensions from public political debate, particularly at the level of ‘constitutional 
essentials’ which it would want to be defined by ‘overlapping consensus’.  The 
competition framework more readily embraces this potential tension and therefore 
responds to one of the critiques we saw above, namely a (too strong) concern with 
stability.  It also embraces possibilities of argument that the liberal model’s basic 
principles would not admit, because of their concern with political justice.   
 
1.2.2 Wolterstorff’s  consocial  position 
Not every alternative to the liberal position is based on a competition of interests model 
of democracy.  Wolterstorff, for example, presents what he calls the ‘consocial’ position 
that shares the concern with political justice.  It departs from the Rawlsian liberal position 
on two points, however.  First, it gives up the idea of finding an independent source for 
our political language and removes, entirely, the restraint on the use of religious language 
in political deliberation.  Second, it interprets the requirement of the coercive state being 
neutral towards particular religious views to mean not a separation of state and religion (à 
la the classical liberal position), but rather that the state must be impartial to any 
particular religious tradition – that the state must treat them all equally. 
What unites these two [above described] themes is that, at both points, the 
person embracing the consocial position wishes to grant citizens, no matter 
  47what their religion or irreligion, as much liberty as possible to live their lives 
as they see fit.
51  
 
Wolterstorff contends that a limitation on the expression of religious convictions and 
reasons in the ‘public square’ effectively limits freedom of religion and therefore the 
liberty of the religious.  This allies itself with the critique we saw above about the 
supposed neutrality of the liberal position.   
…the liberal assumes that requiring religious people to debate and act 
politically for reasons other than religious reasons is not in violation of their 
religious convictions.  He assumes, in other words, that although religious 
people may not be in the habit of dividing their lives into a religious 
component and a non-religious component, and though some might not be 
happy doing so, nonetheless, their doing so would in no case be a violation 
of their religion.  But he is wrong about this.
52 
 
Wolterstorff’s consocial position while asserting a similar aim to the liberal position, 
namely political justice (rather than a debate over the ‘whole truth’) finds the restraint 
that the liberal position imposes on the use of religious language in the public square 
(which of course the liberal position extends to language coming from other 
comprehensive doctrines as well) to be rights violating instead of rights affirming.  His 
call is then for a dramatic departure from the Rawlsian liberal position viz., lifting all 
constraints off the use of religious language in the public square. 
 
This alternative is therefore the mirror image of Rawls: we neither look for an 
overlapping consensus nor do we, to facilitate such a consensus, impose any limits on 
religious reasoning expressing itself in public.  Yet, the consocial alternative shares the 
seminal liberal goal – namely political justice.  What it does not answer, however, is 
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  48whether its unrestrained voices can resolve themselves into any sort of socio-political 
harmony, or whether the failure to do this is a matter of concern.  Rawls worried about 
our capacity to develop political justice if we cannot understand each other.  The 
legitimacy, or lack thereof, of this concern must be addressed.  
 
1.2.3 Habermas’  refinement 
Jurgen Habermas also presents an alternative to the Rawlsian liberal position, though one 
that might still be considered to hew closer to the Rawlsian rubric because it maintains a 
modified sort of constraint on the use of religious language in the public square.
53  
Habermas points out that the Rawlsian idea of an ethic of citizenship rests on an 
epistemic basis in which: 
 …for all their on-going dissent on questions of world-views and religious 
doctrines [read: ‘comprehensive doctrines’ in Rawls’ language], citizens are 
meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their political 
community…And on that basis of mutual respect when it comes to 
contentious political issues citizens owe one another good reasons for their 
political statements.
54    
 
This is the context in which Habermas notes that Rawls speaks of the duty of civility and 
the ‘public use of reason’ that were outlined above.  The epistemic implication of this 
position is that there can be good reasons that are shared and accessible.  As we saw 
above, this claim is not uncontroversial, however.  Weithman for one questioned a 
common base of human reason that would lead to the potential for the development of 
accessible public reasons.  Laying this objection to the side for a moment, Habermas 
draws out a further implication of the Rawlsian framework, namely that it implies a 
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  49secular state.  He says: “The assumption of a common human reason is the epistemic base 
for the justification of a secular state which no longer depends on religious 
legitimation,”
55 since “In a secular state only those political decisions are taken to be 
legitimate as can be justified in light of generally accessible reasons, vis-à-vis religious 
and non religious citizens and citizens of different religious confessions alike.”
 56  As was 
seen above, Rawls himself would argue that his objection was not to religious reasons per 
se and that he did not accept all secular reasons since any secular reasons from 
comprehensive doctrines would also be restrained on Rawls’ theory.  What Habermas 
appears to be getting at, however, is that because for Rawls public political reasons 
should not include reasons derived from religion there would necessarily be a non-
religious, and in this sense secular, basis for the constitutional fundamentals of the state. 
 
However, in his essay subsequent to Political Liberalism, Rawls seems to relax his 
position by saying: 
 
…reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due 
course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by 
comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support 
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support.
57  
 
This provides the so-called ‘proviso’ in Rawls’ theory for the use of non-public, 
including religious reasons.  Let us note that although Rawls’ position here seems broader 
than the restriction he articulated in Political Liberalism, because it allows the expression 
of reasons that may have been under a blanket ban, it is not allowing these reasons to 
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  50stand alone and, indeed, still appears to find these reasons unacceptable, or inadmissible, 
without their being supported by ‘proper political reasons’ which must be reasons of a 
qualitatively different order because they must be ‘reasons [not] given solely by 
comprehensive doctrines’, including of course, religious doctrines. 
 
It is from here that Habermas’ proceeds to put some clear distance between his position 
that of Rawls, even Rawls with the proviso.  Habermas says: 
We cannot derive from the secular character of the state an obligation for all 
citizens to supplement their public religious contributions by equivalents in 
generally accessible language.  The liberal state must not transform the 
requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue 
mental and psychological burden for all those of its citizens who follow a 
faith…it must not expect them to split their identity in public and private 
components as soon as they participate in public debates.
58 
 
Rawls’ theory, however, even with the proviso, would require a certain split inasmuch as 
citizens would have to come up with other ‘properly political’ reasons for the position 
they take in public discussions.  Habermas’ wider scope for the use of reasons coming 
from religious convictions does not, however, compromise the institutional separation of 
religion and the state – i.e., the state as secular – for which Rawls’ theory provides the 
epistemic basis.  For Habermas, only secular reasons will count “beyond the institutional 
threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries and 
administrations.”  Yet, he argues that “This awareness need not deter religious citizens 
from publicly expressing and justifying their convictions by resorting to religious 
language.”
59  To this, Habermas adds no proviso for additional justification by other 
reasons. 
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What motivates Habermas is a desire to open up political discussion in this informal 
sphere to ideas that might be excluded by Rawls’ theory.  Whereas Rawls worried about 
instability and social tension that could result from plurality, Habermas sees a potential 
benefit in diversity.  The liberal state, Habermas argues: 
 …has an interest of its own in unleashing religious voices in the public 
political sphere, for it cannot know if whether secular society would not 
otherwise cut itself off from key resources for the creating of meaning and 
identity.  Nor is there a good normative reason for an overhasty reduction of 
any polyphonous complexity.
60 
 
Though Habermas does not add a proviso like Rawls’ requiring other non-religious (and 
non-comprehensive doctrine based) justifying reasons in public political debate, he does 
share the concern that the institutional state should not be given over to any one religious 
view.  Thus, Habermas imposes a requirement of ‘translation’ such that: “The truth 
content of religious contributions can enter into the institutionalised practice of 
deliberation and decision-making only if the necessary translation already occurs in the 
pre-parliamentary domain, i.e., in the political public sphere itself.”
61  This burden, 
however, does not just fall on those who would use religious reasons.  Habermas insists 
that non-religious citizens must likewise “…open their minds to the possible truth content 
of those [religious] presentations and even enter into dialogues from which religious 
reasons then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible 
arguments.”
62  This distinguishes Habermas’ view from that of Wolterstorff.   
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  52Wolterstorff’s position drops the Habermasian translation requirement, a fact that 
Habermas himself points out.
63 
 
The translation requirement seeks to prevent the possibility that principles will be decided 
on the basis of the religious convictions of the ruling majority in any state and the 
coercive power of the state then being made the agent of this majority.  Translation then 
would ensure a “fair deliberation” preceding a vote on any particular issue, the fairness 
resting on the fact that, through translation, any religious reasons being presented in the 
institutional setting, i.e., the parliament or legislature, will be available to those who do 
not share the religious convictions the underlie them. 
 
Habermas conceives of the translation requirement involving effort being made by both 
those of religious conviction as well as those without. 
Religious citizens had to learn to adopt epistemic attitudes toward their 
secular environment, attitudes that secular citizens enjoy anyway, since they 
are not exposed to similar cognitive dissonances in the first place.  However, 
secular citizens are not spared a cognitive burden, because secularist 
consciousness does not suffice for the required co-operation with fellow 
citizens who are religious.
64 
 
Habermas, thus, wants to open our public cognitive horizons to include a “self-critical 
assessment of the limits of secular reason” which, he asserts, imposes complementary 
learning processes on both religious and non-religious citizens.
65  This new cognitive 
horizon is a “post-metaphysical thought” that “is prepared to learn from religion while 
remaining strictly agnostic” and that “refrains from the rationalist temptation that it 
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  53[rationalism] can decide which part of the religious doctrines is rational and which part is 
not.”
66  It is also a thought for what he calls “postsecular society”.  This form of society: 
…does more than give public recognition to religious fellowship in view of 
the functional contribution they make to the reproduction of motivations and 
attitudes that are socially desirable.  The public awareness of a post-secular 
society also reflects a normative insight that has consequences for the 
political dealings of unbelieving citizens with believing citizens.  In the 
postsecular society, there is increasing consensus that certain phases of the 
‘modernization of the public consciousness’ involve assimilation and the 
reflexive transformations of both secular and religious mentalities.  If both 
sides agree to understand the secularization of society as a complementary 
learning process, then they will also have cognitive reasons to take seriously 
each other’s contributions to controversial subjects in public debate.
67 
 
Thus, Habermas’ theory wants to inject into our political deliberations potential 
normative challenges that come from taking religious reasons seriously and indeed the 
potential epistemic shifts in our cognitive horizon that may result from this process.  He 
believes that this requires both religious as well as non-religious citizens to engage in an 
opening of their minds to new possibilities and arguments.  As part of this process, 
Habermas would allow religious reasons to enter into some public political debate, 
without the Rawlsian proviso that they must then be accompanied by other reasons not 
resting on the same sources that justify the point for which they are arguing.  Through the 
translation requirement, however, Habermas’ theory continues to impose some restraint 
on the use of religious reasons including in the ‘pre-parliamentary’ public sphere but only 
so as to preserve a difference between our institutional and non-institutional political 
worlds.  The difference is that Habermas draws the line of constraint in different place 
from Rawls.  Therefore, we can still see in Habermas’ theory a focus on the limited zone 
of ‘political justice’.  Habermas must surely believe that the requirement of translation 
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  54can preserve the essential point(s) of the positions that are translated. In this sense, 
translation is merely a facilitative requirement that acts to make the translated points of 
view accessible to those who do no share them.  Although this may be the case in some 
circumstances, we might critique Habermas’ requirement as failing to recognise that the 
process of translation may itself do violence to the positions that have to be translated 
because translation is not simply a mechanical and entirely content-preserving process.
68  
For example, it difficult to imagine that the full range of symbolic and affective meanings 
that a religious believer will have towards their own faith tradition will be translatable to 
someone outside of that faith tradition any more than the linguistic form and beauty of a 
poetic work would be fully translatable into another language.  Our whole truth world 
views may be subject to similar restrictions on translatability.  Habermas may be willing 
to accept that translation may not be perfect and might mean some loss of meaning on 
because he may view the general access to positions that translation will engender to be a 
greater good for which some sacrifice of meaning may be an unfortunate necessity.  This 
point of view, however, is by no means obviously correct on the one hand and, on the 
other hand, there might be other viable political alternatives, as we will see below. 
 
                                                 
68 Paolo Flores d’Arcais makes a related point in his ‘Eleven Theses Against Habermas’ (Flores d’Arcais 
(2009); accessible at www.the-utopian.org/2009/02/000062.html) when he says (at 3) “…that the expected 
translation [of religious reasons into] secular-democratic terms is often impossible.  Such expectation is 
nothing but wishful thinking.”  Habermas replies (Habermas (2009) at 4; accessible at www.the-
utopian.org/2009/02/000063.html):  
 
It is certainly true that any translation of a thought from a religious to a secular language 
must entail a loss of connotations.  To render the idea that human beings were made ‘in the  
image of God’ as ‘human dignity’ is to lose the original connotation of man having been 
‘created’.  Nevertheless. The core of the semantic content need not be lost. (emphasis 
added). 
 
Even if we accept Habermas’s defence, his concession to the ‘loss of connotations’ weakens his position 
and the viability of translation. 
  55Habermas’ outlook, like Rawls’, may be seen to follow the institutional position of the 
‘standard approach’ of mainstream liberal thought because it also insists on a restraint in 
the public use of religious reasons.  But there is a crucial difference between the theories. 
Habermas is concerned that we at least open our ‘whole truth’ frameworks – be they 
secular or religious – to cognitive challenges and that we do not dismiss any arguments -- 
again whether we are religious or not -- without due consideration.  The demand to 
expose our whole truth frameworks to challenges is beyond the Rawlsian position and 
may be seen to represent a different ethical conception absent (at least explicitly) in 
Rawls.   
 
 1.2.4  Weithman’s two propositions 
Paul Weithman’s work on religion in the public sphere seeks to defend propositions that 
are less restrictive than those of Habermas.  Weithman argues for the following two 
propositions: 
Citizens of a liberal democracy may base their votes on reasons 
drawn from their comprehensive moral views, including their 
religious views, provided they sincerely believe that their 
government would be justified in adopting the measures they vote 
for. 
 
and  
 
Citizens in a liberal democracy may offer arguments in public 
political debate which depend upon reasons drawn from their 
comprehensive moral views, including their religious views, 
without making them good by appeal to other arguments – 
provided they believe that their government would be justified 
adopting the measures they favour, and are prepared to indicate 
what they think would justify the adoption of such measures.
69 
 
These two propositions are Weithman’s conditions of responsible citizenship.   
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We can immediately see some of the similarities and differences between Weithman’s 
responsible citizenship and Rawls’ duty of civility.  Like Rawls, there is a concern not to 
be too parochial and thus a requirement that any measures that are proposed are 
considered worthy of government policy generally and, even more importantly, that those 
who would advocate policies or reasons based on (for example) religious views are 
willing to justify the adoption of such policies.  Weithman allows the reliance on and 
expression of religious views without these needing to be ‘made good’ by an appeal to 
other, non-religious, reasons. In contrast to Rawls, however, Weithman allows the 
entrance of reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, including religious doctrines, 
to enter public political debate and for these reasons to stand alone. There is no Rawlsian 
proviso inasmuch as there need not be any other non-comprehensive-doctrines-based 
justifying reasons that citizens must offer.  In addition, there is no requirement that 
reasons offered must be accessible.  To these two differences, Weithman adds a third.  
His first two statements, he claims, allow religion to play a much more prominent role in 
political decision making than does the standard Rawlsian, liberal approach.  In so doing, 
they allow for a type of engagement of religion in the public square that proponents of the 
standard liberal approach would find unacceptable as a violation of the duty of 
citizenship (expressed above as the duty of civility).
70  Neither does Weithman impose 
any Habermasian translation requirement on reasons coming from religious doctrines or 
other comprehensive doctrines.  Here, Weithman is more accommodating than Habermas 
in allowing voting on the basis of comprehensive doctrines reasons, and thereby allowing 
them directly to influence policy and law, without the need to be ‘translated’ first. 
                                                 
70 Weithman (2002) at 131-133. 
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We can also see a continuing Kantian influence in the second part of both of Weithman’s 
propositions.  In both cases, citizens must believe that what they think is right based on 
their own comprehensive doctrines, is right in general terms because they as individuals 
believe, in the first instance, that “government would be justified in adopting the 
measures they vote for” or, in the second instance, that “government would be justified 
adopting the measures they favour, and are prepared to indicate what they think would 
justify the adoption of such measures.”  These two requirements echo two classical 
formulations of the Kantian categorical imperative, namely: “Act only according to that 
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law”; 
and secondly, “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end.”
71  Citizens are obliged to think of others because voting or arguing for 
the adoption of a rule by government would affect all citizens.  Citizens must also believe 
the measures they favour are justified as government action, which again would affect all 
citizens and therefore brings others into focus.  And because others must be taken into 
consideration at all times, Weithman’s principles are premised on the citizens seeing 
government as acting for the common, public good.
72  This in turn means that Weithman 
is concerned with justice at a ‘political level’ – i.e., justice when we act in common. 
   
This will lead in Weithman’s view to something close to a liberal democratic model 
since: “A plausible common interest view for liberal democratic government will require 
                                                 
71  On Kant, see Pasternak (2002) at 64 and at 57.  See also Johnson (2004) accessible at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kant-moral/. 
72 Weithman (2002) at 125. 
  58respect for the rights and liberties traditionally associated with liberal democracy.”
73  So, 
Weithman’s framework is not the ‘competition of interests’ model of democracy because 
that requires only a concern for one’s own interests.  However, it is also different from 
the Rawlsian concern because it believes that we do not know enough “about the morality 
of political decision making in the face of deep disagreements about justice, including the 
morality of majority rule.”
74  The mainstream liberal position seems to adjudge this as 
morally suspect and indeed threatening, but Weithman is not sure. This is why his 
position is open to possibilities of political discourse that other liberal positions would 
reject.  As he says: 
…these conditions make it important to distinguish those whose political 
views we do not like from those who violate their duty as citizens.  There 
may be many citizens who, without violating their duty as citizens, use 
religious and other comprehensive views to argue for political outcomes 
with which we are in deep disagreement.  In that case, we should argue, vote 
and organize coalitions to oppose them.
75 
 
Weithman’s propositions seem to straddle the concern with finding a means to achieve 
‘political justice’ in the Rawlsian sense with a concern for a debate around moral values 
and the ‘whole truth’.  His propositions want to construct principles for political justice 
that will force us to encounter, in the public sphere as we may also privately, what may 
be a diverse array of whole truth claims and to test their moral worthiness.   Michael 
Sandel has articulated a similar perspective: 
                                                 
73 Weithman (2002) at 125. 
74 Weithman (2002) at 216. 
75 Weithman (2002) at  216.  What Weithman is not exactly clear about is where to draw this line – i.e., 
when does someone ‘violate their duty as a citizen ‘ and might the expression of some political views 
(which we should tolerate even if we disagree) amount to such a violation (which we should not tolerate).  
One is also lead to wonder if the dynamic of power and it needs to be taken into account here.  Not all 
voices are necessarily equally empowered: the better financed and better socially positioned, and even 
better educated, may have more powerful voices.  This is discussed further in chapter five. 
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will make us like it less.  But the respect of deliberation and engagement 
affords a more spacious public reason than liberalism allows.  It is also a 
more suitable ideal for a pluralist society.  To the extent that our moral and 
religious disagreements reflect the ultimate plurality of human goods, a 
deliberative mode of respect will better enable us to appreciate the 
distinctive goods our different lives express.
76 
 
Both Sandel and Weithman, thus, want politics to be a debate about truth and moral 
values and want truth and moral values to be a part of political debate.  Even though there 
is a concern with political justice as such, this is not to be separated from a concern with 
interrogating and debating claims about the whole truth.  This moves fairly considerably 
from Rawls, whose theory was restricted, explicitly, to the level of ‘political justice’.  It is 
thus that Sandel uses language that distinguishes what he proposes from ‘liberalism’ 
since a liberalism of a type that would avoid debates about the whole truth or conceptions 
about the good life would clearly fall short of what Sandel is arguing for and indeed 
would be less that what Weithman would want.  Weithman’s theory is institutionally very 
close to Wolterstorff’s consocial position in advocating the removal of (almost all) 
constraints on the way in which religious views may be expressed in public political 
debate but, in spirit, it shares a commitment with Habermas’ position to enable religious 
views to challenge other life conceptions and a concomitant commitment that it is only 
through such an open process that a fuller sense of our diversity can be genuinely grasped 
and appreciated.
77 
 
                                                 
76 Sandel (1994) at 1794.  See also Michael Perry’s statement that: “Indeed, because of the role that such 
religious arguments inevitably play in the political process, it is important that such arguments, no less than 
secular moral arguments, be presented in – so they can be tested in – public political debate” in Perry 
(1997) at 130, n22. 
77 On how religious tolerance is connected and facilitative of democratic practices (“Now, pluralism and the 
struggle for religious tolerance were not only driving forces behind the emergence of the democratic state, 
but continue stimulate its further evolution up to now.”) and of cultural rights see Habermas (2006c) at 199. 
  601.2.5  Ladd’s critique of liberal absolutism 
John Ladd’s discussion of politics and religion and the conclusions he draws about the 
role of religion in the public sphere bring this last point home more fully and with greater 
philosophical sophistication.
78  What Ladd points out is that there are a variety of socio- 
political positions we can identify that posit ultimate ends, which are absolutes in terms 
of the specific positions.  Hence, we have a variety of absolutisms included among which 
we can count naturalism, atheism, and religious absolutisms, but also, secularism and 
liberalism.  Since each absolutism projects its own ultimate ends, we might view each of 
them like a Rawlsian comprehensive doctrine.   For example, secularism affirms the 
primacy of the political over the religious (at least in public life) a position that Ladd 
traces to Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin, and liberalism, he contends, gives primacy to 
process and rights, such as the right to property and liberty.  While we could perhaps 
agree on what should be our governing absolutism, in fact we do not.  That we do not is 
both the source, and expresses the fact, of our diversity, which of course was the starting 
point for liberal theory we have here considered.  However, the problem with 
absolutisms, Ladd argues, is that if we do not accept the premises of an absolutism there 
is no way to move forward because we cannot talk to each other, a difficulty that has 
been recognised by the theories we have considered above.
79  The Rawlsian liberal 
institutional solution to this problem was to eliminate these absolutisms from public 
political debate precisely so we would be able to talk to each other and deliberate in a 
meaningful way.  Habermas in a more moderated way and especially Weithman, on the 
other hand, want to allow these absolutisms to interact and clash with each other more.  
                                                 
78 Ladd (1988) at 276-277. 
79 Ladd (1998) at 277. 
  61Ladd’s solution is different.  Ladd contends that while we should not say that all ideas are 
of equal value, we should have a presumption that there might be some value in them and 
therefore that they should not be dismissed out of hand.  This would apply to religious 
doctrines as well.  We should see religions as “experiments in living” from which we 
might learn.  In part this post-metaphysical perspective seems very similar to what 
Habermas is suggesting.  Ladd is calling for a non-absolutist form of pluralism, in which 
positions are not equally valid per se but because they share an equal presumption of 
validity are all tolerated publicly. In this way, religious ideas would become public and 
their value assessed through public discussion.  
 
1.3  Constructing a theory - justice as discourse 
Each of the ‘liberal’ positions discussed here has struggled with the same basic challenge 
that Rawls expressed: how we can create “a stable and just society of free and equal 
citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”  
They all share Rawls’ desire to build a just society and, in the abstract, some sort of a 
stable social order.  In so doing, they all embrace the normative commitment of liberal 
theory as a critical component of such a social order.  But as they demonstrate neither 
their views on the meaning of a ‘just social order’ what ‘stability’ demands, nor how 
either might be achieved, are entirely shared.  Indeed, the liberal position sees our 
plurality of moral, philosophical and religious views as being deep, incommensurable and 
indeed perhaps incompatible when it comes to constructing some sort of political justice.   
At the same time, this outlook acknowledges that our deeply held beliefs are probably 
where we will look for our sense of the good life and will be the wellsprings of wisdom 
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day in our relations with other citizens at the individual, private level as well as with our 
governments, law and institutions of the state at the public level. The challenge therefore 
is to find a point of justice that is fair, in spite of disagreements about fairness itself. 
 
  Addressing this question takes us back to fundamentals.  The logic of a democratic 
system means that all citizens should be allowed to participate in deliberating about our 
political policies and principles, including, in the case at hand, about what would make 
our politics fair.  Clearly, we will need to ensure that in these deliberations everyone that 
wants to participate is allowed to do so.  To achieve this end, we have to recognise that 
we may be more divided than the Rawlsian liberal position suggested because we are 
divided even about what fairness – that touchstone of liberal virtues – means.  We will, in 
short, have to embrace a greater and more raucous polyphony than liberalism may have 
imagined.  At best, and at its best, our politics can allow us to dialogue in the hope that 
through this dialogue we can come to decisions about the appropriate principles of 
fairness and, of course, about the structure of our society.  Justice thus conceived would 
lie in allowing all divergent opinions to be expressed, even those about what and how we 
may engage in discussions.  It is thus a composite theory drawing elements from what has 
been discussed above.  It takes the essential challenge that Rawls outlines as its animating 
impulse and embraces the normative commitment of liberal theory that is reflected in 
Rawls framework.  It seeks, however, to overcome the divide between ‘liberal’ and 
‘theological’ positions that Audi and Wolterstorff stipulated by noting that all of the 
options they discuss differ not in their goal of achieving fairness based on a normative 
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further takes seriously the critiques of Rawls’ theory as being too restrictive and 
constraining on religious expression in public political debate to achieve its own stated 
ends.  The critiques made of Rawls by Habermas and Weithman appear to be driving at 
this point and aiming to provide corrective principles (Habermas’ translation requirement 
and Weithman’s two propositions) that would both better realise the liberal goal while 
safeguarding against theological diktats.   
 
Justice as discourse adopts these concerns and the basic thrust of the remedies proposed 
by proposing that religiously inspired language be given a wide space in public political 
debate, and allowed to be influential upon but never solely decisive of state policy or to 
be invoked as the justification of official state action.  Moreover, it embraces the 
perspectives of ‘critics of liberalism’ like Sandel and Ladd who have questioned the 
neutral status of classical liberal theory by suggesting that liberal theory is value-laden in 
a way that betrays its aspiration to be a space in which different and competing values 
can equally and fairly interact and vie for public recognition.  Justice as discourse would, 
firstly, seek to provide what Sandel called more capacious public space by allowing 
religious ideas to be expressed and thereby to challenge values as well as to shape policy.  
In so doing, it, secondly, accepts that we may achieve neither a stable consensus nor a 
type of political discourse that will be entirely universally comprehensible -- or as Ladd 
put it that we may be confronted by incompatible absolutes.   While a stable consensus 
was Rawls’ aspiration, we may be better served by accepting that our differences will 
persist in spite of discussion.  We might say, then, that justice would lie in discourse, 
  64without any normative conception of fairness.  A notion of justice as discourse would 
have as a key requirement that we agree to listen sincerely to the views of others and that 
they agree to listen to us.  Justice as discourse, however, still believes in the value of 
liberal theory in facilitating the expression of our diversity if we release it from its 
Rawlsian formulation. 
 
Justice as discourse is strongly influenced by Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics, 
which, not surprisingly, has a strong intellectual connection to his idea of post 
metaphysical thought, and his call to embrace polyphonous complexity.  As Habermas 
says, “Discourse ethics…views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective 
practice of argumentation which enjoins those involved to an idealizing enlargement of 
their interpretive practices.”
80  The enlargement of interpretive practices imposes 
demands on all of us to be respectful of alternate positions.  So, discourse ethics is a 
method to achieve the type of exposure to each others’ ideas and calls for an ‘ideal role 
taking’.  Ultimately, Habermas perceives this as a procedural moral and legal theory, so 
much so that he says: 
I propose that philosophy limit itself to the clarification of the moral point of 
view and procedure of democratic legitimation, to the analysis of the 
conditions of rational discourse and negotiations…It [philosophy on this 
Habermasian account] leaves substantial questions that must be answered 
here and now to the more or less enlightened engagement of participants, 
which does not mean that philosophers may not also participate in the public 
debate, though in the role of intellectuals, not of experts.
81 
 
                                                 
80 Habermas (1995) at 117 (emphasis in original). 
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achieve this end, that is to say the substantive content of discourse ethics, calls for a 
particular type of political engagement of all of us with each other: 
Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive 
rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to 
take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the 
understandings and self world of all others; from this interlocking of 
perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which 
all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the 
basis of their shared practice.
82 
 
However, as we have seen, when Habermas specifically considers religion’s public role, 
the broad, and unrestrained perspective that appears to emerge from his description of the 
method of discourse ethics is restricted by his translation requirement and, therefore, 
there is a continued limitation on religion’s public voice and place in the public sphere.  
Justice as discourse wants to push the logic of Habermas’ argument further on this point.  
The translation requirement was Habermas’ way of addressing the concern of 
incomprehensibility of religiously derived political reasons, a concern shared by Rawls.  
While sensitive to this concern, justice as discourse accepts that we may not, and 
probably will not, have reasons that are entirely intelligible to one another and this will 
make both our listening to others and our being heard much more difficult than in a 
system where we relied only on common reasons.  This, however, is the price we have to 
pay, and may gladly agree to pay, for a politics that is expansive enough to embrace a 
deeper notion of pluralism than has been plumbed by the standard liberal position, both in 
its (classical) Rawlsian formulation as well as in variations to this model that we have 
considered.  This pluralism may be as socially inveterate as it is individually and 
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  66communally inspiring.  Certainly, though, it would include our various religious 
convictions as well as allowing them more space than Rawls’ formulation would want to 
accept. 
 
Justice as discourse also proposes an ethical perspective on liberal justice that comes 
from within liberal theory itself.   At the heart of the theory is recognition not only of the 
fact of our diversity but a commitment to allowing this diversity to shape the decisions 
we make in common. Those decisions will include not only institutional forms we 
establish but also the very life ambitions we set for our polities.  Inevitably, this will lead 
to discussions about ultimate questions about the nature of justice.  Rawls famously 
proposed a theory of ‘justice as fairness’.  What Habermas’ discourse theory suggests, 
however, is that the very criteria of fairness and hence of justice cannot (and probably 
should not) be proposed by philosophers.
83  Rather, the great promise of liberal theory is 
that the content of justice will be defined from discursive political debate.  There is of 
course a great risk in this, which is that we may not agree, and this in turn would 
compromise the stability of our political orders.  However, if out of a concern for stability 
we must compromise the diversity that we can bring to the definition of justice, we will 
have violated the very ethic of liberal theory itself. 
 
1.4 Justice as discourse versus alternatives 
Before concluding this chapter, it will be useful to explore justice as discourse further by 
examining it in comparison to alternative theories proposed by Veit Bader and Abdullahi 
                                                 
83 This position is part of the larger debate about whether justice should be conceived of in procedural or 
substantive terms, Habermas’ suggestion tending to the former. 
  67An-Na’im.  Bader and An-Na’im are significant here for different reasons. Bader’s work 
posits a novel outlook on the place of religion in the state and in political discourse.  An-
Naim, on the other hand, considers Muslim environments specifically.  Justice as 
discourse must, therefore, engage with both theories. 
 
1.4.1  Bader’s ‘priority for democracy’ 
Veit Bader has noted that church-state relationships are diverse “…in states that all share 
the principles of liberal democracy”
84 Bader further notes the critiques of the “radical 
exclusion of religious reasons and arguments from public debate and politics in political 
liberalism.”
85  As an alternative, he argues for a ‘priority for democracy’ which takes into 
account that “constitutional principles and public morality of liberal 
democracies….should be as freestanding as possible with regard to competing secular 
and religious foundations…”
86  Bader thus argues for a normative model based on what 
he calls nonconstitutional pluralism (NCP) which: 
 …combines constitutional disestablishment or nonestablishment with 
restricted legal pluralism (e.g. in family law), administrative 
institutional pluralism (de jure and  de facto institutionalization of 
several organized religions), institutionalized political pluralism, and 
the religio-cultural pluralization of the nation.
87 
 
Continuing, Bader asserts that: 
 
 NCP requires specific information rights for organized religions and 
corresponding information duties by state agencies regarding contested 
issues, participation in public fora and hearings, inclusion in advisory 
councils and corresponding consultation rights and duties to listen, and 
so on.
88 
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Bader favours NCP as opposed to the alternative of nonestablishment and private 
pluralism (NEEP), which “declares a strict legal separation of the state from all religions 
as well as a strict administrative and political separation”.
89  It (NEEP) is opposed to the 
institutionalisation of religion that NCP posits on Bader’s account.  The model of the US 
approximates NEEP, while India, Belgium, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands post-
1983 constitutional reforms approximate NCP. 
 
What Bader’s analysis and position usefully indicates to us is that liberal theory can 
accommodate institutional patterns that vary from Rawlsian requirements and, more 
interestingly for our purposes, that liberal theory can allow for a richer role for religious 
convictions in public debate than some of its early institutional formulations envisaged. 
Justice as discourse would differ from Bader’s theory in two respects: one institutional; 
the other conceptual.  Institutionally, Bader’s model appears to be dependent upon being 
able to locate institutional representation for religious communities and thus to develop 
‘institutionalised pluralism’. The heritage of Muslim contexts will, as we will see below, 
raise issues that challenge Bader’s framework for precisely this reason.  How might an 
NCP model work without any institutionalised religious body to act as a representative?  
And how can it work with a tradition that has never known a sort of church structure and 
in which, on the contrary, religious authority has never rested unambiguously with a 
hierarchical clerical establishment but rather with diffuse theologian-jurist-scholars who 
have been respected for their learning, rather that their office per se.  In contrast, justice 
as discourse depends on no such institutional system. 
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Conceptually, because of its requirement for institutionalised pluralism, Bader’s model 
runs the risk of neglecting inter-community diversity.   Justice as discourse recognises 
that having religious voices expressed through corporate representation is problematic 
because each religious community will in fact be composed of individuals with diverse 
personal outlooks.  Corporate representation, however, would not be able to capture all of 
this diversity and in so doing could exclude the full range of opinions that religious 
believers could express and may end up hearing only the most powerful and therefore 
most dominant voices.  Rather than accepting institutionalised pluralism, justice as 
discourse locates diversity at the individual level and is thus concerned with capturing 
this more fine-grained plurality and bringing it to bear on public political discourse. 
 
1.4.2 An-Na‘im’s  ‘civic  reason’/‘public reason’ 
In a recent work, Abdullahi An-Na‘im has developed a theory for the relationship of 
shari‘a, the state and politics, which he refers to as either public reason or civic reason.  
His proposals are as follows: 
First, the modern territorial state should neither seek to enforce Shari‘a as 
positive law and public policy, nor claim to interpret its doctrine and general 
principles for Muslim citizens.  Second, Shari‘a principles can and should be 
a source of public policy and legislation, subject to constitutional and human 
rights of all citizens, men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims equally 
without discrimination.  In other words, Shari‘a principles are neither 
privileged or enforced as such nor necessarily rejected as a source of state 
law and policy simply because they are derived from the Shari‘a.
90 
 
An-Na‘im’s proposals are based on the view that: 
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  70  …the inherent subjectivity and diversity of Shari‘a principles mean that 
whatever is enacted and enforced by the state is the political will of the 
ruling elite, not the normative system of Islam as such.
 91 
 
Out of this concern he posits that: 
 
To avoid such difficulties, I am proposing that the rationale of all public 
policy and legislation always be based on what might be called ‘public 
reason’ whereby Muslims and other believers should be able to propose 
policy and legislative initiatives emanating from their religious beliefs, 
provided  that can support them in a public, free and open debate with 
reasons that are accessible and convincing to the generality of citizens…
92 
 
In a slightly later work for which his essay was a precursor, he develops a concept of 
‘civic reason’ in, he claims, distinction to ‘public reason’ as used by Rawls.  He asserts 
that: 
I am in general agreement with Rawls’ thinking, as clarified (sic) by 
Habermas, subject to an overriding concern about transplanting those ideas 
to Islamic societies at large…let me first recall my definition of civic reason 
as the requirement that the rationale and purpose of public policy or 
legislation be based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept or 
reject and use to make counterproposals through public debate without 
reference to religious belief as such.  This view can probably be supported 
by Rawls and Habermas.
93 
 
And later, 
 
For our purposes here, I believe it sufficient to affirm that the concept of 
civic reason should be rooted in civil society and marked by contestation 
among different actors seeking to influence policy through the agency of the 
state.
94 
 
Ultimately though, An-Na‘im is “emphasising an Islamic perspective to maintain the 
religious neutrality of the state despite the connectedness of Islam and politics”
95 
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there are also differences.  Notably, justice as discourse shares with Na‘im a grounding in 
the political thinking of Rawls and Habermas and the view that religious principles 
should be allowed to be proposed as the basis for public policy or even as legislation, but 
should not be necessarily enforced or rejected as such.  Relatedly, justice as discourse 
does not seek to limit religious discourses to a purely private domain.  Moreover, as will 
be developed in subsequent chapters, justice as discourse also emerges out of a reading of 
the intellectual, political and legal history of Muslim contexts that emphasises the 
diversity and plurality of understandings of the shari‘a and of religious principles more 
generally. 
 
Where justice as discourse differs, however, is in grounding itself not just on the ideas of 
Rawls and Habermas, but in a larger, and more diverse, tradition of liberal theory in 
which, though Rawls and Habermas are prominent participants they are not the only 
voices.  This means not simply that more theorists are considered (a rather banal point 
perhaps) but rather that a more robust use and defence of the normative temper of liberal 
theory as such, and the usefulness of this theory for Muslim contexts is taken up by 
justice as discourse.  This differs in degree, but also it seems in ultimate purpose, from 
Na‘im’s position that is grounded fundamentally in an argument derived from an “Islamic 
perspective”.  In addition, justice as discourse frees religious reasoning from the 
limitations that Rawls’ (proviso) and Habermas’ (translation requirement) impose upon it 
and which An-Na‘im seems to accept when he talks about the need for ‘accessible’ 
reasons to be offered.  Justice as discourse see the process(es) of providing accessibility 
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motivation for  liberal theory – and is not convinced that some public reasoning that may 
be ‘unintelligible’ to some is not an unavoidable consequence of embracing our real 
diversity; and should be seen, not as desirable per se, but as an acceptable compromise in 
order to capture diversity. 
 
1.5   Conclusion 
We can still safely label justice as discourse a liberal theory inasmuch as its principles all 
stem from the liberal concern to address in the best way possible the challenge of 
diversity and the plurality of our moral, ethical and religious outlooks.  Additionally, it 
shares the normative commitment of liberal theory that the full range of our diversity 
should be brought to bear on public decision-making.  Where it differs from the 
‘mainstream’ liberal perspectives represented by Habermas and, primarily, by Rawls is in 
seeking to push the boundaries of the liberal embrace of diversity further than each of 
these theorists; especially so in the space allowed for the expressions of political 
sentiments that may be inspired by religious outlooks or convictions.  In so doing, while 
conscious of the concern about the potentially (and, in fact, very likely) divisive nature of 
religious ideas in public debate, justice as discourse undoes the restrictions that both 
Rawls and Habermas would impose on religious reasons.   An expansive liberal theory on 
these principles will be, I will argue, well suited to all societies, but particularly to 
Muslim contexts in which religious commitments are strong, by providing enough space 
for the expression of these commitments on matters of public concern while at the same 
time safeguarding the capacity for a diverse range of moral views to be expressed.  This 
  73is primarily because justice as discourse emphasises the discursive, political and 
deliberative process over settled conclusion about the content of justice.  Justice thus 
becomes more closely conceived of as a verb, rather than as a noun. 
 
Justice as discourse implies secularism of a particular type and requires us to theorise 
about the boundaries of this secular space in relation to the state, to civil society, to 
politics and to the law.  In addition, it invites us to consider practical institutional options 
that give expression to its principles.  The next chapter addresses these matters before this 
study moves on to flesh out what it means to discuss ‘Muslim contexts’. 
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2.0 Introduction 
We ended the previous chapter by introducing the notion of justice as discourse.  Justice 
as discourse is really a modification of what Paul Weithman called the ‘standard 
approach’ liberalism,
96 particularly as this approach was represented in the contemporary 
period by Rawls’ political liberalism, and was developed after considering several 
reactions to and critiques of  Rawls’ theory.  As we have seen liberal theory continues to 
evolve.  It is grounded in a social and political history but it itself has a history out of 
which it develops: it is thus that Audi and Wolterstorff referred to a broader family of 
liberal positions, with Wolterstorff agreeing with Weithman that all of the positions 
within the family propose a restraint on the use of religious reasons in deciding and 
deliberating about political issues in public.
97  Justice as discourse is thus a label for a 
version of liberal theory.  What distinguishes it from Rawls’ theory and also from 
Habermas’ reaction to Rawls, is that, like Weithman’s positions, it allows a more 
expansive role for religious speech in public discourse.  Sensitive to John Ladd’s concern 
about liberal absolutism and to Jean Bethke Elshtain’s worry of ‘liberal monism’, 
especially when it comes to religious speech, justice as discourse seeks to remove the 
fetters on the expression of religiously-derived arguments and reasons in public political 
debate.  In so doing, however, it shares the concern of more classical liberal views with 
the implementation, in policy, of religious dictates.  Nonetheless, and to be clear, justice 
as discourse embraces several principles shared with standard liberal theory.  It is, thus, a 
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  75conceptual wrapper around a certain type of broadly liberal theoretical conceptions, 
which seek to provide an expanded role for the religious positions and arguments in 
public political debate. 
 
In this chapter, we will further explore justice as discourse. We will do this, firstly, by 
explicating certain principles that it shares with classical liberal theory.  Secondly, we 
will examine what it means to implement justice as discourse as a set of political 
principles.  Specifically, we will begin this second task by considering the sense of 
‘secularism’ that is both implied and necessary in justice as discourse.  We will then 
move on to discuss what role the theory conceives of for the role of religious discourse 
vis-à-vis the executive and judicial authority, civil society, legislative provisions and the 
articulation of political arguments. 
 
2.1  Justice as discourse and classical liberal theory 
2.1.1 Diversity 
Justice as discourse shares some key principles and concerns with classical formulations 
of liberal theory.  The first is on the issue of diversity.   Religious diversity within a 
defined community is of course not a new phenomena, nor is it particular to just once 
civilisation.  The approach that is taken to this diversity, however, has much evolved, 
especially in the past few hundred years and especially in Western Europe.  During the 
16
th century the so-called ‘Wars of Religion’ between Catholics and Protestants ravaged 
France.  Under slogans like “une foi, une loi, un roi” (one faith, one law, one king), 
sectarian conflict raged until the Treaty of Nantes was concluded in 1598.  To achieve the 
  76end of bringing about peace, it was felt necessary to decouple the social order from any 
confessional tradition – in effect to separate out religion and the state.  This separation 
notion became a hallmark for a new, liberal, model for the relationship of the state and 
religion.  Indeed, as Stephen Holmes notes, “liberal beliefs about the proper relation 
among law, morality and religion first acquired distinct contours during the wars of 
religion that ravaged France between 1562 and 1598”.
98  Thus, initially the liberal 
attitude arose out of a concern for social peace.  Over time, however, the liberal model 
evolved into a concern with protecting individual freedom of conscience.  The 
mechanism to realise this end, however, was the same.  Individual conscience could only 
be maintained, it was felt, by preventing the power of the state from imposing religious 
uniformity.
99  Thus, religious diversity was transformed from being viewed as an 
unwelcome aberration of non-conformists who ideally would be made to see the error of 
their ways and brought about to the true faith through either coercion or conversion, or, if 
not this ideal, then barely tolerated, to a feeling that freedom of religious belief (or lack of 
belief) is among the most important rights that society can grant to its citizens and that 
the energies of the state must weigh in not to bring non-conformists ‘on side’, but rather 
to protect them so that they may hold on to their beliefs.  Slightly ironically, perhaps, the 
public protection of religious consciousness gave rise to the view of many thinkers that 
religion can only “co-exist within a liberal order when kept in a private dimension of 
social interaction.”
100  Religion was thus privatised on the theory that in a pluralistic 
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  77society religious sentiment could only appropriately be expressed in private settings so 
that state and public discourse would be insulated from any particular individual religious 
belief. 
 
With the advent of the modern nation-state, generally linked to the changed pattern 
arising out of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, an institutional distinction emerged 
between the state and its religious character.  This is not to say that, at this point, church 
and state were separated or that there was any “disestablishment”: the legal expression of 
that idea came later, especially in the constitution of the United States, and of course is 
still not present de jure in many parts of Europe (even if it exists in a de facto sense).  
Instead, what happened was a distinction between what we might call, to use the well-
known Durkheimian distinction, the ‘profane’ and the ‘sacred’.  The state and political 
life became profane or this worldly and in this sense separated from the other worldly and 
sacred world of religion.  As a consequence, political life and the state were secularised 
in a particular way.  Political association that would previously have been linked to a 
divine founding of society in some sort of sacred time (hence the “une foi, une loi, un 
roi”) was now linked to a political process in social and profane time. Charles Taylor 
identifies these conditions of our modern, post-Westphalian, political order.  Discussing 
what he terms the ‘modern social imaginary’, Taylor notes that: 
Plainly, this imaginary is the end of a certain kind of presence of religion or 
the divine in public space.  It is the end of when political authority…[is] 
inconceivable without reference to God or higher time. 
 
More precisely, the difference amounts to this.  In the earlier phase, God or 
some kind of higher reality is an ontic necessity…What emerges from the 
change is an understanding of social and political life entirely in secular 
  78time…This is the picture of le social fondé sur lui-même (society as founded 
on itself) of which Backzo speaks.
101 
 
Contemporary classical liberal theory arose out of the social and political context just 
described and out of an acceptance that in the new profane time there will arise an 
irreducible diversity of views.   
 
Justice as discourse shares this premise and the related concern for allowing, in the first 
instance, the full diversity of these views to enter into public political debate.  However, 
it also takes seriously critiques that have argued the standard liberal position has been too 
restrictive to achieve its own end – namely to be open to the range of our views -- by 
being too constraining of the expression of religious voices in public political debate.  
Thus, justice as discourse is willing to allow for a more open and fulsome expression of 
religious views in public discussions.  In this way, it seeks to be more expansive and 
pluralism enhancing by better capturing the diversity of views, religious views included, 
and allowing them to inform matters of public policy.  Justice as discourse thus 
emphasises processes and methods of discourse.  It was the risk that particular religious 
outlooks would be directive of public policy that was the great historical struggle which 
engendered liberal theory.  This historical background likely also accounts for the special 
concern with religious voices influencing public policy, and it is in response to this that 
critiques have suggested that too much was done in this vein. In now taking the position 
that the standard version of liberal theory may be too restrictive, justice as discourse 
seeks to better capture the original liberal impulse, namely to bring to bear the full range 
of our diversity into public decision making. 
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2.1.2  Neutrality 
The second shared concern, which is closely related to the issue of diversity, is with 
neutrality.  Liberal theory insists on the state being neutral with respect to conceptions of 
the good and in respect of how, subject only to basic public order limits, individuals 
within the state pursue their personal ideas of the good.  Neutrality is rightly seen as a 
precondition, and a facilitative condition, for diversity because any deep set or strongly 
existing commitments would limit the range of options that the state would consider.   If 
the state is neutral as to what goods it should pursue, however, and what goods the 
individuals that it regulates may pursue, then a full range of options is available.  The 
commitment to neutrality is thus necessary for the widest possible array of the diverse 
views that will be held by individuals to be given a chance to influence public decision 
making.  The neutral state would thus be open not only to how individuals seek to live 
their own lives but also to what they may urge the state to pursue as its goals.   
 
Justice as discourse embraces the value of neutrality in providing the platform for broad 
public input and debate about how we should act in common and through the agency of 
the state.  In so doing, it suggests that it is not necessary and indeed even 
counterproductive to broad public debate to limit the expression of religious ideas or 
values in public political discourse.  In this, it does not accept the argument that there 
must be limits on religious expression per se, because of the potential for this type of 
expression to be confrontational, provocative or confusing.   This is similar to the 
thinking that seems to have inspired Justice Brennan in the US context to say: 
  80That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotions, 
may incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife does not rob it of 
constitutional protection…The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment 
Clause [part of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution] is to reduce or 
eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussions, 
associations or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of 
discussion, association and political participation generally…The State’s 
goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be accomplished by 
regulating religious speech and political association.  The Establishment 
Clause does not licence government to treat religion and those who teach or 
practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American 
ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities… In short, government 
may not as a goal promote ‘safe thinking’ with respect to religion and fence 
out from political participation those…who it regards as over involved in 
religion.  Religionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full 
measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity 
generally.
102 
 
Justice as discourse puts its faith in the contestation of public debate to test and challenge 
all ideas, including those that have a religious element, without these needing to be 
censored or limited in advance.  As Justice Brennan went on to say about the US system: 
The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would 
inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to 
refutation in the market-place of ideas and their platforms to rejection at the 
polls.
103 
 
Classical liberal theory has been criticised as being excessively worried about, and 
therefore excessively exclusionary of, religious expression in public discourse, 
notwithstanding its principled commitment towards public neutrality.  Justice as 
discourse presses the case for neutrality specifically at this point.  Within the concept of 
neutrality is both impartiality and inclusiveness.  Indeed, it is impartiality which is 
conceived of here as the basis for inclusiveness since if the state was indeed partial to 
some set of principles it would, ipso facto, be inclined to exclude other principles.  At the 
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  81same time, justice as discourse is not insisting on the impartiality of reasons to make 
them into ‘good’ public reasons in the manner that Rawls might insist upon.  So, justice 
as discourse is especially concerned with neutrality towards the public expression of 
religious language, accepting that this language quite clearly contains the capacity to be 
itself partial, politically divisive and to arouse strong emotions and reactions.  That 
potential alone is not, however, good reason for restricting such language nor for limiting 
the principle of neutrality.  Justice as discourse is thus willing to allow religious 
expression to compete for public acceptance within a market place of ideas defined by a 
broad and expansive politics. 
 
2.1.3  Limits 
In order to maintain neutrality and to allow for the diversity of expression, liberal theory 
has posited that limits must be placed on the public role of religion.  We have heretofore 
been considering limits on the expression of religious values or arguments in public 
discussions and debates, which represent one aspect of the limits.  The other aspect of 
limitation, however, is the reliance on particular religious arguments as matters of policy.  
Here, liberal theory is clear that no religious argument should per se be able to dictate 
matters of public policy.  That is to say, that it would be unacceptable for a conclusion or 
position coming from any religious tradition or pronouncement to be determinative, 
without any further debate or discussion, of a political issue.  Moreover, if after debate, if 
such a view were to hold sway it is important that it would not be justified or rationalised 
on the basis of its religious pedigree.  To do so would be, firstly, to compromise the 
political neutrality of the state and, secondly, to thereby sacrifice the diversity of potential 
  82views about and options for state action.  Justice as discourse shares this concern and the 
insistence that no religious opinion should be determinative of public policy because of 
the state’s prior commitment to a religious outlook.  Thus, justice as discourse would 
require that a fine distinction be made between allowing religious expression and those 
expressions being decisive of an issue of public policy.  In other words, justice as 
discourse, like standard liberal theory, insists upon an independent political ethic.  As 
Charles Taylor points out, the traditional independent political ethic of the West was an 
ethic that was independent from religion.  However, this need not be the case.  An 
independent political ethic does not need to mean that religion is less relevant to public 
life, but rather only prevents the state from backing religion.  Taylor suggests that this, in 
fact, was the original meaning of the First Amendment to the US constitution with its 
dual emphasis on non-establishment on the one hand and free exercise on the other.
104  It 
is this delicate ground, balancing being (potentially) influenced by religion on the one 
hand, while also not backing a particular religion on the other, which justice as discourse 
seeks to occupy.   
 
Whereas the standard position drew the line of balance at the level of the expression of 
religious arguments in public political debate, justice as discourse draws it around the 
implementation of policy justified by religious convictions.  It demands that the state not 
commit itself to adopt the views of a particular religious tradition as matters of policy.  
Below we will discuss more specifically where this line must be drawn with respect not 
just to the state but also to civil society, law and politic debates more generally. 
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2.2  Justice as discourse and the Secular 
2.2.1   Secularism 
As mentioned in the discussion above, justice as discourse necessarily implies an element 
of secularism.  To understand the nature of this secularism, we must look at the history of 
the concept of the secular and its cognates. 
 
For this purpose, we must again turn to developments in Europe.   The term secular itself 
is has its roots in the Latin seacualris but came to be derived in Middle English from the 
Old French seculer.
105  Its sense in this context related to the ‘worldly’ or ‘this worldly’ 
things which were temporal and ‘in the world’ or ‘in society’, as opposed to being in 
purely spiritual or ‘other worldly’.
106  Thus, secular was a term used to describe members 
of religious orders that went out of the monastic life to work in society.   Hence, the 
phenomenon, without any colour of the oxymoronic or ironic, of ‘secular priests’ out in 
the world working with and ministering to the people versus others who would remain in 
their cloisters.  A form of the secular was thus born out of a religious tradition. In a 
similar vein, José Casanova notes that there existed what he calls a ‘double dualist’ 
classification in pre-modern Europe.  On the one hand, we had a distinction between this 
world and the other world. But the worldly and temporal ‘this world’ was itself split 
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  84between the religious and purely worldly – viz., the ‘secular’.
107  The idea of the secular 
today is built around this heritage even though it has transformed it.  
 
In time, the ‘this worldly-ness’ of the idea of the secular asserted itself more robustly and 
distinguished itself more profoundly from the ‘religious’.  Taylor marks the advent of 
modern, western secularism as developing particularly out of the Wars of Religion 
mentioned above, at which time it was sought to create a public domain that was 
regulated by norms independent of confessional allegiances.
108  This is the sense of what 
Taylor finds to exist in the modern social imaginary. Grotius’s words, cited by Taylor, 
explain this imaginary in which “even if God did not exist, these norms would be binding 
on us”.
109  An idea of the secular was critical to this Grotian understanding because it 
expressed the concept of the distinction between the temporal or worldly from the 
spiritual and religiously-grounded. 
 
In light of the above, Taylor asserts that a facet of the newness of the (modern) public 
sphere is its ‘radical secularity’.
110  In this paradigm, common, social action takes place 
within a framework that does not need to be established in some ‘action-transcendent’ 
dimension – whether this is based on God, a great chain, or laws from time immemorial.  
This, Taylor contends, is what makes the modern public sphere radically secular and this 
is what is new about it.  As we can see, this early or emerging sense of the secular has 
political ramifications inasmuch as it grounds political life on a different basis. 
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It was not until the nineteenth century that the concept of the secular became adopted, 
and adapted, by those freethinkers who would call themselves ‘secularists’.
111 In England 
in 1851, the terms secularist and secularism, in these senses, were employed by the 
atheist George Holyoake who was looking for respectable (and probably more socially 
palatable) alternatives to ‘atheist’ or ‘unbeliever’ or ‘freethinker’, all of which would 
have been socially as well as politically pejorative.
112  The secularists were espousing a 
normative doctrine of secularism, which advocated that beliefs and values should not 
play a role in the political affairs of the nation-state.
113  In doing this, they were 
advocating something that was beyond the notion of the secular that we have seen above.  
The nineteenth century secularists were engaged in a more comprehensive re-working of 
the relationship between personal morality and state law than was seen before, and of the 
medieval conception of a social body of Christians.
114  Yet the elements of this re-
orientation do seem to have been echoed within the earlier sense of the secular in two 
ways.  First, as we have noted, in the aftermath of the Wars of Religion, there emerged an 
acceptance of confessional difference without persecution (or at least not such repressive 
persecution) as a way to secure some social peace.  Second, once the political order was 
decoupled from the divine order (because it was now possible to have different divine 
orders co-existing within one political order) – and in this sense became secular – it 
became easier to push the argument a bit further and urge that confessional matters, and 
indeed matters of conscience, should be excluded from society’s political life altogether.  
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the political order safe for different Christian confessional communities, the emergence 
of those with different convictions, such as George Holyoake’s atheism, would naturally 
want the socio-political order made safe for their points of view as well.  The solution 
was to take matters of religion out of politics, so as to protect those that had no religion. 
 
Notwithstanding the links that these moves had with the past, this concept of the secular 
was clearly different from the one described above in which the secular was linked to an 
aspect of the work of the Christian church.  And this is precisely because this normative 
secularism was making a ‘non-religious’ argument, namely staking out a political 
position in favour of purging matters of religious conscience from public discourse.
115  
Indeed, in this conception we get the emerging sense of how in the West today we 
counterpoise religion and the secular as opposites. 
 
Secularism, as a normative ‘ism’ was able to argue not just that there be a neutral public 
space, but indeed that religious conviction must retreat from this space all together.  As 
Talal Asad has put it: “From the point of view of secularism, religion has the option of 
confining itself to private belief and worship or of engaging in public talk that makes no 
demands on life…Either is equally the condition of legitimacy.”
116 
 
The secularism demanded by justice as discourse does not, however, make such a strong 
claim.  While it participates in the ‘radical secularity’ of the modern age by not grounding 
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profane time and while it does insist on a neutral, in the sense of an a priori impartial, 
public space, it does not take the normative step of saying that religion must make no 
demands of public life.  Furthermore, it insists upon action taken in the name of the state 
being justified independently of any religious reasoning and, as such, the secularism it 
rests on “…requires citizens be emancipated from state and ecclesiastical diktat; they 
should be free to believe or to worship according to their conscience and ethical 
judgments.”
117  
 
2.2.2 Secularisation   
Closely allied to the concept of secularism has been the social process of secularisation.  
Casanova has argued that secularisation has as its core a functional differentiation 
between ‘secular spheres’ – primarily the state, economy and science – from the religious 
sphere, and the specialisation of religion into its own sphere tending to the private needs 
of individuals.
118  This means that these spheres have become de-coupled from the 
control of religion or theology -- that they proceed independently – while, on the other 
hand, religion assumes the role of ministering to citizens’ ‘spiritual’, ‘other worldly’ 
needs.  According to Casanova, two sub-theses flowed from this process:  one was that 
this process would bring the progressive shrinkage and decline of religion – the ‘religion 
in decline’ thesis; the second was that secularisation would bring the privatisation and 
marginalisation of religion in the modern world – the ‘privatisation thesis.’  Casanova 
argues that both of these sub-theses have been proved wrong.  In fact, his central claim is 
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secularism (and here it must mean a normative secularism) has decreed for them and are 
challenging the claims of social spheres (like the market) to be exempt from “extraneous” 
normative considerations.
119 
 
While religion (viz. religious traditions and those of religious conviction) is in these 
senses pushing back at its marginalisation and privatisation, the results of the process of 
secularisation in the form of functional social differentiation are evident.  It is the case 
that over time there has been a differentiation between religious and political institutions, 
though of course, this has manifested itself differently in different societies.  Nonetheless, 
along the important social vectors that Casanova has mentioned, the state, the economy 
and science, we can see that religion is no longer in control as it once was.  Science, for 
example, is no longer determined by the strictures of theology such that it is difficult 
(albeit in the ‘Creationism’ discourses taking place in the US today, not entirely 
impossible) to imagine a Galileo like situation occurring now.   Similarly, the market 
today is not controlled by the fiat of religious authorities.  As Sami Zubaida has noted: 
The Reformation, followed by the Scientific Revolution and the 
Enlightenment represented departures from [a] state of religious ambiance.  
To simplify matters, it was the processes of capitalism and the rise of the 
modern state which led to institutional differentiation and specialization, 
with various organisations and functions splitting off from religion, the 
churches and their authority.  Philosophy, law, medicine, government, 
education and, more recently, family and sexuality, split off from religious 
authorities and cognitions.
120 
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  89Secularisation is not limited to European democracies.  Abdou Filali-Ansary notes that 
while Muslim societies have not experienced secularisation qua differentiation as an 
internal or autonomous move because of external influences which either started the 
secularisation process or disrupted it (a matter on which, he says, historians disagree): 
… [S]ecularisation is already a reality in the Muslim world.  No Muslim 
society today is governed solely with reference to religious law; religious 
traditions no longer possess absolute or near-absolute predominance (except 
perhaps in some remote rural areas); and newly emerging leadership classes 
are almost everywhere displacing or marginalizing the clerisy of theologico-
legal experts who used to control meaning and organisation in these 
societies.
121 
 
Suffice it to say that although some of the historical processes have been different, a 
functional social differentiation by way of a separation between religious and socio-
political institutions is evident in Muslim contexts as well, albeit with a different 
historical trajectory.   
 
Justice as discourse rests on this particular sense of the secular.  It is a this-worldly 
secular but one that does not seek to expunge religious convictions from any public role.  
Taylor notes the ‘radical secularity’, which of the modern public sphere, is much more 
than ‘not religious’ and that indeed we could still engage in religion even if we live 
within this radical secularity.
122  The secular thus does not necessarily exclude principles, 
ideas or policies that might be derived from religious convictions from public life, nor of 
course it does insist that they should be there.  The secular, in fact, is agnostic both about 
the truth of religious convictions and their public policy-influencing and law-influencing 
role.  Jeffrey Stout reinforces this point when he notes that a secularised ethical discourse 
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  90is not necessarily a commitment to secularism (as a normative position) because it entails 
neither the denial of theological assumptions nor the expulsion of theological expression 
from the public sphere. Believers might still see the political order as ultimately under 
divine judgement, though of course others may not.  But, Stoutt asserts, this means only 
that theocracy is over, not that the anti-Christ has taken over the political sphere.
123 Thus, 
it is inaccurate to see the secular as simply ‘anti-religious’.  What the secular does 
demand, however, is some guarantee of a continual this-worldly focus, and this will have 
political and thereby legal implications. A secular law and politics will have to be one 
that stands apart from (though not necessarily hostile to) any particular set of religious 
beliefs.  This end seems clearly to require the following: (i) the state should be neutral 
towards the religious beliefs of its citizens and should treat citizens equally regardless of 
their religious beliefs (or lack thereof); (ii) the state should protect freedom of religion 
and conscience; and, (iii) that governmental and public institutions should be autonomous 
from the direct control of any religious authority.  These requirements may, however, be 
achieved in different ways, and indeed they are not incompatible with a certain embrace 
of religion.   
 
In his study of a ‘struggle for Islamic democracy’, Noah Feldman notes that, for example, 
the lack of formal separation between church and state in the UK and the fact that most 
schools in Bavaria are Catholic, does not preclude our considering the UK or Germany to 
be meeting the tests of a secular, liberal democracy.
124  Feldman recognises that liberal 
democracy requires that governments should be neutral about what matters most to 
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  91citizens, leaving these decisions up to individuals.  As part and parcel of this, it is further 
necessary to respect the individual’s right to worship and to provide religious liberty for 
citizens.  Nonetheless, he notes: 
But so long as the government does not force anyone to adopt religious 
beliefs that he or she rejects, or perform religious actions that are anathema, 
it has not violated the basic right to religious liberty.  Separation of church 
and state may be very helpful in maintaining religious liberty, as it is in the 
U.S., but it is not always necessary for it.
125 
 
Amartya Sen, who describes himself as an unreformed secularist, applies a similar line of 
thinking to state support and funding for ‘religious’ institutions.  Sen points out that a 
separation of the state from a particular religious order, and thus the independence of the 
state from religious authority, does not mean that the state must steer clear from dealing 
with religion of religious communities altogether.  Rather what is required is simply that 
the must treat religious communities symmetrically.
126   If the state is to support religious 
communities, it must support them all in the same way, or it may support none of them in 
any way.
127  
 
A secular framework therefore does not have to mean a ‘laïc’ model à la France or 
(inspired by France) Turkey, in which a sharp division is made between public life and 
religious belief and strong divisions are applied to keep religious belief away from the 
state, the law and political debate.
128  It is not incompatible with a formal, legal 
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129  It does not prohibit state 
support for religious organisations or interests, so long as this is provided symmetrically, 
nor does it require it.  Most importantly, it shows that it is possible and consistent to meet 
both the requirements of the secular as well as leaving open the possibility for those of 
religious beliefs to participate meaningfully in public discourse and the shaping of public 
policy and law.  In this, it puts paid to the assertion that there cannot be, to borrow a 
phrase, ‘the dance of the secular and the religious’.
130 
 
We can now state in summary the requirements that the version of liberal theory we are 
labelling justice as discourse will demand. In order to allow the expression of the full 
range of diversity, justice as discourse, in distinction from and arising out of the critiques 
of the classical liberal theory, seeks to allow an enhanced role for the expression of 
religious arguments in the public political discourse.  Doing so, however, raises the risk 
that some religious views will effectively overrule other religious views or views which 
have no religious grounding.  To prevent the plurality limiting consequences of this 
possibility and to preserve individual freedom of conscience, justice as discourse insists 
on a neutral state.  This in turn means that there must be appropriate limits on the public 
role of religion to preserve this neutrality.  These limits are to be found not in needing to 
limit religious expression but in needing to limit how any such expressions are made into 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of 
law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; 
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the 
fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. 
129 We may discover that a formal separation is, however, not only convenient but also a better fit for 
denomination neutrality.  This will be addressed in a subsequent section of this study. 
130 I borrow the phrase from Sajoo (2004). 
  93public policy.  In taking this view, justice as discourse posits a more expansive space for 
religious values and ideas than does classical liberal theory.  The need for limits, 
however, necessarily also requires a secular state – but it is secular in the way of being 
agnostic as to religious (and indeed non-religious) arguments, not hostile to them; an 
understanding that still allows a substantial role for religious views and arguments.
131 
 
The key now is to define where lines need to be drawn to preserve this important secular 
character, which is itself an expression of the neutrality that liberal theory insists upon, in 
order to guarantee that the full diversity of individual views may be expressed. 
 
This exercise compels us to consider the application of justice as discourse within a 
political order.  In so doing, we are able to elaborate what justice and discourse demands 
as a matter of implementation and institutional form (taking account of the requirements 
we have just been discussing) and thereby to enrich our understanding of the theoretical 
framework elaborated in the previous chapter.  
 
 
2.3 Implementing  justice as discourse: the axes of state, law, civil society and politics 
2.3.1 Executive,  bureaucratic  and judicial authorities 
We have already stated that justice as discourse requires the state to be neutral and, ipso 
facto, secular in the manner described above.  What does this requirement mean in 
implementation?  Theories of the state abound and conflict.  Thus, as Bob Jessop has 
                                                 
131 See Lægaard (2008), which discusses Tariq Modood’s idea of ‘moderate secularism’ that is related to 
the point made here.  See also Modood (2008) available at: 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/faith_ideas/europe_islam/anti_sharia_storm. 
  94noted, the innocuous looking question ‘What is the state?’ gives rise to conceptual 
chaos.
132  Perhaps the most prominent theory is that of Max Weber who defined the state 
as follows: 
The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it 
possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, 
to which the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also 
controlled by regulations are oriented.  This system of order claims binding 
authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom 
have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all 
action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction.  It is thus a compulsory 
organization with a territorial basis.  Furthermore, today, the use of force is 
regarded as legitimate only in so far as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it…the claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of 
force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and 
continuous operation.
133 
 
Weber’s definition is suggestive of a number of key characteristics of the state: a 
centralised and bureaucratically organised administrative and legal order; binding 
authority over what occurs in its area of jurisdiction; a territorial basis; and, a monopoly 
                                                 
132 Jessop (2006) at 111. 
133 Weber (1978) at 56.  The Weberian definition has been challenged by a range of different conceptions 
of the state.  While Marx and Engels developed no coherent theory of state themselves they portrayed the 
state as reflecting underlying economic structures and interests, conceiving of the state as an instrument of 
the ruling class and a repressive arm of the bourgeoisie (Hay (2006) at 60-62; see also Jessop (2006) at 
116). This Marxist perspective has influenced other state theorists of a broadly Marxist orientation.  Hence, 
Gramsci has defined the state as ‘political and civil society’ and saw the state as hegemony armoured by 
coercion and Nicholas Poulatzas viewed the state as a social relation biased by virtue of its structural and 
strategic selectivity (Jessop (2006) at 113.)  Taking a slightly different tack, Foucauldian approaches have 
undermined the authority of the state by emphasising multiple sites of power – beyond just the state – with 
the state as the site of government rationality (“governmentality”) but within a complex in which power is 
ubiquitous (Jessop (2006) at 120.)    Feminist perspectives, which themselves range widely, also do not 
present one coherent state theory but they challenge two important aspects of the Weberian framework. 
First, they challenge the understanding of the state as the only vehicle of permitted violence noting in 
particular that violence perpetrated by men on women is often allowed to happen de facto if not de jure.  
Second, feminist analyses challenge and critique the type of public/private distinction made by traditional 
state theory.  The private is conceptualised as the domestic or family sphere as opposed to the public realm 
of the state and civil society (the latter therefore not as private).  On this analysis, women’s preponderant 
role in the private sphere is held functionally to exclude them from equal participation in public sphere 
(Jessop (2006) at 121-122).  Finally, we can consider the discourse analysis and strategic relational 
approaches to the state.  Discourse analysis suggests that the state does not exist in and of itself but rather is 
an illusory product of political imaginaries and narrative and rhetorical practices.  The strategic-relational 
approach notes that state power is a contingent product of the changing balance of political forces within 
and beyond the state, conditioned by the institutional structures of the state (Jessop (2006) at 123 and 124). 
  95on the (legitimate) use of force.
134  All understandings of the state, therefore, emphasise 
that the state exercises power.   The essential Weberian insight is that this power is 
exercised through an organised, bureaucratic order and thus that it acts as binding (even if 
it not the sole source of social power). 
 
Justice as discourse is concerned with no pre-set commitments, religious or otherwise, 
being adopted as determinative of matters of public policy.  This limit would apply 
particularly to those acting for the state through its organised capacities, especially in 
executive or judicial roles.  That is to say, that no minister, judge, civil servant or other 
official who has the capacity to set or influence public policy should be allowed to have 
her or his decision about this policy set by any pre-existing religious commitments that 
they may have personally, nor should they be allowed to justify any public policy they 
adopt by reference only to their own (or any other) religious views.  In the case of the 
political executive and civil service, their direct role in determining and implementing 
policy makes clear the limits that are being placed on them.  Judges might appear a 
different category because they are at some remove from the political executive.  The 
same restriction must apply to judges, however, because of their legal authority (which 
can commit the state) and their normative power.  This is not to say that these officials 
may not consider perspectives or arguments coming from religious traditions when 
contemplating matters of public policy, but it does mean that the reason for adopting any 
specific policy cannot be justified exclusively on that policy being either required by, or 
supported solely on the basis of, a religious value.  Officials exercising executive or 
judicial authority will therefore have to have other reasons – independent from any 
                                                 
134 Gill (2003) at 2ff. 
  96religious basis – to justify their decisions.  Even if their decisions should result in similar 
policy prescriptions as (a particular) religious tradition or outlook would lead, their 
reasons may not be derived from the religious views.  A judge could not, therefore, 
justify her decision in a case solely based on her personal religious views, nor on a reason 
coming from any religious tradition.  She will have to find and use reasoning that does 
not have a religious basis, though she may cite, if she wishes, parallel religious values 
that would accord with her judgment.  Similarly, no minister, or civil servant could make 
a policy decision or pronouncement based on her personal religious views, or other 
religious views, and would have to be able to provide independent and freestanding 
reasons justifying chosen policy.  The strongest and sharpest line must thus be drawn 
between the state as represented by those exercising executive or judicial authority in its 
name and religious values. 
 
2.3.2 Legislative  provisions 
Aside from the above-noted constraints on the way in which judges provide reasoning for 
their decisions, justice as discourse would also require that positive law legislative 
provisions do not invoke any religious grounds for the rules or requirements that they 
stipulate.  This would mean two things: firstly, that no legislative provisions should 
reference, cite or otherwise invoke any religious doctrine as the basis for the provisions, 
and; secondly, that no overarching or omnibus legislative provisions should be based on a 
religious grounding.  Thus, for example, declaring the nature of the state to be associated 
with a particular religious outlook would not be acceptable since this would prima facie 
indicate that that state is not neutral and therefore not fully open to diverse religious as 
  97well as non-religious views of its citizens.  Another strict and hard line must therefore be 
drawn around any explicitly religious basis for legislative provisions.  As an example, a 
statutory provision that stated that divorces could be granted ‘according the provisions of 
Islamic law’ and would therefore necessitate that judges find what these provisions are 
would fall afoul of justice as discourse.  That said, justice as discourse is willing to allow 
religious values to influence the formulation of legal rules through more discursive and 
political processes so long as the justification for any legislative requirements is not made 
on the basis of religious doctrine or prescription. 
 
2.3.3  Civil society: Community organisations, NGOs 
Invoking the concept of ‘civil society’ is also to introduce a term – like the term ‘state’ – 
whose definition is contested.  José Harris suggests four models of ‘civil society’.
135  
Model 1 posits that civil society is virtually coterminous with government, law 
enforcement and the state.  Model 2 views civil society as consisting of private property 
rights, commercial capitalism and the legal, institutional and cultural systems which 
support these.  In this sense, civil society captures sites of economic and social power 
held in private hands rather than in the hands of the state as representing the public.  On 
the third model, ‘civil society’ consists of  that set or range of voluntaristic no-profit-
making civic and mutual help movements that coexist with but have a different ethos 
from either the state (Model 1) or the market (Model 2); this understanding locates civil 
society as akin to what Alexandre de Tocqueville called ‘civil associations’ in his 
Democracy in America.  Finally, on Model 4, ‘civil society’ means universal standards of 
democracy, fair procedure, rule of law and human rights, conceived of as the basis of 
                                                 
135 Harris (2006). 
  98‘civilised society’.  As Harris notes the term ‘civil society’ has radically changed its 
meaning over the course of the 2,000 years since the idea emerged in Ancient Rome, 
such that “[the term] remains curiously obtuse, malleable and [a] much contested idea, 
difficult to define categorically by reference to either what it is or what it is not.”
136  
Notwithstanding this conceptual challenge, contemporary discourses have by and large 
employed ‘civil society’ in the sense of Model 3, to designate those forms of social 
organisation that are not under direct governmental control and administration (though 
they may receive governmental funding). 
 
Adopting this sense of ‘civil society’, justice as discourse would not constrain any non-
governmental organisations, whether these be more informal community based groups or 
large and more formalised NGOs, from adhering to, asserting publicly or advocating 
politically from the basis of religious values.  This would include lobbying of political 
representatives and the expression in publications or through other fora of positions and 
ideas that may be grounded in religious beliefs.  This is near to saying that no 
constraining line must be drawn around civil society organisations but this may not 
exactly be the case.  In the provision of services or in rights to participate in activities, 
religious-orientated civil society organisations may exclude those who do not share their 
religious outlooks.  While there would be no problem if, for example, non-adherents were 
excluded from a religious service, there may be cases where non-governmental, religious 
organisations take on functions that are supported or regulated by the state and in which 
therefore any religiously exclusionary behaviour could be problematic.  Faith-based 
schools are perhaps the most obvious example.  It is difficult to theorise in the abstract 
                                                 
136 Harris (2006) at 140 (emphasis in original). 
  99about what constraints may have to be imposed on civil society organisations in cases 
where they engage in activities which the state has an interest, but in such circumstances 
it may be necessary to constrain religiously exclusionary behaviour, in the name of 
preserving the secular, in the sense of neutral, character of the state.  For faith-based 
schools this would probably mean a commitment to either fund all such schools in some 
equitable manner or not to fund any of them and it may require admissions regulations if 
there is funding.  Such a constraint, however, would be a much weaker and tentative line 
than would be imposed on the state’s executive or judicial officials or on a religious basis 
for legislation.  Moreover, the constraint would be minimal: it would only go so far as 
necessary to preserve the neutral and secular character of the state; any advocacy or other 
activity by the civil society groups would be unconstrained. 
 
2.3.4  Political reasons 
The most substantial difference between justice as discourse and Rawls’ political 
liberalism comes in the role that religious outlooks may play in the broad zone of 
discursive politics and general political debate.  Political liberalism, even with Rawls’ 
proviso, insisted on constraining religious (and other) comprehensive doctrines in public 
political debate in order that all reasons in such debate are grounded in what he called 
“proper political reasons”,
137 namely reasons that are not given solely on the basis of 
comprehensive doctrines, including religion. 
 
In common with the critiques of this position discussed in the preceding chapter, justice 
as discourse would remove the constraint of providing ‘proper political reasons’ and 
                                                 
137 Rawls  (1997) at 783ff. 
  100allow citizens individually as well as collectively publicly to express and advocate in 
religious terms and on the basis of religious reasoning.  In this, justice as discourse also 
goes beyond even Habermas’ alternative to Rawls, precisely because it removes the 
translation requirement Habermas would impose and allows religious reasons to be 
expressed in legislative deliberations.   
 
The political arena is thus conceived of as a zone of public discourse but private opinion. 
That is to say, whether individually or in a collective, when citizens engage in political 
discourse at this level they would have to do so as private citizens, expressing private 
views – not the views of the state, or government.  This zone of politics would, however, 
include formal political parties and other political lobbying structures and may even see 
these organisations receive public funding or public support for their funding (in 
facilitative tax treatment, for example).  To ensure equality, justice as discourse would 
insist that if any such support is given  it must be provided on a symmetrical basis to all 
organisations of the type – i.e., to all political parties (though there may be requirements 
that such parties should have a certain number of legislative seats or percentage of the 
vote etc).  The receipt of public support, however, would not compromise that view that, 
these organisations would be expressing private views.  Thus, both  Political Party A and 
Political Party B may get funding from the public treasury without this funding meaning 
that the views of either party are views of the state; each would understand themselves as 
expressing a private (though in the case of parties not individual) set of political ideas.  
Justice as discourse would allow though not compel public support for political 
expression. 
  101 
Within the zone of politics thus posited would also be included more informal political 
expression.  The publication of pamphlets or newspapers, the holding of debates, the 
distribution of policy papers, the submission of ‘letters to the editor’, and other such 
political expressions.  In all of these sorts of activities, justice as discourse would allow 
those with religious convictions to express these convictions as such and to advocate for 
public policy to reflect their particular concerns and to subject these views, as Justice 
Brennan said, to public scrutiny and to support at the ballot box.  This is therefore the 
area where there would be no constraints but for the above-noted requirement that if 
public support from the state is provided for such organisations, it must be provided 
symmetrically. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Justice as discourse seeks to retain the strengths of the liberal outlook and in particular 
liberal theory’s desire to allow for broad expression of different viewpoints.  At the same 
time, it is also an attempt to develop a conceptual framework that will overcome some of 
critiques that have been directed at classical liberal theory, particularly in the restrictions 
that this theory imposes on the expression of views in public political debate that are 
based upon or inspired by religious convictions.  To this end, the goal of the framework is 
to develop a broader public space that is more receptive to a diversity of viewpoints, 
including, and particularly, those that may have religious groundings. 
 
  102In this chapter, we have noted that achieving this goal necessarily implies a public space 
that is secular but, in so being, not one that is hostile to religious sentiments.  This raises 
a tension.  How might arguments and opinions coming out of religious commitments play 
a legitimate role when we come to debate matters of public importance on the one hand, 
while we still maintain the particular, and necessary, element of secularity on the other?  
The answer proposed herein lies in articulating boundaries that will both allow diversity 
to be expressed as well as secure the necessary element of secularity.   
 
We have further noted that these boundaries have to be drawn in relation to the sites of 
power and authority that could limit expressions of diversity.  It is thus that the 
bureaucratic and institutional capacities of the state, as reflected in its executive, 
administrative and judicial officials, must be restrained from using their powers either to 
advance or to hamper any particular religious view(s).  This means further that no 
reliance can be made on such views in the exercise of state offices, whether in an 
executive policy making, or administrative or judicial reasoning capacity.  Necessarily, 
these restrictions will have to be ensured by the courts.  For this, courts will need to be 
empowered with guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and belief, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association the defence of which would then enable them to 
constrain authority as and when necessary.  Equally, such provisions should be the limit 
for securing the agnostic secular space that justice as discourse would demand.  Any 
more robust assertions of secularism should be avoided as prejudicial to the expression of 
religious viewpoints and hence of the full gamut of political diversity. 
 
  103Such a schema both recognises and embraces the fact that restricting the organised state 
does not mean that these institutions will be immune from the influence of religious 
convictions.  As alternatives to the Weberian conception of the state have indicated, the 
formal structures of the state are not the only site of social power.  Justice as discourse is, 
however, committed to allowing the state to be influenced by diverse views and by other 
sites of social power; to allow these ideas, even to seek to, as Talal Asad has put it, 
“reform the life ambition of the secular state itself.”
138  Thus, outside of the institutions of 
the Weberian state, justice as discourse proposes that religious convictions should be 
given a wide zone to operate within the sphere of civil society and in relation to 
discursive politics undertaken in informal ways.  Critically, this would be permissive of 
the expression of religious reasoning as a legitimate variety of political reasoning. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that the requirements of justice as discourse in terms 
of implementation offer a set of political principles as boundaries or limits for the 
political order.  Consistent with classical liberal theory, these would obviously be 
compatible with different types of the political institutions, i.e., uni- or bi-cameral 
legislatures; constitutional monarchies or republics; Common, Civil or other types of law 
regimes etc.  Thus, Rawls discussed his political liberalism as applying only to the level 
of ‘constitutional essentials’ (though he was less clear about what these were)
 139 beyond 
                                                 
138 Asad (2003) at 199. 
139 It is interesting to speculate on why Rawls leaves ‘constitutional essentials’ somewhat vaguely defined.  
Perhaps he thought where this line was drawn would rightly be itself a matter of debate and contestation 
that courts should settle.  As he says  in footnote 7 of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Rawls (1997) 
at 767): 
 
Constitutional essentials concern questions about what political rights and liberties, say, 
may reasonably be included in a written constitution, when assuming the constitution may 
be interpreted by a supreme court, or some similar body. 
  104which political liberalism did not really have anything to say. Justice as discourse applies 
more widely.  Mainstream liberal regimes, whether of the Rawlsian variety or otherwise, 
can and do exist in a variety of institutional forms and thus we can think of, for example, 
the United States, the UK, France, Canada etc as all being ‘liberal’ even thought they 
have different institutional forms.   The same would apply for justice as discourse; it, too, 
can consistently exist with a variety of institutional arrangements. 
 
The delicate balancing act between being influenced but not committed, being open but 
not beholden, that justice as discourse proposes rests on walking a fine line.  However, 
the only way it seems possible to allow the widest and most expansive variety of political 
outlooks -- including especially those that may arise from religious convictions -- to 
speak to our political decisions and choices, is to establish a line that is strong enough to 
keep the coercive power latent in the state uncommitted to any political (and religious) 
outlook, while also porous enough to be challenged by such outlooks through other 
locations of discourse and of social power, whether these be located in elements of ‘civil 
society’ or the articulation of ‘proper’ political reasoning.  Justice as discourse thus 
attempts to modify the requirements of classical liberal theory enough, but only just 
enough, to allow this theory to achieve the aim which it always set for itself; that is to 
allow the widest possible range of conceptions of the good to be posited and to compete 
for societal acceptance.
 140    It is the contention of justice as discourse that for this to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
This defines but in a rather loose way.  Alternatively, maybe this is just an area of Rawls’ theory that we 
have to accept as needing elaboration, though sadly, now, we cannot press Rawls to be clearer.   
140 Of course, a feminist, for example, might say that inherent or pre-existing allocations of power mean 
that free and fair competition can never happen.  More generally, it might be argued that there will always 
be dominant groups in any society who will be able to use ‘neutral’ principles to maintain their dominance.  
  105realised religious sentiments must be allowed to be expressed more freely than they are 
under the restrictions of classical liberal theory and additionally that they should be 
allowed to express themselves on their own terms and in their own languages.  Moreover, 
it will be argued later in this study that this new balancing is especially appropriate for 
Muslim contexts where the relationship between religion, politics and law has been 
shaped by a particular dynamic and which are today in need of a way of drawing lines to 
embrace the interplay of these forces in a manner that is appropriate to the legacies of 
their histories. 
  106Chapter 3.  Muslim Contexts I: History and heritage 
 
It is better to trust in the Lord than to put confidence in princes.
141 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
We have thus far considered the role of religion in public political discussions in terms of 
normative political theory and the issue of the relationship of the ‘secular’ and the 
‘religious’ and their political implications, which was developed out of ‘Western’ 
contexts and was indeed applicable to them.  Given that this study is addressed to 
environments where Islam is a majority religious tradition – what I call ‘Muslim 
contexts’ -- at certain points in the discussion reference was also made to the 
particularities of these contexts or to implications that may be distinctive to these 
environments.  We are now at a point where it is important to unpack more fully the 
special characteristics and structures of Muslim contexts.  Of course this chapter (indeed, 
no chapter) can ever hope to cover everything that one could gather under the heading of 
‘Muslim contexts’ in a comprehensive way.   What this chapter does want to address, 
however, is that particular part of the heritage of, and thought coming from, Muslim 
contexts that is relevant to the issues with which this study is concerned, namely issues of 
political and legal order and structure.  Another general aim of this chapter is to reinforce 
the relevance of the issues discussed earlier to Muslim contexts by demonstrating their 
significance both to concerns of the past and present of these contexts.  Lastly, but by no 
means least, the final general aim of this chapter is to provide the basis for ‘connecting 
the dots’ between the above-noted general issues that this study is concerned with and the 
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  107unique context in which, and for which, it seeks to address them.  In this way, this 
chapter will make it possible to marry the generic discussion to a specific milieu and 
thereby construct an analytical as well as normative framework – a task that will also be 
addressed in the following chapter. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter will begin by examining the idea of ‘Muslim contexts’.  We 
will explore both what unites these contexts as well as the diversity that exists within 
them.  Second, we will consider how in the history of Muslim societies religion, politics 
and law have been related both in theory and in practice.   From this we will see that 
while not always accepted in theory, in actual practice, religious and political authority 
have occupied different places for most of the history of Muslim contexts.  This means 
that, indeed, Muslim contexts have indeed experienced secularisation in the sense of the 
functional social differentiation discussed earlier and that this has had, and continues to 
have, substantial political and legal implications, especially with the emergence of the 
nation state.  Moreover, in what will follow this chapter, we will see that there is 
substantial support within contemporary Muslim contexts for democratic structures 
which still leave open a place for religious sentiments.  This chapter thus makes the 
independent, though perhaps somewhat implicit, claim that much of the liberal theory and 
liberal framework we have seen previously has relevance to the Muslim milieu we will 
discuss herein. 
 
 
 
  108 
3.1  Why use the term ‘Muslim contexts’? 
I use the expression Muslim contexts both deliberately and advisedly, with each part of 
the expression seeking to elicit a particular meaning.  The latter part of the term is 
perhaps easier to understand.  The societies in which Muslims live exhibit a great deal of 
diversity.  That this should be so is hardly surprising.  Countries of Muslim majority are 
first of all spread over an enormously large area, stretching from, essentially, Morocco, 
across North and West Africa to Central and West Asia, into South Asia and down and 
east across the vast expanse of the Indonesia archipelago.   In addition, of course, there 
are significant Muslim minority populations in India, China, and, of more recent 
settlement, in Western Europe and North America.  The geography of Muslim presence 
alone is, therefore, enormous.  Add to this geography more than 1400 years of a rich 
history
142 and total numbers consisting of about one billion people, approximately one-
sixth of the world’s population, and the range of experiences and conditions that inform 
and shape Muslims is tremendous.   Indeed, that Muslim societies should be a monolith 
considering these factors would be a shock.  As Carl Ernst has stated: 
Muslims are the majority population in more than fifty countries that vary 
widely in language, ethnic composition, natural resources and level of 
technology, and they form significant minorities in many other countries.  
Why, then, should it be so natural for non-Muslims to assume that all 
Muslims are and act the same, regardless of the conditions in which they 
live?  Is it conceivable that all Muslims are identical, and that they have no 
location in time and space?
 143 
 
 
                                                 
142 The Muslim calendar dates from the hijra, that is, Muhammad’s pilgrimage from the city of Medina to 
Mecca, which took place in 622 of the Common Era (CE).   
143 Ernst (2003) at 12. 
  109Nor is the plurality of the Muslim world new.  It has existed since centuries as Islam 
spread to different parts of the world where it encountered different cultures and 
traditions.
144  For example, as Clifford Geertz has noted in his study of Morocco and 
Indonesia, 
 …to say that Morocco and Indonesia are both Islamic societies, in the sense 
that everyone in them (well over nine-tenths of the population in either case) 
professes to be a Muslim, is as much to point to their differences as it is to 
locate their similarities.  Religious faith, even when it is fed from a common 
source, is as much a particularizing force as a generalizing one…
145  
 
What Geertz and Ernst help us to realise is that Muslim contexts are characterised both 
by different interpretations of faith as well as by different influences coming from the 
local situation. 
 
If the fact of diversity is not new, what is more recent is the (greater) recognition of this 
plurality.  As Riaz Hasan has noted globalisation – presumably through the means of 
vastly improved modes of communication and travel -- is showing Muslims the diversity 
in Islam and allowing them to experience the reality of different Islamic cultures.
146  We 
can thus see that there is not a singular ‘Islamic’ response or answer or position, but 
rather that it is better to speak of the responses (answers, positions) of Muslims.  And of 
course, we are not dealing in all Muslim contexts with just Muslims.  Muslim contexts 
encounter both intra- as well as inter- religious diversity.  Indeed, on this point, it is 
important to remember that Islam because it emerged historically after Judaism and 
                                                 
144 Wael Hallaq has noted, for example, the ‘ubiquitous plurality’ of early Muslim legal thinking up to the 
10
th century CE, albeit a plurality that became somewhat more circumscribed, but not eliminated, in later 
history.  See Hallaq (2001) at 61. 
145 Geertz (1971) at 13-14. 
146 Hasan (2002) at 243. 
  110Christianity, self-consciously sees itself as part of a message that explicitly includes its 
Abrahamic cousins.
147  The Qur’anic text has numerous references both to the Biblical 
prophets as well as their messages and confirms these as coming from the same source; 
hence the concept of the ahl al-kitab (Peoples of the Book).   
 
In the face of this diversity there are of course two options: one is to try to ignore it or 
eliminate it; the other is to embrace it and, perhaps, draw strength from it.  While the 
latter is not easy to do, the first seems to be an obscurantist exercise in futility.  Thus, it is 
important to talk about contexts versus a context, thereby keeping in mind the locations 
in time and space and the diversity that this will, inevitably, engender. 
 
This diversity is additionally significant because it belies any attempts, whether by 
academics, journalist or other observers of Muslims, or indeed of Muslims themselves, to 
speak as if what they observe or what they say represents the view of ‘Islam’.  Thus, 
Ernst further notes that: 
Although it is common to hear people say, for example, “Christianity says 
that…” or “according to Islam…” the only thing that can be observed is that 
individual people who call themselves Christians or Muslims have particular 
positions and practices that they observe and defend.  No one, however, has 
ever has ever seen Christianity or Islam do anything.  They are abstractions, 
not actors comparable to human beings.
148 
 
Of course in certain cases, there are religious authorities and bodies that can speak for 
certain communities.  Christianity may not be able to say “x” or “y”, but the Roman 
                                                 
147 The Qur’an makes several references to earlier scriptures and to earlier prophets including Jesus (Isa), 
David (Daud), Moses (Musa), Noah (Nuh) and Abraham (Ibrahim) and says that it confirms these 
scriptures.  The Qur’an further says that it is the final revelation in this line. See Qur’an 3:03; 3.48, 3:50, 
4:163, 5:44, 5:46, 5:110, 61:06,. 
148 Ernst (2003) at 51.  See also in the same spirit Panjwani (2005). 
  111Catholic Church, for example, can.  In the case of Islam, however, Ernst’s observation is 
even more poignant because there has never been a church structure nor a clerical 
organisation or hierarchy with the same authority as in the case of the Christian churches, 
or in certain other religious traditions. Indeed, while there may not be the position of 
‘Christianity’, there have been and continue to be the positions of the recognised, 
corporate, Christian churches.  The same, however, cannot be said of an ‘Islamic’ 
position since there have never been institutions which have been able to speak with the 
same level of authority in the name of the faith.  The ‘clerics’ of Islam, various styled as 
imams, maulvis, shaykhs, mullahs etc -- with perhaps the only notable exception being 
the Imam in Shia Islam -- have been recognised as clerics in this sense by others in the 
community.  Occasionally, as we will see in more detail below, governments have sought 
to validate and appoint people to clerical office, but this has not really given these people 
normative clerical authority (even if it gave them administrative authority).  Thus, to the 
first term of the phrase, I use the word ‘Muslim’, rather than ‘Islamic’ to avoid the sense 
of speaking in a religiously normative way and to emphasise that the contexts that I am 
speaking about are contexts composed of the views of Muslims rather than of ‘Islam’ as 
if it were some entity that can be understood outside of the expressions of Muslims.
149 
                                                 
149 It is in this sense that I have some discomfort with titles such as that of Hamid Hadji Haidar’s 
Liberalism and Islam: practical reconciliation between the liberal state and Shiite Muslims (Haidar 
(2008)).  My concern arises from how one defines the parameters of ‘Islam’ or even the views of ‘Shiite 
Muslims’.  In his text, Haidar has to confront this point and states the following: 
 
It should be noted that by Shiite Islam this book refers to the theory that justifies the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in its ideal form.  There are, however, many basic principles and values 
that are characteristic to all Twelver [i.e., the majority Shiite community] Shiite Muslims 
throughout the world.  Yet, in controversial and sensitive cases, this book constructs its 
arguments largely on views and ideas developed by Imam [i.e., Ayatollah] Khomeni (1902-
1989)…In addition, in many cases a reference will be made to the views and ideas 
developed by Muhammad Hussein Tabatabai (1903-1981).  
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The diversity just described is further significant because it means that there will of 
course be multiple positions, interpretations and understandings that Muslims will hold 
on what Islam demands and what they would wish to see occur in the societies in which 
they live.  In short that there will be the ‘irreducible fact of pluralism’ both within and 
across Muslim contexts that is constant and enduring. 
 
3.2  What is the same, and what is different, about Muslim contexts? 
One might be tempted to ask if Muslim contexts can be, and are, so diverse, what if 
anything makes them different from other contexts of either a religious or non-religious 
type?  Moreover, if Muslim contexts are so varied and thus can mean an enormously 
wide range of opinions and perspectives do they actually mean anything?  Indeed, does it 
make sense to use the idea of ‘Muslim contexts’ or is this term a mere chimera? 
 
Discussing Muslim contexts is not disingenuous because there are important elements 
that make these contexts distinctly Muslim (though, it bears repeating, not necessarily 
‘Islamic’).  Most fundamentally, within Muslim contexts two sources are taken seriously 
and considered basic.  One is the text of the Qur’anic revelation; the second is the person, 
example and traditions of the Muhammad b. Abdullah, i.e., the Prophet Muhammad (d. 
632CE).  The salience of both of these sources is perhaps obvious but no less significant 
for being so.  The Qur’anic text is considered the most significant and sacred scriptural 
                                                                                                                                                 
Haidar’s work thus appears as an evaluation of the practical reconciliation of liberalism (he uses 
JS Mill and John Rawls as his liberal theorists) and the theory of the Islamic Republic of Iran as 
expressed by Khomeni and, secondarily, Tabatabi.  This is both more focused and more limited in 
scope than the title of his work at first reading suggests and his conclusions must be understood in 
this more specific frame. 
  113source within Muslim contexts.  It is the basic, foundational, reference for a Muslim 
outlook.  Similarly, the example, teaching, actions and model of Muhammad are looked 
to both as a moral exemplar and source of guidance as well as, often, a paradigm for 
emulation. 
 
This is not to say that Muslims in all their contexts (both in a contemporary sense and 
over the years) have always understood either the Qur’anic text and message or the 
example and teachings of Muhammad in the same way.  They certainly have not.  What 
makes their contexts distinctly Muslim is not an unanimity of interpretation but rather a 
consensus on the significance of, and reference to, these two basic sources, 
notwithstanding the myriad views that they may generate.  In short, these foundational 
sources are taken seriously and addressed with a certain gravity as basic to the 
community of Muslims, and this is what unifies and binds together these contexts and 
distinguishes them from non-Muslim contexts.  Outside of Muslim contexts, the Qur’anic 
text and the Prophetic example, while they may be studied, respected and even venerated 
are not going to be basic, foundational sources for one’s world view or ‘whole truth’. 
 
To illustrate this point, we can draw an analogy from literary criticism.  In his 
groundbreaking work The Great Code: the Bible and literature, the eminent Canadian 
scholar Northrop Frye argued convincingly that the Bible was a sort of leitmotif that ran 
through the history of Western literature.
150  Though an oversimplification of Frye’s 
argument, the essential point (or at least an essential point) that Frye was making was that 
one cannot fully appreciate the corpus of Western literature without understanding the 
                                                 
150 Frye  (1982). 
  114enormous reference, explicit and implicit, that it makes to the Bible.  In other words, the 
Bible is the ‘great code’ to this enormous literary heritage.  We might say, then, that 
Muslim contexts are those in which the Qur’anic text and the Prophetic example operates 
as a type of ‘great code’; and non-Muslim contexts will operate on different ‘great 
codes’.   This coding idea means, of course, that Muslim contexts are not geographically 
defined per se; rather they are defined by the existence and operation of the Muslim code.  
This may occur in countries of Muslim majority populations but it could also occur 
among Muslims where they are in a minority; what is important is the ‘coding’.   
 
From these essential sources, however, has grown a much larger edifice of thought and 
reflection.  This whole complex of Muslim societies and cultures might be characterised 
as a working out, in multiple locations of time and space, of the meanings of the essential 
sources.  Just as the Bible would have informed the corpus of Western literature in so 
many ways, so too the essential sources of Muslim identity have informed another corpus 
of literature.  But of course the influence has been not just on literature but also on 
science, philosophy, history, law, art, architecture etc; in short the whole range of human 
experience and activities.  This heritage is also imbedded within and a part of the 
character of Muslim contexts and it is distinctive because it evokes a different range of 
references than other contexts.  Thus, for example, instead of thinking of Thomas 
Aquinas as a pre-eminent figure in theology and law as may be the case in contexts 
informed by Christianity, in Muslim contexts one might think of al-Ghazzali (d. 1111 
CE).   So Muslim contexts have a whole range of references that will be different, though 
not necessarily always so or exclusively so, from non-Muslim contexts.  Just as the 
  115essential sources of Muslim contexts, qua a ‘code’ are not geographically constrained, 
neither is the broader heritage of thought and references.  These, too, will be found, 
mutatis mutandis, in Muslim communities in different parts of the world and at different 
times. 
 
All of this is to establish that there is something to the idea of Muslim contexts.  There 
are essential, foundational sources – a sort of great code – that are both pre-eminent and 
basic, and then there is the whole civilisation (some may prefer to say civilisations) that 
has developed out of a dialogue over time and in different locations with the code.   As 
Mohammad Ashgar Khan has noted when talking about the Muslim world encompassing 
about one sixth of the world’s population and stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, 
there is, for want of a better term, “an ‘Islamic factor’ prevalent in these 
countries…There is a thread of affinity which runs across national boundaries...”
151 
However, this does not compromise that within the civilisation(s) there has been and 
continues to be great diversity of interpretation, perspective and practical manifestations 
(in institutions etc) and thus that there must be an appreciation of the plurality of Muslim 
contexts. 
 
In consequence, by addressing Muslim contexts I mean to address all those for whom the 
‘code’ I have just described is foundational.  This would include countries of Muslim 
majority but also minority Muslim populations, whether of large numbers both absolutely 
and as a percentage of their national populations, for example, in India, or of relatively 
small numbers (in both senses) as they may be in Australia.  Necessarily, however, what 
                                                 
151 Khan, (1995) at 1. 
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majority settings.  In these environments, I hope to show how justice as discourse is 
useful where there is a predominantly Muslim code. Indeed, it is in these settings that I 
hope this study will make the greatest impact.  In this sense, I hope to make a 
contribution to a challenge identified by Hassan Hanafi, who has argued that: 
The major risk for the future is that Muslim societies will be offered only 
fundamentalist/secularist alternatives.  Unless Muslim advocates of a middle 
course resume the serious task of developing and implementing pluralistic and 
representative conceptions of state and society from within the Islamic 
tradition, Islam will offer no conception of civil society.
152 
 
What Hanafi seems to suggest is that there is a polarisation of options for Muslim 
societies where religion is either supposed to be entirely defining (‘fundamentalist’) or 
must be entirely excluded (‘secularist’, though of the laic variety) and hence the need for 
other options.  By positing the framework I do, I hope that this study will make a 
contribution to developing a ‘middle course’ both by challenging the polarisation Hanafi 
appears to assume and then developing within this framework a pluralistic and 
representative conceptions of state and society, a part of which includes the role of civil 
society, consistent with Muslim heritage.  This task requires taking seriously the needs of 
Muslim societies, important aspects of which I seek to elucidate in this chapter. 
 
It is also important to address the relevance of ‘Muslimness’ as a category.  As Ernst 
notes, Muslims are affected by all the major factors of life that influence all of us: 
economic class, access to political power, ethnicity, gender, nationality, location, 
                                                 
152 Hanafi (2002) at 74.  Akeel Bilgrami has termed this polarized situation a ‘clash within civilisations’ 
(adapting Samuel Huntington’s now famous ‘clash of civilisations’ phrase) in his “The clash within 
civilisations” (Bilgrami (2003)). 
  117language and history and thus “To assume that Muslims, and Muslims alone, are driven 
to act exclusively by religion, apart from any other factors that shape our lives, is more 
than absurd.  It dehumanises Muslims…”
153 A similar situation affects any general 
category, let us say, ‘women’ for example.  Are there issues that affect women in general 
or does a ‘feminist outlook’ become an untenable premise? For that matter can there be a 
‘Black’ outlook or a ‘British’ outlook?  We cannot deny the variation that runs 
throughout a category of Muslims (or of women or of the British) and the various other 
factors that might stimulate the outlooks and actions of the peoples in this (these) 
category(ies).  Nor, however, should we, on the other hand, deny that there might be 
some significance to the fact of Muslimness (etc).  Muslims clearly are separated and 
divided by geography, language, economic situation and even aspects of history and yet 
those who call themselves Muslims accept, I would suggest, some basic elements – 
namely, as I have formulated it, the Qur’anic text and Prophetic example; the elements of 
my Muslim ‘code’.   
 
Benedict Anderson has developed the idea of an ‘imagined community’ -- community 
that is not based on direct, face-to-face interaction but rather on an imagined, and one 
might say projected, affinity and communion.
154  Anderson’s imagined communities are 
linked to the nation and to the development of national print-languages, but the concept 
of a community stemming from some source and generating from that a communion 
amongst its members is useful. Indeed, the long-standing idea that emerged among 
Muslims of the ‘ummah’ being a broad community of faith encompassing all Muslims 
                                                 
153 Ernst (2003) at 28 (emphasis added). 
154 Anderson (1991) at 6. 
  118and having a sort of transcendent character, which unites Muslims in bonds of fraternity 
(and sorority) within a defined geographical area, but also trans-nationally, has been, and 
continues to be, a locus of identity for Muslims and seems very much to be the type of 
imagined community that Anderson envisages.  As he says: 
…the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. 
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two 
centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to 
die for such limited imaginings.
155  
 
The same may be said for the ummah.  That the ummah is not the same because 
its members all think the same, speak the same languages, enact the same rituals 
or come to the same views on what their religio-legal rules require etc, and that on 
any one of these or other matters there might not be a unifying core, should not 
make us despair of the category.   
 
Grappling with the sameness of difference and the imprecision of some categories 
which still seem to make sense, Ludwig Wittgenstein, using the example of 
games, develops the idea of ‘family resemblance’.
156  In Wittgenstein’s analysis, 
in a category like ‘games’ or ‘numbers’ there may not be one thing that all games 
or all numbers have in common and yet there is resemblance similar to the 
“various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc. [that] overlap and criss-cross in the same way.”
157  
Hence, there may be no one thing that all in a family may have in common and 
yet there can still be a ‘family resemblance’ that unites them.  Our inability to 
                                                 
155 Anderson (1991) at 7. 
156 Wittgenstein (2001). 
157 Wittgenstein (2001) at para  67. 
  119give a definition based on a single common thing – e.g., all games do this, all 
numbers are like this, everyone in the family shares this trait, or all Muslims 
do/think/believe ‘x’ – need not need force us to admit ignorance of family 
resemblances.  “We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn” 
and we should instead think that “the strength of the thread does not reside in the 
fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of 
many fibres.”
158   
 
The code suggested above generates an imagined community of the ummah, which unites 
Muslims not in an exact sameness or even one expression of exact sameness but only as 
parts of a similar family with subtle and complex resemblances.  And this, in turn, means 
that they can all relate at some level to the working out of this code in the history of their 
co-religionists and thus participate in a certain common – albeit diverse – legacy.  This is 
not, however, a legacy of a linear history.  Among some of the groups that will be 
discussed below, the Fatimids and the Abbasids existed at the same time, the Umayyads 
in Spain outlived the Umayyads in Damascus and the Ottomans both existed at the same 
time and outlived the Qajars in Persia and the Mughals in India.  Thus, while we must 
recognise the inter-sectionality of Muslims and the complications of the legacy we need 
not make the fact of their being Muslims irrelevant; we need not either destroy or deny 
the code. 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Wittgenstein (2001), at paras 69 and 67. 
  1203.3  The politico-legal legacy: 
Critical to this study is a discussion of the political and legal heritage of Muslim contexts.  
We can begin by looking at the inter-relationship between political and religious 
authority, and thereafter at legal authority.  It is often pointed out that Islam has never 
known a ‘church’ in the Christian sense of an organised, hierarchical and authoritative 
body.  Indeed, since its early years, after the period of the so-called  “Rashidun” or 
“Rightly guided” caliphs (the last of whom, Ali b. Abi Talib, died in 661 CE) a de facto 
split between political and religious authority has prevailed.  Casanova acknowledges and 
asserts that in its early days Islam was both a religious as well as a political community, 
with Muhammad having the roles of both political and religious leader.
159  Nonetheless, 
he argues that since the time of Muhammad there has been differentiation between 
political and religious roles within Muslim societies and hence a type of secularisation.  
But all of this needs to be unpacked and explained through a brief overview of salient 
elements and episodes of the political and legal history of Muslim civilisations. 
 
3.3.1  Muhammad, the Prophet, the Leader and the Lawgiver 
We begin with Muhammad himself who receives his first revelation in 610CE while he is 
in the city of Mecca, which was his home.  As he begins to share his revelation, from 
about 613CE onwards, and to receive more, a group of followers gather around him.  
Muhammad’s message, however, challenged the structures and religious traditions of his 
Meccan society, and the authority of the Meccan tribes, and as his influence and 
following grew, so did the annoyance he caused to the powers of the time.
160 The 
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  121situation became tense and ultimately very precarious for Muhammad so that eventually 
he was left with no choice but to seek refuge somewhere else.  He and a small group of 
his followers thus left Mecca to migrate north to the city of Medina in 622CE.  This 
migration, known as the hijra, marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar which dates 
events from the hijra, designates as ‘AH’ (after hijra).
161  In Medina, Muhammad and his 
community of Muslims meet with much greater success.  He is, in short, able to establish 
a community of followers as a political as well as spiritual entity.  Here, however, 
Muhammad also encounters Jewish communities who, not unlike the Meccan tribes, were 
at least dubious of his message.  Having some political authority, Muhammad was able to 
establish a relationship between his community and the Jews -- though a compact known 
famously as the ‘Constitution of Medina’ -- though over time, the power of the Jewish 
clans in Medina was reduced.  This agreement laid the groundwork for the emergence of 
Muhammad’s followers as a political community, as his followers were to constitute an 
‘ummah’ (community) among the clans of Medina.  Eventually, the idea of the ummah 
expanded to embrace a fellowship of all Muslims and this is still the word used for the 
community of Muslims today. 
 
Muhammad’s position was thus one of both religious and political authority and later 
emerged also as a legal authority.  The revelation Muhammad received, which Muslims 
believe is now collected in the Qur’an, articulated a vision of right conduct and the best 
way to live and gave guidance to those who would follow it.  The idea of the ‘Shari‘a’ (a 
term that is actually not used very frequently in the Qur’anic text itself) was thus an 
attempt to articulate this vision.  Hence, the term shari‘a may be seen as an abbreviated 
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  122form of the phrase ash-shari‘a al-islamiyya (or the Islamic way or path – shari‘a in fact 
coming from the same lexical root as the contemporary Arabic word for road or street). 
This pathway needed to be explained and expounded and, during his lifetime, 
Muhammad was the authority to do so.
162   
 
The extent to which Muhammad intended to establish a polity as part of his mission is 
much debated.  Anthony Black suggests that what Muhammad did was spiritual and 
political, and that part of Muhammad’s point was that earlier theism had failed to come to 
terms with the problem of power.  At the heart of Muhammad’s project then was the 
transfer of power from empire to prophet and from tribe and state to religious 
community.
163  Wael Hallaq, however, suggests that prior to his arrival in Medina, 
Muhammad probably did not have in mind the establishment of a new polity, let alone a 
new legal order, being concerned up until that time with “faith, morality and the purity of 
mundane existence.”
164  Once in Medina, however, circumstances forced themselves on 
Muhammad and, as we have said, he became the head not just of spiritual community but 
also a political one.  Regardless of whether the political establishment was intended in an 
a priori way or not, the move to Medina consolidated a political role for Muhammad. 
The nature of the political community, however, was different from the existing tribal or 
clan based political groupings that predominated in Arabia at the time.  The ummah was 
to be a community of faith based submission to God and his prophet. As the Qur’an says 
(Qur’an 48:10): “Those who swear fealty to you [Muhammad] swear fealty by that act 
unto God.  The hand of God is over their hands.”  On the other hand, a community 
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  123defined by its religious character was something that was not unknown in the Abrahamic 
tradition in which Islam would be situated.  The Jewish clans in Medina were an example 
and equally the idea of religious communities was mentioned in the Qur’an.  Sura 
(chapter) 5:48 of the Qur’an states: 
We have revealed unto you a Book [the Qur’an] with the Truth, confirming 
whatever scripture was before it…for We have made for each of you [i.e., 
Muslims, Christians and Jews] a law (shari‘a) and a normative way to 
follow (minhaj). If God had willed, He would have made you one 
community. 
 
The arbiter of the law for the Muslims was Muhammad, who “solved legal problems as 
and when they arose, by interpreting the relevant Qur’anic revelations”.
165  As Werner 
Menski has noted “He [Muhammad] was the leader the judge and spiritual guide of the 
emerging community” adding further that “The multiplicity of the Prophet’s functions 
shows that he was primarily engaged in applying God’s Laws, inevitably involving 
human discretion.”
166 
 
The various roles that Muhammad fulfilled for the nascent Muslim community were all 
linked to, and indeed forged by, the unique authority with which he was vested.  Because 
the revelation came through his voice, Muhammad was the ultimate (physical) source for 
its explication.  Because this revelation contained certain rules, and a sense of a divine 
path or law (the shari‘a), Muhammad was invested with the legal authority in the 
articulating this path and applying these rules.  Indeed, as has been noted, in this role, 
Muhammad’s activities “…created a large body of rulings, regulations, decisions and 
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167 Finally, because the new community (the ummah)
168 was one that was 
organised around a religious faith, rather than on ethnic or other lines, it fell to 
Muhammad as the expositor of this faith to also lead the community politically, and of 
course this role would have entailed legal consequences as well.  Through the unique 
vehicle and circumstances of Muhammad’s prophetic authority there was therefore a 
powerful coincidence of religious, legal and political roles, all of which were exercised, 
par excellence, by the person of the Prophet.  As Hugh Kennedy notes: 
But behind all his pronouncements was the knowledge that Muhammad was 
the chosen of Allah and that there would be divine punishment, horrible and 
unrelenting for those who disobeyed his command, while those who 
followed his ways would be sure of everlasting bliss.  His practices and 
decisions, known as Sunna, were to be the future guidelines in the Muslim 
community.
169 
 
It might go almost without saying that Muhammad’s authority and the above-noted roles 
he fulfilled by virtue of that authority were unique, not just in the common sense of the 
term, but really as ‘one-of-a-kind’ in the context of his times because of the special 
mission (or activity) in which he was engaged.  Thus, Muhammad was, and is, unique in 
the Islamic tradition in the way Moses and Jesus are in Judaism and Christianity 
respectively.  The leadership that Muhammad exercised therefore represents, on the one 
hand, an ideal, because it was infused with unparalleled insight into the divine plan 
arising from the communion that the Prophet enjoyed with God.  On the other hand, this 
exemplar was also unrealisable after Muhammad’s death because it became an article of 
                                                 
167 Menski (2006) at 296. 
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  125faith that  the particular nature of the communion was not going to be enjoyed by 
anybody else thereafter.  It is thus that Muhammad is known as the ‘seal of the prophets’ 
by Muslims with the Qur’an as the final revelation. 
 
The conflict between the ideal model of the Prophet and the unique authority he exercised 
that seamlessly covered political, religious, and legal matters (to which we can add for 
greater accuracy, moral as well) and the incapacity – almost by definition -- for this 
model to be replicated by those who would follow him, would be a tension that runs 
through much of Muslim politico-legal developments and the heritage that these have 
bequeathed to contemporary Muslim contexts and it is to the next stages in the 
development of this heritage that we can now turn. 
 
3.3.2   After the Prophet: Power and Law & Religion 
3.3.2.1 Succession to Muhammad
170- the early caliphs and the emergence of the Sunni 
and Shia traditions 
 
Muhammad’s death in 632CE initiated a sort of crisis in the early Muslim community.  
At stake was the nature of leadership that would succeed him.  Studies of this early 
period are legion such that covering this time in scholarly depth would require at least a 
thesis in and of itself.  For purposes of the legal and political heritage that we will 
require, however, there is a set of prominent points that we may review. 
 
                                                 
170 I borrow this heading from the title of a very comprehensive study of the situation immediately 
following Muhammad’s death by Wilferd Madelung:  The Succession to Muhammad (Madelung (2004)). 
  126First and foremost, there emerged from the question of succession two major models of 
leadership.  The majoritarian model, which we now know as the Sunni tradition, chose 
Abu Bakr as the first caliph to succeed Muhammad.  While the role of the caliphs 
changed over time, to simplify matters what we can note is that the caliphs gained their 
authority either from having been chosen by the community of Muslims, in the case of 
the first four caliphs, or, later, by being part of a dynastic line.  The first four caliphs -- 
Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali b. Abi Talib -- are collectively regarded as the ‘Rightly 
Guided’ caliphs.  All four were intimate companions of the Prophet and were raised to 
the caliphate by being selected by the community.  This, along with their close 
relationship with the Prophet, gave them particular esteem in the eyes of the community 
even though they led in very turbulent times and in fact the last three of these early 
caliphs all met their death by assassination.  Given that they could not simply ‘take over’ 
from Muhammad because of the uniqueness of his position, the precise nature of caliphal 
authority was something that was worked out in the community.  The caliphs were the 
heads of the Muslim community and they exercised primarily political and also a type of 
legal authority, but the receiving of revelation had ended.  Hence, except in the sense of 
the other major model, namely the Shia model which is described below, the caliphs were 
not invested with anything like the same measure of religious authority as Muhammad 
because they were not seen to be in direct communion with the divine.  In short, they 
were his successors but of a qualitatively different kind.  If this was the case with the 
early caliphs it applies even more so after the rightly guided caliphs.   What is important 
to note, however, is that even these first four highly revered individuals were not 
unchallengeable in the way that Muhammad was. 
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Ali b. Abi Talib was Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, having married Muhammad’s 
daughter, Fatima.  He was also from the same clan (or house or family group) as 
Muhammad, the ‘Banu Hashim’ (i.e., Clan of Hashim).  Ali’s father and Muhammad’s 
uncle, Abu Talib, had been the head of the Banu Hashim and had raised Muhammad, 
whose own father had died before the Prophet was born.  On Muhammad’s death, a 
section of the community believed that Ali was the rightful successor to Muhammad and, 
indeed, that Muhammad himself had declared this succession very shortly before his 
death.  Those of this opinion constitute what we now refer to as the Shia (or Shi’i) 
tradition.  While almost certainly not fully formed as a doctrine at the outset, the Shia 
tradition held that the rightful successor to the Prophet should come from the prophetic 
family, known as the ahl al-bayt (or ‘People of the House’), starting with Ali and 
following in hereditary succession through the progeny of Ali and Fatima.  As mentioned 
above, Ali was also the fourth of the selected ‘rightly guided’ caliphs but was regarded by 
the Shia as the first rightful successor.  The Shia further maintain that Ali and his 
successors were endowed with special, divinely-sanctioned authority greater and over 
and above that of Ali just being a close companion and relative of Muhammad and, 
moreover, that this authority is transmitted to Ali’s descendants.  Thus, the Shia use the 
term ‘Imam’ to designate their leaders and the concept of the office of the Imamat as the 
institution of leadership.  While the Shia also maintain that the Qur’an was the final 
revelation, they invest the Imams with the capacity to interpret the Qur’anic text 
authoritatively and furthermore see the Imams as acting and living -- and where the 
opportunity would present itself of ruling -- infallibly. 
  128 
3.3.2.2 After the Rightly Guided – Early dynasties 
With the death of Ali b. Abi Talib in 661CE, the political contours of the Muslim 
community changed significantly.  Ali was succeeded as caliph by Muawiya (b. Abu 
Sufayn) who was able to asert his authority as caliph from his base in Syria.  Muawiya 
reigned as caliph from 661-680CE but more importantly was able to change the form of 
succession to establish the first familial dynasty, known as the Umayyads, which lasted 
from 661 to 750CE.  The dynasty gets this name because Muawiya came from the ‘House 
of Umayya’ (Banu Umayya), one of the significant family/kinship groupings in Arabia at 
the time.  The establishment of a dynasty, with lineal succession, marked a fundamental 
change in the nature of the political leadership and of the authority with which it was 
associated.  The rightly guided caliphs were among the closest companions of 
Muhammad, expected therefore better to understand and to express the prophetic legacy.  
The Umayyads, however, were established by their military and political might and 
succeeded by their bloodline. Thus: 
The caliphal state now stood as a more mundane imperial power, no longer 
based directly on Islam.  Rather it was supported internally as well as 
externally by a particular complex of military and physical power which was 
partially supported in turn by the Islamic faith.
171 
 
In short, the logic of ‘monarchy’ was established and this rested on a very different type 
of authority to that which Muhammad, par excellence, and the rightly guided caliphs 
thereafter represented.
172  Naturally, this had political and religio-legal implications.   
                                                 
171 Hodgson (1974) at 218. 
172 This is not to say that all scholarship agrees that the Umayyads were not making claims that were 
actually religious for their authority.  Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds (Crone and Hinds (1986)), argue that 
the Umayyads saw themselves as rightful successors because of their familial relationship to the third 
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As the political governors, the Umayyads made rulings on a host of legal matters, 
including those that the Qur’anic text or Prophetic traditions (Sunna as collected in 
reports called hadith) may have spoken to, and of course, they would not have been able 
simply to disregard these sources even if they wanted to do so. On the other hand, the 
Umayyads succeeded to an office that, because it had been occupied by boon companions 
of Muhammad who had also made several legal rulings in their time, was invested with a 
great deal of religio-political and religio-legal authority.  Indeed, the early caliphs seemed 
to have used the title of khalifat Allah (‘Deputy of God’), rather than the later khilafat 
rasul Allah (Deputy of the Messenger of God).
173  This deputy status, however, rested in 
a dynastic line not in closeness or companionship with Muhammad.  So we have a double 
legacy combining the establishment of a dynastic system with a monarchical logic, on the 
one hand, and the inheritance of a religious and legal authority, on the other.   
 
There is some scholarly controversy about the upshot of this double legacy.  Sami 
Zubaida asserts that “It would seem that in the first century of Islam, the Umayyad and 
first Abbasid [the Abbasids were the dynasty that followed the Umayyads] caliphs were 
endowed with supreme religious authority, including in matters of interpreting and 
elaborating, and even promulgating shari‘a rules.”
174  Anthony Black, however, while 
accepting that the Umayyad caliphs laid down rules in many different areas, asserts that 
the idea that the caliph could contribute to the actual development of the shari‘a found 
                                                                                                                                                 
caliph, Uthman (who was of the same clan) and thus rightful successors to the Prophet.   As we will see, 
however, the result of the system initiated by the Umayyads would lead to a different conclusion. 
173 See Crone and Hinds (1986) at 43. 
174 Zubaida (2003) at 74. 
  130little support outside court circles.
175  These different opinions are significant for an 
understanding of the time but even Zubaida’s assertion is a harbinger of an important 
change.  This change, now nascent, was a differentiation, or better decoupling, of 
political and legal authority.  Black’s claim suggests that even in the time of the 
Umayyads this was already taking place; Zubaida, on the other hand, would seemingly 
place this development later in history after the Umayyads and the early period of the 
Abbasids.  Both analyses, however, point in the same direction.  In fairness, Black’s 
claim is stronger though, as he argues that many Muslims including proto-Sunni religious 
experts (i.e., the ‘ulama; to be discussed below) saw the Umayyads as deviating from the 
correct norms of Islam and lacking norm-defining legal legitimacy as a result.  The rule 
of the next dynasty, the Abbasids (750-1258CE), would see further developments to the 
caliphal role and, ultimately though not necessarily intentionally, to a greater separation 
between religio-legal and political authority.  Of course, however, these changes would 
not follow a straight path. 
 
The Abbasid capital was Baghdad, instead of the Umayyad Damascus, and by this time 
Muslim territorial conquests had moved beyond the Arabian peninsula and was 
encountering the ancient culture(s) of Persia.  Early in the Abbasid period, Ibn Muqaffa 
(720-c.756CE), a Persian who had served as a secretary under both the Umayyads and the 
Abbasids wrote his Message (Risala fi’l-sahaba) addressed to the caliph al-Mansur (r. 
754-775CE).  In this work, Ibn Muqaffa promulgates ideas of the patrimonial system of 
Ancient Iranian government and seeks to apply them to the caliphate.  The patrimonial 
conception put the state as within patrimony and benefice of the ruler.  As noted by 
                                                 
175 Black (2001) at 19. 
  131Black, as part of this conception, Ibn Muqaffa’s theory wanted to give the ruler power 
over the law by taking the law into his own hands.
176  Ibn Muqaffa, however, seems not 
to have won the argument, at least not dispositively, and at least not in the sense that in 
later years (Ibn Muqaffa was executed by the caliph in c.756CE) others would try to 
reassert claims of the same type; a clear indication that Ibn Muqaffa’s ideas did not 
succeed in establishing the supremacy of the caliph over the law when they were first 
proposed.  Indeed, in an opposing vein, Abu Yusuf, the chief judge (qadi) in the time of 
the caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 781-890CE) in his Book of Taxes (Kitab al-kharaj) while 
addressing the caliph reverentially, emphasises the caliph’s strict accountability to God 
by adherence to ‘God’s law’.  This might be seen to be a very respectable position for a 
judge to take but of course it also articulates a position diametrically opposite to Ibn 
Muqaffa’s formulation.  The caliph al-Mamun (r. 813-833CE), one of the more 
significant Abbasid caliphs, attempted in his time to develop the high ideal of imperial 
dominion and make the ‘deputy’ independent of the religious leaders and in this he was 
supported by the scholar al-Jahiz (c. 776-868/9CE).  The theoretical arguments for the 
supremacy of the caliph qua deputy would, of course, have had to be backed up by 
effective, actual, political power.  For the later Abbasids, however, this would never be 
realised.   By the time of one of al-Mamun’s successor, al-Mutawwakil (r. 847-861CE), 
Turkish slave soldiers had come to dominate over the caliph in terms of real power and 
the various provinces had become effectively independent under new, local, dynasties 
headed by amirs or sultans.   
 
                                                 
176 Black (2001) at 22. 
  132Marshall Hodgson, in fact, characterises the ‘High Caliphate’ as the years 692CE to 
945CE, during which time the caliphal state was a well-established empire.  After 945CE, 
the caliphal state was sometimes only a figurehead.
177 The Abbasid caliphate continued, 
however until 1250CE when Baghdad fell to the Mongols but by this stage the caliph was 
really only a local power that retained a symbolic authority.  Black concludes that the 
emerging Sunni consensus on the role of the caliph was, thus, “damagingly unclear.”
178 
 
This lack of clarity, however, was not only because of the political weakness of the 
Abbassid caliphs, or, to put it differently, the political weakness of the caliphs was not 
only the result of rival political leaders.  Something else was also developing, the germs 
of which have been alluded to above and which we must now examine. 
 
3.3.3  The development of the law – the schools, the fiqh and usul al-fiqh 
Certain fields of thought and practice came to be dominated by piety-
minded representatives of the Islamic hope for a godly personal and social 
order – a hope inherited from the Jewish and Christian priests and monks 
and rabbis and their flocks…Among both Sunni and Shi’i Muslims, a host 
of pious men and women who came to be called the ulama, the ‘learned’, 
worked out what we may call ‘Shariah-minded’ programme for private and 
public living centred on the Shariah law.  They exercised a wide sway, but 
not exclusive control, in Muslim speculative and theological thought.  They 
exercised an effective – but never decisive – pressure in the realms of public 
order and government and controlled the theoretical development of Muslim 
law.
179 
 
We have in the period from about the eight to tenth centuries CE the emergence of the 
great classical tradition of ‘Islamic law’ stemming out of the orientations of the so-called 
                                                 
177 Hodgson (1974) at 233. 
178 Black (2001), at 30. 
179 Hodgson (1974) at 238.  On the last point see also Kelsay (2002) at 10. 
  133piety minded.  Why did this body of people and the classical legal tradition of which they 
would be the expositors develop?  As Roy Mottahedeh has noted, “It was by no means 
inevitable that law should have become so central to higher learning amongst most 
Muslims in the pre-modern period.”
180  However, there is no denying that it did become 
so central, and in many respects remains so today.  There may be several reasons for this, 
of which we may consider the following.  First, of course, time was passing from the 
actual presence of Muhammad and the immediate impact of his authority.  Second, and 
relatedly, with this passage of time were also coming new issues, particularly as the area 
under Muslim hegemony was expanding.  Third, was the fact that the type of authority 
Muhammad enjoyed enhanced and confirmed by his receiving revelation, was not to be 
found again, even among the immediate and close and senior companions from which the 
Rashidun caliphs were drawn, and certainly not, increasingly, thereafter.  Fourth, the rule 
of the Umayyads and later Abbasids was seen as at variance to ‘Islam’ (which really was 
only perfectly represented by Muhammad’s authority and ideal example) at least in the 
eyes of the piety minded for whom the Abbasids represented “…at best a compromise 
with their pious ideals for Muslim society.”
181  Finally, but by no means least, was the 
character of the new religious system that had emerged.  The new community was a 
religious community after all and it had as its linchpin the command of God expressed 
first through the medium of the Prophet and thereafter through the revealed Book.  For 
Muslims, then, the event of the Qura’nic revelation elevated the basic social need for law 
into something more substantial.  Indeed, while it is generally accepted that of the 
approximately six thousand verses of the Qur’ran no more than five to six hundred at 
                                                 
180 As-Sadr (2003) at 1. 
181 Hodgson (1974) at 280. 
  134most have what one might call legal content per se, the Qur’anic ethos envisions 
humanity striving to live in accordance with God’s rules and directions and in God’s way 
or path.  Thus, there are references to the boundaries or limits (hadd, pl. hudud) that 
Muslims should not transgress, and to following God’s path or way (shari‘a), an idea also 
captured in the oft-invoked prayer to remain on the right or correct (and in this sense 
divinely-sanctioned) path (al-sirat al-mustaqim).  This has lead to a conceptualisation of 
the realm of law in Muslim contexts that is more extensive than it is generally thought of 
in, say, the contemporary West.  To some extent, the legal tradition aspires to characterise 
all acts in God’s eyes.
182  The ethos of the Qur’anic text, then, spurred on those who 
would articulate this conceptualisation, especially so once Muhammad was gone and 
there was a different character to the political leadership.  The piety-minded ‘ulama may 
thus be seen as having taken on the responsibility for understanding and articulating 
God’s will as part of a moral hermeneutic. 
 
Early legal formulation drew both upon pre-Islamic legal practice where this was not 
seen as incompatible with the Islamic (and particularly Qur’anic ethos) as well as local 
custom.  As Annelies Moors has noted: “As long as they were not contrary to Islamic 
principles, existing provisions were incorporated into the Islamic legal system, providing 
space for considerable variability in legal practice.”
183  Prophetic practice and traditions 
were also important but, in the first century, as Muhammad’s authority was seen as 
anchored in the Qur’an and as a spokesperson and interpreter of God’s word, rather than 
as law-making in and of himself.  Additionally, though as we shall see this was to 
                                                 
182 Thus Muslim legal traditions know a five-part characterization of acts as forbidden, discouraged, 
permissible, recommended and mandatory. 
183 Moors (1999) at 144. 
  135change, the rulings of the early, and especially, Rashidun caliphs, were also drawn upon 
to construct the legal norms.  This meant that the caliphs “…were not independent agents 
of legislation, but integrally dependent on prior exemplary conduct and precedent, only 
one source of which happened to be decisions of previous caliphs.”
184 
 
The agents of the legal formulations were the piety minded who arose at first as a pious 
opposition
185 to the Umayyads and, as such, operated largely outside of the pre-modern 
Muslim state structure.  While the caliphal regimes appointed, as state officials, judges 
(qadis) who heard individual cases and while the accumulated decisions of the qadis did 
over time start to give some shape to Islamic legal practice, the real agents for this 
development were not the state judges but the independent scholars/jurists (who 
collectively came to be known as the ‘ulama).
186  S o m e  o f  t h e  ‘ ulama w e r e  i n  f a c t  
appointed as judges, but many kept their distance from government and thereby gained 
prestige in the eyes of the people.
187 
 
The further and detailed history of the development of the classical tradition of Islamic 
law is well documented in scholarship
188 and does not, therefore, need to be retold with 
any great elaboration.  What we need to draw out from this history, however, are a few 
prominent points that have relevance for this study.   
 
                                                 
184 Hallaq (2005) at 45. 
185 The phrase ‘pious opposition’ comes from Noel Coulson’s A History of Islamic Law (Coulson (1964)). 
186 Weiss (1998), ch. 1. 
187 Mottahedeh, “Introduction” in as-Sadr  (2003) at 8. 
188 In addition to Hallaq’s, Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law and Coulson’s A History of  Islamic Law 
cited above, other well known and seminal histories in English include Joseph Schacht’s An Introduction to 
Islamic Law (Schacht (1964)) and Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Schacht (1965)), and Knut 
Vikor’s Between God and the Sultan (Vikor (2005)). 
  136The first point is that out of the scholarly efforts of the piety-minded ‘ulama there 
developed a body of legal material called the fiqh. Literally meaning ‘discernment’, the 
word fiqh describes a body of written material that represents an attempt to give practical 
expression to what the shari‘a means.  That is to say that, the fiqh was an attempted 
exposition in the here and now of the divine path expressed in the shari‘a that only God 
knows perfectly. This establishes a fundamental distinction between the shari‘a and the 
fiqh, both of which are often (and somewhat confusingly) translated simply as ‘Islamic 
law’ in English.  One, shari‘a, is Islamic law in the sense of the ideal path or way that 
God wishes; the other, fiqh, is Islamic law in the sense of the very earthly, human-
constructed attempt to understand and practically express the ideal.  The fiqh was the 
main work product of the ‘ulama.   
 
Second, since the ‘ulama were basically private scholars mainly operating outside of the 
realm of political authority, one of the fundamental features of the legal tradition was that 
the  fiqh developed in conditions of some considerable diversity and reflected this 
diversity in its substantive content.  This was especially so in the early period of the eight 
to tenth centuries CE.  No doubt part of this diversity was engendered by the very fact 
that the ‘ulama (or, initially, the proto-‘ulama) emerged organically and were grouped 
only informally.  Moreover, while they were able effectively to shrink the caliphs’ 
authority to promulgate legal rulings, this power stemmed not from the organisation of 
the ‘ulama but rather from the authoritative basis and mantle that they were able to 
assume.  It is important to note here that like other legal orders, Muslim legal traditions 
are concerned with social, including commercial, relations; matters which are grouped 
  137together under the heading of mu‘amalat.   Muslim legal traditions, however, also 
encompasses matters of religious practice and worship (ibadat), which are generally 
regarded as personal concerns outside the purview of ‘law’ in the other non-religious 
legal orders and in particular Western legal systems.
189  This makes these traditions more 
comprehensive and more wide-ranging that contemporary Western legal systems, 
because the norms, inspired and derived from the faith, cover many more areas of human 
experience than in other systems.  Colin Imber has summarised these points with the 
following observation: 
…the shari‘a does not correspond to a modern understanding of law.  In the 
first place, many of the legal rules which the jurists enunciate are neither 
enforceable nor intended to be so….Second,…many of its [the shari‘a’s] 
provisions concern religious ritual, regulating man’s relationship with God 
rather than man’s relationship with man.  In the sense that it regulates both 
worldly and religious matters, the shari‘a is an all-encompassing and all-
embracing law but, in the sense that many if its provisions have no 
application in practice, much of it is not, in the modern sense, law at all.
190 
 
 
Hence, following God’s path and respecting God’s boundaries means obeying ‘law’ in a 
much broader and potentially totalising way than in other traditions.  However, we must 
also understand that, as Imber remarks, not all of the ritual aspects of shari‘a would have 
been expected to be enforced and thus, depending on one’s definition, may or may not be 
seen as ‘law’.  A corollary of the wide-ranging nature of shari‘a norms, however, is that 
the legally-minded pious scholars were able to occupy a greater area of social life and 
authority than court-bound judges and thus establish their influence in a more 
comprehensive way within Muslim tradition.  Practically, this was accomplished by the 
legal opinions (fatwas, pl. fatawa) that the jurists would issue in response to questions 
                                                 
189 Of course, other religiously based legal orders, like Jewish law, include discussions of ibadat type 
matters - e.g., ritual purity. 
190 Imber (1997) at 30. 
  138about, essentially, how the shari‘a was to be understood by believers, including on 
matters that would not ordinarily be addressed by courts.
191  It also evidences a gap 
between judges and jurists that was to endure. 
 
The first conglomerations of the ‘ulama were geographically centred.  Relying on a 
mixture of pre-existing localised custom of their area, basically centred on a particular 
city, and an interpretative consensus of the jurists in the locale, they developed regional 
legal communities.  As time passed and the legal scholars developed more and more of a 
presence, in the Sunni world these regional schools became associated with, and named, 
after important individual scholars.  Thus, by the 10
th century, the four major eponymous 
schools in the Sunni tradition which still dominate today had emerged, namely, the 
Hanafi (after Abu Hanifa), the Hanbali (after Ahmad ibn Hanbal) the Maliki (after Malik 
b. Annas) and the Shafii (after Muhammad Idris al-Shafii).  To these need to be added 
major schools in the Shi’a tradition of which the most significant to day are the Jafari (or 
‘Twelver’ or Ithna-ashairi) school, the largest of the Shia schools, the Ismaili and the 
Zaydi.  In addition there are the Ibadis, a numerically small group that sits outside the 
Sunni/Shia division.  Within most of the schools (madhab, pl. madhahib) there are 
subdivisions between different communities of interpretation that for reasons of 
geography, history or theology have crafted a separate tradition.
192 
 
                                                 
191 Fatawa are thus not unlike the responsa in the tradition of Rabbinical law. 
192 As varied as this account of the different schools of law may appear, it is important to note that there 
were several other schools that existed in history but which have now died out, particularly in the Sunni 
tradition. Furthermore, each of the schools represents itself a larger or smaller range of opinions thus there 
may be majority and minority opinions within the Hanafi School, for example. 
  139An understanding of the emergence of the different schools of Islamic law helps us 
understand that the tradition of classical Islamic law is probably best understood in the 
plural: it is not a ‘Tradition’, but rather a complex set of traditions.  Moreover, all of the 
schools have been defined to a greater or lesser extent, though in almost all cases very 
predominantly, by the work of scholars.  In most cases this has been the overwhelming 
way in which the school has been articulated, even in the Shia traditions.
193  Historically, 
then, we might see the body of the fiqh as the collection of various localized attempts, 
produced in diverse local contexts, to give expression to the normative ideals of the 
shari'a; a process made vastly more rich and complex with spread of Islam over large 
geographical areas.   
 
The emergence of schools of fiqh was followed by the emergence of another important 
part of the framework of ‘Islamic law’ namely the discipline of usul al-fiqh (lit. the roots 
of the fiqh), usually rendered as ‘Islamic jurisprudence’ or ‘Principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence’.  The usul al-fiqh was an attempt to systematise the sources and processes 
by which the fiqh was to be discerned.  Within the Sunni traditions of Islam, the ‘roots’ of 
the fiqh came to held to be four: the Qur’an, the Sunna (sayings and exemplary conduct 
of Muhammad as captured especially in written hadith reports), qiyas  (reasoning by 
analogy) and finally ijma (or consensus, notionally of the community but effectively of 
the jurist/theologians). Not surprisingly, usul al-fiqh developed first in the Sunni 
                                                 
193 Here the contemporary Nizari Ismaili tradition is somewhat different.  Whereas for the other Shia 
groups the Imam is not physically present but is rather held to be in occultation (ghayba) pending a future 
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article (Jamal (2001)). 
  140traditions because these traditions knew no authority like that of the Shia Imam to which 
they could turn for authoritative guidance.  With the occultation of the Ithnashari/Twelver 
Shia Imam however, the Shia too, developed an usul al-fiqh.  This differed from the 
Sunni usul al-fiqh in one of the roots: Shia usul al-fiqh rejects qiyas in favour of aql 
(reason(ing)) and its ijma is the ijma of the Shia scholars.  In addition, as well as the 
Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, the Shia tradition gives importance to the sunna of the 
Shia Imams.  The emergence of the discipline of usul al-fiqh thus represents a further 
level of scholarly sophistication and textual refinement to the working out of the law.  
Along with the fiqh, this means, as Norman Calder notes, that: 
The third century [after Hijra, viz. 9
th to 10
th centuries CE] sees a movement 
from jurisprudence which is a predominantly oral and socially diffuse 
informal process towards a jurisprudence which is a complex literary 
discipline,  the prerogative of a highly trained and socially distinct elite.  
That movement…was no doubt a natural process but was also affected by 
school competition and government policy.
194 
 
I have emphasised part of Calder’s words to bring home the point that the emergent 
‘ulama developed an alternative source of normative authority to the political leadership 
and, as they developed, that the ‘ulama constituted a different social group as well.  As 
the ‘ulama developed more and as their written production expanded, they were able to 
articulate the ‘pious opposition’ more strongly, more clearly and, crucially, more 
independently.  As Crone and Hinds have noted, the reliance on the Book and the Reports 
(that is to say on the Qur’an and sunna/hadith as the primary sources or normativity) 
effectively “deprived the Caliph any say, qua Caliph, in the definition of Islamic 
norms.”
195  The norms of the faith and the norms of ‘Justice’, the latter linked now to the 
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  141divine and having a sense of the ‘sacred’, were thus set up independently from the state 
authority, which was ‘profane’.  This distinction marked out an important difference 
between state law and the shari‘a. 
 
It has been important to spend some time discussing the development of the proto- and 
emergent ‘ulama and of the discipline of fiqh because of the enduring legacy of these 
developments.  Thus far, we have emphasised the challenge leading to the distinction 
between political authority on the one hand and religious (becoming religio-legal) 
authority on the other that the emergence of the ‘ulama and their work product and 
methodology (the fiqh and usul al-fiqh respectively) engendered.  But this was, and is, 
not the only important consequence of these developments.   
 
Notwithstanding that the ‘ulama may have (i) emerged out of a shared sense of piety and 
indeed pious opposition to caliphal rule; and, (ii) eventually agreed on basically the same 
methodology for their work – i.e., settled on the ‘roots of the law’, they were not 
homogeneous.  In part, this heterogeneity may have arisen because of the fact that the 
schools of law were influenced by the locales and local practices (‘amal) out of which 
they emerged.
196  The upshot of this is that there was no authoritative consensus on what 
the shari‘a meant and demanded.  Theoretically, it may not be surprising to note that 
efforts to understand the divine will would lead to differing interpretations and 
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  142understandings.  Practically, however, the emergence of the different schools of law, in 
which the four Sunni schools and the Jafari (Shi’i) school generally co-exist in a 
condition of mutual respect and mutual toleration means that, for centuries, there has in 
effect been no unanimity on what the shari‘a is in an absolute sense. Islamic law, or 
perhaps better Muslim legal traditions, thus, do not speak with one voice.  From this it 
follows that the sense of ‘Islamic law’ being understandable as if it was like, say, the 
Income Tax Act – that is to say expressed in a single, authoritative, comprehensive 
compilation of positive (and positivist?) law is not accurate in at least two senses: firstly, 
because this sort of conceptualisation blurs the difference between the ideal and the 
practical expression of the ideal, and, secondly, because of the diversity of the practical 
expressions.  Instead, we have a much more plural and open textured tradition(s).  As 
Wael Hallaq has pithily stated: “Notwithstanding all efforts to minimise plurality, [the] 
Sharia’s  fiqh was incontrovertibly pluralistic: this is simply one of its most essential 
features.”
197  The emergence work of the ‘ulama and the development of the different 
schools of law, therefore, not only marked a differentiation between political and religo-
legal authority but also evidence the fact that normativity in Muslim contexts has been 
expressed diversely for centuries. 
 
The period around, and following, the establishment of the schools of law, was not, of 
course, the final chapter in settling the interaction between political, legal and religious 
authority for Muslim societies.  Indeed, these processes continue to be worked out today.  
Additionally, however, we cannot see the story as told thus far as fully settling the issue 
of the developed heritage.  What we have seen, however, to some extent establishes a 
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  143watershed principle from which, in a fundamental way, there would be no retreat, as 
Black notes: 
The political decline of the Deputyship (khilafat) produced a partial spilt 
between religious and political power, between religio-moral-legal authority 
and political-military power.  The former became the domain of the Learned 
[read: ‘ulama], the latter of the Sultan.
198 
 
The religio-moral-legal-authority here is the authority of the shari‘a qua sacred law.  On 
the political and military side, however, a type of ‘administrative law’ (or, perhaps better, 
the law necessary for administration), called the siyasa shari‘a (roughly, ‘political   
shari‘a) was vested.  The siyasa shari‘a, however, as the ‘law’ of the political rulers and 
functionaries had none of the normative weight or significance of the  shari‘a elaborated 
by the ‘ulama.  In order to understand this process better, it is to selected relevant parts of 
the subsequent political history to which we must now turn. 
 
3.3.4  Power, law and religion – the on-going dynamic 
As mentioned above, one early attempt to regain a united authority for the caliph came 
with al-Mamum (Abbasid Caliph, r. 813-833CE).  Al-Mamum sought to reconstruct a 
high caliphal ideal and to align the shari’a and the court.    His method of doing so was to 
support a strain theological of thought referred to as the Mutazila (or Mutazilite), which 
emphasised the use of reason and advanced the theological claim that the Qur’an was 
created in time.  The Mutazilites were opposed by the Asharite school that asserted that 
the Qur’an was eternal and uncreated.  Within this theological tussle of course lay an 
important political principle.  Asharite thought was conformist and rejected rational 
speculation in favour of a textualist approach.  The assertion of the uncreatedness of the 
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  144Qur’an fits into this outlook because it meant that the Qur’an was a source that could 
neither be derogated from, nor interpreted through rational consideration, but something 
simply to be followed, basically literally.  On the Mutazilite, view, however, as 
something created the Qur’an was rather like human intellect (also created) and could be 
interpreted with the aid of rational consideration.  In this Mutazilite process the Caliph 
could play a part in the interpretation but this was not available to him on the Asharite 
understanding.  On the Asharite view, reliance had to be placed only on the sacred Text 
itself and the reports (hadith) and these governed and imposed themselves on the caliph, 
not the other way around.  Of course, these sources were also the province of the ‘ulama 
and so the Asharite position solidified the interpretative and normative authority of the 
‘ulama.  Al-Mamum’s attempt to champion the Mutazilite view  did not succeed but that 
it was attempted at all does show that the theological position and the terms of settlement 
between caliphal authority and that of the ‘ulama were still open to consideration and 
debate in his time.   As we saw, however, by the time of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 
847-861CE), the claim for primacy of the caliph over the ‘ulama was effectively a spent 
force and it would remain so definitively. 
 
The one significant alternative arrangement of political and religious authority, to which 
we have already referred, was the Shia tradition.  The establishment of the Shia Ismaili 
Fatimid empire in North Africa and then Egypt in the 10
th century represented the 
manifestation in practice of the distinctly Shia conception of the relationship of political 
and legal authority.  The leader of the empire was the Fatimid Caliph-Imam: qua caliph 
he was the head of state and holder of the caliphal political authority; qua Imam, 
  145however, he was also the ultimate religious authority.  Thus, in one figure was combined 
the absolute ruler to whom allegiance was owed in both a worldly as well as religious 
sense.  The Fatimid Imam thus manifested not just Shia theory but the type of combined 
authority that had not been seen, in practice, since the time of Muhammad.  The Fatimids, 
however, ruled over an empire in which their Ismaili co-religionists were a minority, with 
Sunni Muslims in the majority even in the Fatimid capital of Cairo.  Moreover, they ruled 
with a policy of general religious toleration towards other Muslim communities as well as 
towards Christian and Jewish communities, who were generally treated well and some of 
whom occupied senior positions of state. 
 
While the Fatimid state thus represented a radically different relationship between 
religious and political authority (and a political rival) to the Abbasid regime, it was an 
alternative that occupied only a small slice of Muslim history.  The Fatimids were in 
power in Egypt from 969-1194CE, after which they were replaced by a new, Sunni, 
regime.  After this time the Ismailis became, as they have remained to this day, mainly a 
politically quietist sect.  In the result, the Fatimid system has not represented a departure 
from the general trend in the relationship between religious and political authority within 
the heritage of Islam generally because it was a relatively short-lived alternative.   
Moreover, subsequent Shia polities (e.g. the Safavids and Qajars who were based in Iran) 
followed the Twelver tradition but did so after the occultation of the twelfth Imam and 
hence did not have the same figure of the Imam in and around whom to fuse religio-legal 
and political authority.  The Safavid and Qajar political rulers (called ‘shah’) thus had to 
operate with religious authority residing in their ‘ulama. 
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Of course, the unique Fatimid structure did not represent the only innovation in the 
arrangements between religious and political authority, which remained in constant 
development, and it is useful to turn to some examples of this. 
 
The rule of the Saljuqs (sometimes ‘Saljuks’) coincided with the latter part of the 
Abbasid period.  The Saljuqs, who arose from Turkic slave soldiers, eventually achieved 
militarily and political domination relegating the Abbasid caliph to a politically 
subsidiary position, albeit one which still held symbolic importance.  Thus, the caliphate 
continued but with effective political power now being exercised by a Saljuq ‘sultan.’  
This structure of caliph and sultan of course raised the issue of religious and political 
power once again.  In short, even more so than the (admittedly) weakened caliphs, the 
sultans needed a way of situating their role within the developing normative hermeneutic 
being articulated by the ‘ulama.  Given the role of the ‘ulama now and the continuation 
of the caliphate it is perhaps not surprising that theories about the complementary nature 
of political and religious authority arose in this time.  The Persian historian Bayhaqi 
(944-1077CE), for example asserted that: 
The Lord most high has given one power to the prophets and another power 
to the kings, and he has made it incumbent on the people that they should 
submit themselves to the two powers…
199 
 
In similar vein, the great intellectual al-Ghazzali (d. 1111CE) claimed that “God has 
singled out two groups of men and given them preference over others, one prophets; the 
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  147other kings…”
200 As Black points out, “This was virtually the dualist position of many 
European advocates of the autonomy of royal secular power.”
201 
 
Two points need to be made here.  First, in advocating formulations that would accord 
with the realpolitik of the day, these theoretical perspectives evidenced that “Whereas in 
Europe the issues of religious and worldly power was an occasion for church-state 
conflict, over the centuries in Islam it was sheathed within rhetoric and mutual 
accommodation.”
202 Second, that this accommodation was following the basic lines we 
have seen above; namely that there was a separation of political and religious authority -- 
the former may have been in the hands of the sultans now (and to a lesser extent the 
caliph), but the latter was the province of the ‘ulama.  
 
Another example to look at comes several centuries later with the Ottomans (c. 1290-
1922CE).  The Ottoman sultan sought to maintain and promote ‘din ve devlet’ – religion 
and empire (or dynasty). Within the Ottoman structure the ‘ulama were for the first time 
given a formal structure and system of ranks as part of the state hierarchy in a system tied 
to education and qualifications.  The qadis in this structure administered both the 
religious law (shari‘a/fiqh) as well as the state legislation (qanun or kanun; deriving from 
the siyasa shari‘a authority).  Indeed, the office of the ‘shaykhuislam’ (or chief shaykh or 
head of the ‘ulama) was a high office of state theoretically equivalent to that of the 
vizier
203(basically the prime minister).   The Ottomans developed fairly detailed ranks 
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  148and groupings of the ‘ulama and important acts of government had to be sanctioned by a 
fatwa from the ‘ulama.  We see in the Ottoman model thus both a regularisation of the 
‘ulama by the state but still – and in fact perhaps it should be said in spite of this – the 
persistence of the distinction between religious and political authority in the continued 
status of the ‘ulama.  Here, perhaps more clearly than in the other examples we have 
considered, however, we also see a functional separation, albeit within a unified 
administrative structure, of religious and political authority.  
 
A final example to consider is that of the Safavids mentioned above.  A Twelver Shia 
dynasty, the Safavids ruled in Persia from 1501-1722CE.  Being Shia, and thereby 
inheriting the special role accorded to the Shia Imam the Safavids religio-political system 
may have been a departure from some of the systems we have seen above.  By the time of 
the Safavids, however, the Twelver Imam was not physically present and thus the Safavid 
ruler (who took the ancient Persian title of ‘Shah’) did not have to contend with a figure 
that was in this position, nor was he himself in this position, like the Fatimid Caliph-
Imam.  Nonetheless, the symbolism of the Shia tradition with the ideal of unified 
religious and political authority in the Imam was part of the Safavid context, and the 
Safavid Shah thus combined political authority with a greater measure of religious 
authority than any leader since the Fatimids.  In the absence of direct access to the Imam, 
the Twelver Shia tradition had to develop its own ‘ulama who became the effective 
holders of religious authority in a similar way to the Sunni ‘ulama.  The Safavid Shah 
Ismail allowed the scholar al-Karaki (c.1466-1534CE) to develop a theory of the 
mujtahid (that is to say a scholar who was able to engage in ijtihad or independent 
  149development/thinking about the law) that elevated the mujtahid to the status of a deputy 
of the Hidden Imam.  This, of course, made the mujtahid the representative of the highest 
notional authority in the Twelver Shiism.  Interestingly, it also affirmed a division and 
distinction between religious and political authority even in Shia context and even within 
a system of the Shah being more closely associated with sacred authority. 
                                                                                                    
3.4  Conclusion and lessons from the heritage 
We have now been able to look at selected episodes that tell us about  of the relationship 
between religious and political authority in Muslim history.  In this, we have paid 
particular importance to the early years, the so-called formative and classical periods of 
Islam, because it was in these periods that certain fundamental ideas that resonated in the 
later centuries of Muslim experience were developed.  It was in the early periods that the 
Muslim community had to confront at least two basic issues that would shape its outlook 
on the interaction of political and religious authority.  The first was the nature of 
succession to Muhammad, specifically what role future leaders could have and how much 
of the mandate of Muhammad they would assume.  As I have suggested above, 
Muhammad represented a type of leadership that was ideal and unrealisable because of 
the truly unique authority with which he was vested.  Indeed, to reiterate, it was an article 
of faith that Muhammad was the ‘seal (or final) of the prophets’ and therefore it was not 
possible that a successor could step fully into his shoes.  Second, the early Muslim 
community(ies) had to deal with the regulatory and legal needs of a rapidly expanding 
empire and naturally, as the community was now a religiously-defined community, it was 
the moral hermeneutic of their religion that would be a source for the norms and laws. 
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These issues set-up a tension between religious and political legitimacy, and religious and 
political authority, that had to be resolved.  The method of this resolution resulted in an 
overall sense in a differentiation between religious and political authority.  The ‘ulama as 
jurist-scholars emerged as the custodians of religious authority and, in large measure, of 
the normative articulation of Islam.  On the other hand, political authority continued to be 
recognised and allowed its own territory.  But this method was practical rather than 
theoretical resolution.  As Carl Brown has noted: 
Rulers learned that they could usually get the acquiescence of their subjects 
provided they did not try to impose orthodoxy.  Subjects learned that they 
could deviate in their religious belief and practice provided that they did not 
openly challenge government.  Certain ulama could resist the blandishments 
of government office, others could accept, and all could accommodate in a 
system where no one – not even the caliph – presumed to speak ex cathedra 
(to use the Catholic term) on religious dogma…The early Muslim 
community developed in a way that facilitated compartmentalization, 
isolation, and, thus, non-resolution of potentially explosive issues involving 
religion and politics…Muslims found it easier to rock along with a certain 
indeterminacy.
204 
 
This ‘rocking along’ in turn meant several things.  It meant a sort of secularisation of the 
political regime in the sense of a functional social differentiation, or de-coupling, of this 
(really, these) regimes from religious authority in a practical sense, notwithstanding the 
theoretical non-resolution of this issue.  Contemporary historians have remarked on this 
trend.  Roy Mottahedeh, for example, has asserted that the Islamic tradition has all the 
rich diversity of fifteen centuries of history within which real combinations of spiritual 
and political leadership in Muslim history have been rare and are usually fraught with 
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205 and Ira Lapidus has noted that “Despite the common statement…that the 
institutions of state and religion are unified…most Muslim societies did not conform to 
this ideal, but were built around separate institutions of state and religion.”
206  Eqbal 
Ahmed agrees with this assessment holding that the absence of such a fusion – of religion 
and political power – is a historically experienced and recognized reality, which shaped 
tradition of statecraft and the history of Muslim peoples.
207   And Nikki Keddie baldly 
states that “The supposed near identity of religion and politics in Islam is more a pious 
myth than reality for most of Islamic history”.
208   
 
The means of this separation and differentiation – the distinction between the 
caliph/amir/sultan and the ‘ulama – also took place in a particular form.  There is no 
establishment of a hierarchical Church to stand apart or outside of Government and the 
‘ulama are not consecrated clergy and have no sacerdotal function.  Thus, religious 
authority has been more plural and diffuse because there has not been one body to 
regulate and define it in a univocal way.  As we have seen, at times in the past, political 
authority has sought to impose this control, but this has been ultimately unsuccessful, 
something to which the assertions above attest.  It meant also, as we have seen, that there 
was not one ‘Islamic’ or model to the relationship between political and religious 
authority but rather there were different Muslim responses to these issues.  In short, 
Muslim contexts have indeed experienced a flow of history, and this should not be 
forgotten in considering their current situations. 
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Within these evolutions, however, an undeniable part of the heritage has been the 
“…continued importance of the early Muslim community as a political model” such that 
“The model of the early community remains an unsullied norm, but in the terminology of 
modern political science the maxims derived from the idealized model are not readily 
operationalised.”
209  Moreover, however, even in theoretical terms as part of a normative 
articulation, there has not been one answer since, by the eleventh century, it was clear 
that a certain amount of legal diversity, as reflected in the more or less mutually 
tolerating schools of law arising from different interpretations of the religious message, 
was here to stay
210; a factor that both reflects a certain commonality in the normative 
exposition of Islam but also the undeniable plurality of these expressions. 
 
The legacy of the political and legal heritage Muslim contexts has thus seen a de facto 
distinction between religio-legal authority on the one hand and political authority on the 
other.  This distinction was not widely accepted as a theoretical ideal
211 since the 
example Muhammad and the early community when political leadership was fully (or 
nearly fully) in harmony with religious authority and normativity continued, and 
continues, to be the exemplar, even if an unrealisable one. This factor in turn has 
engendered the continual negotiation of relations between religious, legal and political 
authorities as part of the heritage of Muslim contexts.  The effective differentiation of 
these in a non-hierarchical and diffuse structures of religious authority, and the plurality 
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  153this has engendered, has been a theme of the heritage; though one often not generally 
recognised by either Muslims or non-Muslims. 
 
  154Chapter 4.  Muslim Contexts II: Contemporary contexts 
 
4.0  Introduction – three convulsions 
The preceding chapter reviewed salient themes in the politico-legal heritage of Muslim 
contexts.  It pointed out the centuries-old differentiation that has been present – in fact 
even if not settled in theory -- between political authority and religio-legal authority.  To 
make the discussion of Muslim contexts more complete, however, and to address the 
needs of these contexts today, to this historical survey one needs to add a contemporary 
dimension.  This dimension will not simply be a continuation of the historical story, 
though there will be an element of this, but rather will also advance theoretical arguments 
about how this heritage may be understood today. 
 
It is appropriate that the historical chronology covered in the previous chapter ended 
basically with the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922CE).  From the latter years of the 
Ottomans (historians often describe the decline of the Ottomans as starting from about 
1699CE) several significant changes had come about to the structure of political life for 
most of the world’s Muslim populations.  These seismic alterations to the pre-modern 
pattern of the rule of empires that had been the norm for Muslim contexts heretofore 
included, significantly, (i) the formal end of the caliphate in 1922 under the new, modern, 
Turkish state; (ii) the encounter with and experience of colonialism, and; related to the 
above, (iii) the establishment of the modern nation state as the principal form of political 
organisation under which Muslims would live. 
 
  155Before we turn to how these changes affected the ways in which the heritage(s) of 
Muslims were sometimes re-articulated let us recall an important feature of the 
contemporary landscape, one that affects both Muslim and non-Muslim contexts but 
which is no less significant to us for this broader influence.  As we noted, Casanova and 
others have identified a contemporary trend towards the deprivatisation of religion 
globally, as religious voices seek to be heard on issues of public concern.  Within this 
trend, the role of religion is an issue of particular salience in Muslim contexts where, 
perhaps more poignantly than in other environments, the voices of deprivatisation are 
speaking up and speaking louder. Keeping this in mind, we can unpack somewhat the 
significance of the three changes we have just noted.   
 
As we saw above, by the end of what Marshall Hodgson has called the ‘High Caliphal 
period’, the practical political power of the caliph was limited by the rise of other 
leadership in the sultans, amirs etc in whom actual political and military power resided.  
Notwithstanding this diminution in effective power, the office of the caliphate was still 
rich in symbolic authority.  Moreover, the caliphate also represented, in a mutatis 
mutandis sort of way, the continuation of an institutional structure and type of authority 
that went back to the earliest days of Islam and to some extent drew on the example of 
the leadership of Muhammad himself.  Indeed, it is these deep historical roots as well as 
the connections to the Prophet and to the continuation of his special authority (albeit 
imperfectly) that imbued the caliphate with its notional import, even long after its 
practical significance had faded.  While in terms of political institutions and of 
governance the end of the caliphate was not as important because alternative offices were 
  156managing political rule, with the abolition of the caliphate, as feeble as it was practically, 
a great deal of rich ‘Islamic’ symbolism and potential repository for ‘Islamic’ identity 
was lost. This might in part explain why the re-establishment of the caliphate is such a 
cause celebre for certain contemporary Islamist groups.  In their reckoning, with the 
revival of the caliphate would come a revival of Islam precisely because the caliph would 
be the symbol of Islam; his glory would be Islam’s glory – a potent metaphor for the 
Islamists.   
 
The abolition of the caliphate left open an important question:  if the caliphate as a locus 
for ‘Islam’ was now lost, what would (and could) replace it?  Was there another 
institution that could ‘take up the cause’ and what would this be?  At the risk of 
belabouring the point, let us also keep in mind that the caliphate was practically almost 
inert – not dissimilar to say a constitutional monarchy – only symbolically rich.  Would 
any replacement be the same?  In short, the removal of the caliph begged the question 
and allowed alternative institutional structures, including the modern nation state, to 
potentially claim the ‘mantle of the Prophet’.
212 
 
The second great convulsion following on from (about) the end of the Ottomans was the 
domination of many Muslim societies by Western powers.  As Mohammed Arkoun has 
noted: 
What we call ‘modernity’ made a brutal eruption in to the ‘living space 
of Islam’ with the intrusion of colonialism as a historical 
fact…Colonial endeavours of 19
th century Europe sought justification 
in what was called a civilising mission.  It was a matter of raising 
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  157‘backward’ peoples to the level of a ‘universal’ culture and 
civilisation.
213 
 
Emran Qureshi refers to this phenomenon as “globalisation of Western cultures in 
Muslim societies”, and notes that much of 19
th and 20
th century ‘Islamic’ (I would prefer 
the term ‘Muslim’ here
214) intellectual thought was conditioned by the encounter of 
Muslims with the colonizing West and that, in this regard, “…there is a contestation of 
Islamic traditions taking place within the Muslim world”.
215  On the one hand, Qureshi 
finds “Liberal Islamic thinkers [who] believed that the West’s strengths needed to be 
emulated or indigenised: whether in reference to the struggle for gender-equality, human 
rights, or constitutionalism, as democracy was called in the early part of the twentieth 
century.”  On the other hand, is the “Islamist/fundamentalist [who has] felt that Western 
influences needed to be expelled along with the colonizers.”
216 The dust has not settled 
on this debate.  The experience of colonialism both introduced Western liberal notions of 
democratic institutions and forms to Muslim contexts (as well as others) as well as altered 
the institutional structures of the pre-modern Muslim polity.  In addition, the above-noted 
deprivatisation of religion has emerged in the Muslim world with vibrancy, especially in 
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  158recent decades.  Robert Heffner in his study of Islam in Indonesia has noted that global 
politics at the end of the 20th century were marked by two major forces: “the diffusion of 
democratic ideas to disparate peoples and cultures around the world” and the “forceful 
reappearance of ethnic and religious issues in public affairs.”
217  In addition, sadly, 
though perhaps partly as a result of the above, Qureshi also notes that “Today, polarizing 
Occidentalist and Orientalist caricatures and stereotypes have become ascendant within 
both the Islamic and Western worlds [which] attempt to explain behaviour through 
‘traits’ that can be ascribed to a negative reading of the Other’s religion or national 
culture.”
218     
 
Finally, not just in the Muslim world but more generally, by the end of the Ottomans our 
third convulsion was evident as the sun was setting on the age of empire and the modern, 
bureaucratic state was becoming the basic institution of political organisation.  By the end 
of World War I, not only was the Ottoman Empire over but so too were the old Russian 
and Austro-Hugarian empires.  Of course, colonialism would still persist for some 
decades, and parts of the ‘Muslim world’ were placed under League of Nations mandates 
in the aftermath of World War I resulting in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire 
so the transition from empire(s) to nation state was a gradual, iterative, process.  Through 
the mandates and other interventions the older organic and internal empires that had ruled 
in the Muslim world were largely displaced – either in favour of European (mainly 
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  159British and French) empires or newly minted Muslim dynasties, like the Saudi or 
Jordanian monarchies.  Nonetheless, the establishment of the modern state, even if still 
with ruling monarchies in places like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the Gulf states, 
meant a change of structure.  The empires and dynasties of old were over. 
 
The upshot of all of all of these shifts was to usher in a new political landscape for 
Muslim societies.  While the same normative sources of reference may still be 
significant, the legal and political milieu of Muslim contexts had (has) to find a way to 
adapt to the new landscape.  It is in this light, that Amyn Sajoo calls Muslim societies 
‘transitional’ in needing to rearticulate their values in both a post-colonial context and 
one in which theoretical structures that had been developed in pre-modern social orders 
have now to face the reality of new structures such as the modern state.
219   
 
At this point, it is necessary to be both clear and honest about the ground being tread 
here.  This study, in fact, might be located within efforts to respond to the state of 
transition, to “write the next chapter in [the] story” of Islam acknowledging that “What is 
taking place now in the Muslim world is an internal conflict between Muslims, not an 
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  160external battle between Islam and the West.  The West is merely a bystander…”
220 As 
part of this, John Bowen has noted that:  
So far, however, major theorists of pluralism in Europe and North 
America – John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, John Gray, Bhiku Parekh – 
have not had much to say about political and legal arrangements in 
Muslim-majority societies, or the normative debates among Muslims 
living in Europe or North America.
221 
 
This study aims precisely to cover (some of) this ground.   
 
To proceed, we will look at a series of issues that the changes to the political landscape 
have raised for Muslim contexts and discuss responses that have been – and those that yet 
might be. 
 
4.1  Re- working the law: replacement, codifications and ‘etatization’ 
While the encounter between Islam and the West raised different and sometimes 
diametrically opposed reactions, one interesting aspect is what it did to the religio-legal 
legacy that was discussed previously.  The colonial state often took the organic tradition 
of Islamic laws resting in the hands of the ‘ulama  and either supplanted it with the 
imposition of colonial law (as in Algeria and Indonesia) or sought to codify it into state 
law.
222  It was this latter pattern that occurred by direct colonial rule in, for example, 
British India, in Malaysia and in North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia), where various 
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  161statues and codes were enacted.
223   Laws of personal status were often the only 
exceptions, but even these were regulated. 
 
Codification was also attempted by the Ottomans, though not under benign conditions.  
Having been subject to the Capitulations, by which it was agreed that European, not 
Ottoman, laws would govern European citizens in Ottoman territories, by the nineteenth 
century there was some familiarity with European laws.  As the Capitulations became 
irksome and in seeking to modernise, the Ottomans – by this time the so-called ‘sick man 
of Europe’ -- turned to adoption of legal structures modelled on European codes.  A 
substantial part of the codification process, therefore, was launched in the last decades of 
the Ottomans with their Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876CE), which introduced many 
codifications in several areas of law including, via the Mejelle, of (mainly Hanafi) 
personal law.  Ottoman codifications, which naturally influenced many areas under the 
suzerainty of the Sultan, reflected a substantial influence of the French Commercial and 
Penal Codes and post-Ottoman Turkey’s reforms later reflected the influence of Italian 
law in the Criminal Code (1926), Germanic law in the Code of Civil Procedure (1928) 
and the Swiss Civil Code (in a 1927 replacement of the Ottoman Mejelle under the 
Republic of Turkey).   Through these various means, of direct replacement of the 
traditional laws, codifications undertaken by the colonial rulers and the influence of 
European laws through the legacy of the Ottoman codes a profound change took place, 
which, in effect saw the political authorities of the state assert their power to define the 
                                                 
223 See in Pakistan The Muslim Family Law Ordinance (1961) a successor to the colonial era legislation.  
For Malaysia see the Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance, 1880 and various state Islamic Family Law 
Enactments and Administration of Islamic Family Law Enactments.  In Morocco see the Code of Personal 
Status (1956) and subsequent amendments.  For Tunisia see the Code of Personal Status, 1956 as amended. 
  162terms of shari‘a. Anver Emon summarises the effects of these codifications across 
Musliom societies: 
Both colonial administrators and Muslim national assemblies preserved 
Islamic law in codified form while modernising other legal areas such as 
commercial law.  This reduction in jurisdiction and application arguably 
placated Islamists who felt threatened by modernisation and considered the 
preservation of traditional Islamic family law as necessary to maintain 
Islamic identity in the face of encroaching modernity.  This phenomenon is 
widespread across the Muslim world, where colonial powers exerted force.  
The effect this had on the Shari‘a, and in particular, Muslim understanding 
of Shari‘a, was profound.  The colonial treatment of Islamic law, whether in 
terms of redefining it or reducing its scope rendered the Shari‘a reified and 
static in application and conceptual coherence.
224 
 
 
It is thus that, as Javaid Rehman asserts, “Islamic laws were adulterated by the 
disturbances of colonialism.”
225  In short, the encounter with colonial/imperial rule and 
the re-working of the traditional structures of Islamic law through this rule and 
codifications, raised the issue of, firstly, how to respond while still under colonial rule 
and, secondly, what to do with the traditional structures.  Not surprisingly, there have 
been myriad ideas and responses. 
 
As the modern state developed, it sought to change the traditional pattern of relations 
between political power on the one hand and religio-legal power on the other, by re-
forming and regulating the shari‘a as an instrument of the state and its administration.  
Sami Zubaida refers to this process as the ‘etatization’ of the law (meaning here the 
shari‘a) which was begun by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.
226  For example, 
Zubaida notes that the: “Mecelle [ Mejelle] was written in accordance with a French 
                                                 
224 Emon (2006) at 349. 
225 Rehman (2005) at 24.  
226 Zubaida (2003) at 121ff; particularly at 156. 
  163methodology and format [of Civil law], but draws it substance and its initial axioms from 
the shari ‘a: the ‘form’ is European; the ‘content’ Muslim.”
227  The significance of this 
‘legis-lising’ of the shari‘a (in other words, ‘etatization’) is elaborated by Berkes: 
Although by no means a legislative act of parliament, the enactment of 
the Mecelle was the first instance of legislation within the field of 
Seriat [shari‘a] exclusively by the sovereign and his government in 
their temporal capacity.  Although no one could find any religiously 
legitimate grounds for declaring the Mecelle unacceptable from the 
viewpoint of the Seriat, there was no precedent for it in tradition.
228  
 
A similar pattern can be seen to have occurred later in Pakistan.   In the current 1973 
Constitution of Pakistan, Pakistan’s official name is the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ 
(Part I, Article 1), Islam is the official religion of the state and, “the Injunctions of Islam 
as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah shall be the supreme law and source of 
guidance for legislation to be administered through laws enacted by the Parliament and 
Provincial Assemblies, and for policy making by the Government” (Part I, Article 2); 
and, the President of Pakistan must be a Muslim (Part III, Article 41).
229 Similarly, Art. 4 
of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, states: 
All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, 
political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. 
This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the 
Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha of 
the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.
230 
 
                                                 
227 Zubaida (2003) at 133-134. 
228 Berkes (1964) at 171. 
229 See http://www.pakistanconstitution-law.com/theconst_1973.asp for the text of the Constitution of 
Pakistan. 
230 http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-1.html.  Emphasis added. 
  164The etatization pattern has thus meant the encroachment of temporal, governmental, 
power into establishing and also defining the role and place of Islam and its traditional 
law in the state.   
 
It is useful here to clarify the differences between this structure and the traditional 
structure.  The pre-modern empire relied upon, was guided and checked by, was subject 
to and enforced the legal rules developed by the ‘ulama.  But, as Khalid Masud explains, 
critically, even though shari‘a rulings may have been enforceable by the state, they were 
not state law.
231  This is because determining the content of the law, except for those 
areas which the shari‘a did not address or in the ‘secular’ law areas of administrative 
rules (the siyasa shari‘a), was not something which was in the fiat of the state but instead 
in the hands of the ‘ulama.  Indeed, as Masud further notes, Muslim moral traditions 
(including the fiqh as one type of moral tradition) evolved independent of state support 
and, although expecting the state to enforce the laws to ensure social regulation, these 
traditions did not allow the state to arbitrate between ethical differences (e.g., between the 
opinions of the jurists).  Authority rested within the traditions and the scholars.
232 Khaled 
Abou el-Fadl adds to this that traditional Islamic epistemology tolerated and even 
celebrated divergent opinions and schools of law but that, today, in some countries of 
Muslim majority, the state has grown to be extremely powerful and “meddlesome” and it 
is centralised in ways that were inconceivable two centuries ago.   For example, the 
modern states will these days often seek to control the clergy and the previously private 
religious endowments (awqaf; sing. waqf; which are trust-like charitable vehicles that 
                                                 
231 Masud (2002) at 139. 
232 Masud (2002) at 141. 
  165could be established under classical fiqh rules).  The problem and challenge today, Abou 
el-Fadl suggests, is that Islamic civilization has collapsed under these new structures and 
traditional institutions have been dismantled so that now new structures need to be 
erected.
233 
 
John Kelsay, on the other hand, articulates a ‘complementary thesis’ in the traditional 
structure: according to Kelsay both religious and political institutions may play 
complementary roles in the pursuit of human happiness.  Hence, in the framework of 
‘Classical Islam’,
234 religion and politics were complementary, but independent, sets of 
institutions.  Issues of Islamic legitimacy and moral authority rested with the ‘ulama but 
the government had at times the trappings of religion in, for example, the caliph leading 
prayers or preaching from the pulpit (of more commonly of having sermons preached 
from the pulpit in the name of the caliph), but neither moral power nor Islamic 
legitimacy.
  235  Rather, the role of the political leadership was profane: to secure the 
peace of society.
236 Complemetarity is not, therefore, to suggest identity,
237 though 
Kelsay does suggest it has meant some sort of established status for Islam albeit not one 
that should foreclose reform within Islam.  Finally, Kelsay posits that contemporary 
Islamic political thought continues to seek out complementarity between religious and 
                                                 
233 Abou el-Fadl (2002) at 6-7. 
234 Although the phrase ‘Classical Islam’ is often used by scholars and commentators on Islam to denote, 
essentially, the pre-modern period of the caliphate(s), and while it is difficult to find an alternative 
nomenclature, the very use of the term ‘classical’ suggests that after this period there has been some 
decline, corruption or contamination of Islam.  These implicit connotations of course feed into the 
ideological claims made by some Islamists etc for a return to Islam ‘proper’, based on ‘classical’, 
structures.  For want of a better term, I will continue to use the term ‘classical’ though I mean it only to 
demarcate historical periods.  I remain well aware of the implications of this type of language, though I also 
reject the normative authority of these implications. 
235 Kelsay (2002) at 9. 
236 Kelsay (2002) at 10 and 30. 
237 Kelsay (2002) at 12. 
  166political authority and in this complementarity created (and presumably continues to 
offer) a number of possibilities for a relationship between religious authorities and the 
state, without suggesting that there can be no boundaries between religion and the 
ate.
238   
               
st
 
It is in this context that Wael Hallaq has made the point that calling the shari‘a ‘Islamic 
law’ interprets and manages into something other than what it was in the past.
239  The 
shari‘a in its classical form was a discursive practice and cultural phenomenon and it is 
only under the influence of modernity that it has been entexted as ‘Islamic law’. And of 
course a textualised shari‘a particularly suits the needs of a modern nation state structure.  
The pre-modern shari‘a confronted power with its own truth but, returning to Masud’s 
point, was not co-terminus with state law.  Additionally, the fiqh was neither a totalizing 
statement of the law (inasmuch as there were other legal materials like the siyasa 
shari‘a), nor did it seek to control society.  It was not an expression of the will of the 
state.  The textualisation of the shari‘a, however, through the fiqh ( qua texts) has 
resulted, Hallaq argues, from the encounter of the shari‘a and the state.  While 
incompatible in the past because operating in different, albeit complementary, spheres, 
the modern state confronted the shari‘a as a purely legislative entity and through the 
means of codification strove for its uniformity.  A codified fiqh has thus been made part 
of the machinery of the bureaucratic state but this process has destroyed the moral and 
social hermeneutic of the fiqh, which, standing outside of the state, was its pre-modern 
                                   
238 Kelsay (2002) at 14. 
239 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 152. 
  167condition.
240  The early vehicles for this codification and entexting given by Hallaq are 
examples we have already touched upon: the Ottomans operating under the shadow of 
European strength and the Capitulations and British India.   Hallaq makes the point, now 
obvious from his analysis, that Islamist movements that rest(ed) on a political-legal 
project of re-establishing the shari‘a have no sense of the actual historical shari‘a but 
mean an entexted, modern ‘fiqh-as-state-law’ sense of the term that is at variance with its 
origin odern 
shari
objective knowledge.  A 
particular practice determined by the fiqh is posited to have already 
existed…[but] such uses are estranged for the reality of the past – whatever 
conversion of the past into an ideological tool.  
d framework of ‘classical Islam’ 
and i lains, 
it is a
        
al nature.  This is a politics that would have been alien to the pre-m
‘a.
241  He notes: 
What is notable about such espousals [of a received, modernized shari‘a] is 
that despite their many variants, they seem to possess a perception of a pre-
modern Shari‘a that makes serious claim to 
that reality is – precisely to the same extent as modernity has ensured the 
242
 
In taking control of establishing the norms of Islamic law that may be enforced, the 
modern state has succeeded where the Caliphs al-Mamun and al-Mustasim failed: to put 
governmental authority in charge of the shari‘a and inasmuch as the shari‘a  is a 
normative expression of Islam, of the faith more generally.  It is vitally important to 
remember, however, that this is a very modern phenomenon and that it has radically 
altered the ‘classical’ relationship that had prevailed previously.  Indeed, it does more 
than that for it fundamentally wrong-steps the pattern an
ts history.  Etatization, therefore, is not rescuing the shari‘a, but, as Hallaq exp
 morphing of the shari‘a’s nature.  Thus he states: 
                                         
240 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 171. 
241 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 154. 
242 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 154-155. 
  168But the fiqh was never ‘the law’ in its full range, in its realization within a 
social environment, nor does it ever constitute a totalising statement of the 
law in practice…Attributing to fiqh roles of control and management is a 
distinctly modern misconception, a back-projection of our notions of law as 
a state vehicle for social engineering…The integration and final 
transformation of fiqh into a code-like genre is wholly attributable to the 
represented a metamorphosis but also announced the demise of the Shari‘a 
ago.  
the question of how then one might deal with the relationship of 
ari‘a and the state given the nature of the shari‘a and the fact that it did not involve 
en 
 ‘church’ and ‘state’, or between a faith (din) and the world  (dunya).
244  
Indeed, in a speech given in Canada His Highness the Aga Khan, Imam (spiritual leader) 
of the hia Muslim 
tradition) noted: 
                                                
success of modernity…Yet the transformation into this new reality not only 
and its fiqh as Muslims knew them and lived them until two centuries 
243
 
This, of course, raises 
sh
coercive state power.  It is to this that we can now turn in looking at the nexus betwe
din, dunya and dawla. 
 
4.2  The nexus of Din, Dunya and Dawla: religion, politics and the state - divided? 
One of the supposedly major fault lines that might separate Muslim from liberal and 
secular frameworks is the idea that Islam does not know, and indeed cannot wear, any 
division between
 world’s Shia Ismaili Muslims (a minority branch within the minority S
 
243 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 167-168 and 171 (emphasis in original). 
244  For example, in his work The Law of Peoples, John Rawls hypothesised a fictional state called 
Kazanistan.  Kazanistan is a religiously committed state where the predominant religion is Islam.   
Specifically, in Rawls’ Kazanistan: (i) there is no institutional separation between ‘church’ and state; (ii) 
Islam is the favoured religion; and, (iii) only Muslims can hold upper positions of political authority and 
influence. Given that one of the touchstones of a liberal system is that the state will have no pre-set 
conception of the good, leaving this matter within the domain of either individual citizens or of 
associations, with the state remaining uncommitted, the conditions outlined above clearly seem to make 
Kazanistan a non-liberal place.  Indeed, Rawls pays particular attention to condition (iii), noting that, “This 
exclusion [i.e., condition (iii)] marks a fundamental difference between Kazanistan and a liberal democratic 
regime, where all offices and positions are, in principle, open to each citizen”.  Thus, Rawls refers to the 
Kazanistanis as a decent, but non-liberal people for whom liberals can have respect and with whom they 
can reasonably interact. Rawls (1999) at 75-76. 
  169Islam is all encompassing in the direction which it gives to Man's life. 
It is perhaps this very concept that the West, more familiar with the 
Augustinian Christian principle which separates the spiritual and 
 
‘enforced’ varied considerably over time and place.  And this was the case even though 
                                                
material, finds difficult fully to understand and appreciate.
245 
As a result, it is oft asserted that Islam never developed a position of retreating from 
engagement with the worldly and, thus, with politics.  For example, there is no monastic 
tradition in Islam where devotees can seek to live apart and in isolation, and can do so as 
being fully in accordance with the tenets of their religion.  The Biblical maxim to 
“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that 
are God's”
246 may have facilitated this possibility of a fully committed Christian being 
able to absent him or herself from the worldly affairs but, certainly, no such terse 
statement of principle appears in the scripture or other ‘Islamic’ textual sources.  Some of 
this may of course have been due to the political circumstances at the advent of Islam. 
Unlike early Christianity, which faced both ideological opposition as well as severely 
constrained arenas for political activism, the early Muslim community was able very 
quickly and remarkably successfully to establish an empire by conquest.  The state and 
the faith, then, were, if not exactly coterminous, certainly linked.  Of course, the pre-
modern Muslim polities were not religiously uncommitted.  Islam in some form was the 
religious tradition of officialdom – though not necessarily in the sense of established by 
state law -- binding both ruler(s) and ruled, though how it was expressed and how it was 
 
245 Speech given by His Highness the Aga Khan at the Foundation Ceremony of the Ismaili Jamatkhana and 
Centre, Burnaby, B.C., Canada, 26
th July 1982 (Aga Khan (1982)); accessible at: 
http://ismaili.net/speech/s820726.html. 
246Holy Bible, Matthew 22:21 
  170other minority religious communities continued to exist under Muslim rule, albeit under 
particular conditions often as protected, but not equal, subjects of the ruler.
247 
 
Still, as we have noted, Islam has not known a canonical church structure as developed in 
Christianity, which could be ‘established’ per se.  But some suggest that in this link 
between the spiritual and the material Islam does not separate ‘church’ and ‘state’ in 
theory, even if in practice there was no church and religious and political authority were 
separated.  Thus it is asserted that Islam has linked ‘din’ and the ‘dunya’ in a way that 
cannot accommodate diversity.  The din and dunya nexus, however, may be read 
differently.  It is true, as Amyn Sajoo points out, that a merging of the sacred and the 
secular became a “leitmotif of Muslim civilisational experience”
248 however, as he goes 
on to assert this does not mean that religion must be linked to the modern dawla (state): 
 
The world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are diverse in their cultures and 
understandings of Islam.  But they share a weltanschauung in which 
din and dunya (but not the modern dawla) are merged, so that both 
secular and sacred resonate in the public domain.  Far from 
precluding the institutional separation of Mosque and State, this 
perspective takes no ideological position in this regard: the umma 
can thrive in a plurality of political arrangements.  In other words, 
the occidental liberal conception of civil society is not inimical to 
Muslim traditions simply because it is wedded to secular 
space…However, a radical secularity that banishes social ethics from 
the public sphere is patently inimical to Muslim society…
249 
 
                                                 
247 For the ‘People of the Book’ and others this was the status of dhimmis.  See on this Cahen (1960-).  
Dhimma was a term used to designate the sort of “indefinitely renewed contract through which the Muslim 
community accords hospitality and protection to members of other revealed religions on condition of their 
acknowledging the domination of Islam” Those under this status were called dhimmis.   The protected 
status was originally accorded to Jews and Christians (the Qur’anic ‘People of the Book’) but later 
encompassed also Zoroastrians and other more minor faith communities. 
248 Sajoo (2004) at 2. 
249 Sajoo (2004) at 45. 
  171Analysing  the matter slightly differently, Abdulaziz Sachedina, considering the situation 
of Iraq as a case study, says flatly: “Secularism with its insistence on the separation of 
‘church’ and ‘state’…is not responsive to a culture that demands keeping religion at the 
core of the emerging national culture.  To put it differently, the ‘disestablishment’ of 
Islam will not work.”
250  He does go on to note, however, that the Sharia: “provides a 
paradigm of civil religion by separating the jurisdictions in its laws.  This principle 
allows religion to manage God’s relationship to humanity without interference from any 
human institutions, including the mosque and the seminary.”
251 
Continuing, he asserts: 
This separation of jurisdictions is the closest the Sharia can come to 
secularism adopted in Western constitutions.  It allows for functional 
secularity that can generate civic equality and mutual responsibilities 
at the human-human level of relationship, while maintaining the 
particularity and independence of the religious tradition from state 
administration.
252 
 
Sachedina’s conclusion is that, as a result, “Islamic heritage must guide rather than 
govern a modern nation-state.” He cites the Qur’anic verse (Qur’an 5:48):  
For everyone of you [Jews, Christians and Muslims], We have 
appointed path and a way.  If God had willed, He would have made 
you one community, but that [He has not done in order that] He may 
try you in what has come to you.  So compete with one another in 
good works. 
 
as a challenge to religious communities and the way in which they might institutionalise a 
culture of inclusiveness. 
 
                                                 
250 Sachedina (2006) at 19. 
251 Sachedina (2006) at 20. 
252 Sachedina (2006) at 21. 
  172Din and dunya links the spiritual and the material; it asserts a place for a religiously 
inspired ethics in public life, and for religion in the ‘world’.  Both Sajoo and Sachedina, 
though disagreeing in some parts perhaps, suggest that the din/dunya link can be 
separated from state administration (dawla) by pointing out the conceptual differences 
between a linkage between din and dunya on the one hand, and din and dawla on the 
other.  These perspectives suggest a secularism of functional differentiation based on a 
separation of jurisdictions so long as faith can continue to be related to the needs of the 
world and not just the needs of individuals privately; and in this way guide rather than 
govern the state.    As we have seen above, in the experiences of Muslim history this has 
been the role that has developed.  As Hallaq has noted, the shari‘a, though of course 
through its exponents among the ‘ulama, has confronted power with its own truth.
253  
Moreover, an affinity between faith and the world has not meant that a single set of 
understandings of Islam has been dispositive, nor that a state could appropriate the mantle 
of religious authority and enforcement.  Religious authority has been diffuse and multi-
vocal and it has been within the province of the jurist-theologian-scholars, and expressly 
not political authorities.  Thus, there has been a distinction between the ‘sacred law’ 
expressed by the ‘ulama (i.e., ‘Islamic law’) and the profane law of administration that 
was imposed by the political authorities. 
 
An historical example will help here.  In the preceding chapter, reference was made to the 
Shia Ismaili Fatimids who ruled from Egypt from the 9
th to 11
th centuries CE, 
establishing an alternative, and rival, state and caliphate to the Baghdad-based Sunni 
Abbasids.  As Shia Ismailis, the Fatimid religion-political structure rested of course on 
                                                 
253 Hallaq (2005-2006) at 155. 
  173that particular form of authority of the Shia Imam, which, in brief recap, sees the Imam as 
the legitimate and divinely inspired successor to the Prophet and as a near ‘caesro-papist’ 
leader occupying at one and the same time the roles of imam and caliph.  We noted above 
that the Fatimid political structure did not have a particularly great influence in Muslim 
history generally because of the relatively short duration of Fatimid reign in the context 
of Muslim history overall, and, even more, because of the different theological basis of 
the Fatimid system (qua a Shia system) as compared to the majoritarian Sunni traditions.    
Even during the Fatimid period, however, that is to say where, in a sense much more so 
than in the Sunni tradition, religious and political authority was united, legal diversity 
persisted.  The Fatimids did develop a (Ismaili, obviously) legal code whose major text 
the D‘a’im al-Islam (“Pillars of Islam”) was authored by the great Fatimid jurist the Qadi 
al-Nu‘man, and this was the law of the Fatimid state.  But it was not the only law to 
which one could appeal.  The other different (Sunni) legal schools were still recognised, 
with their strength derived from the authority of their own jurist-scholars, who continued 
to hold positions of qadis for their various communities.
254 Moreover, high officials of 
state in the Fatimid period were not drawn exclusively from Ismaili adherents, or even, 
from just amongst Muslims. Ismaili, other Muslim, Jewish and Christian individuals rose 
to high public office including to the highest office of wazir (roughly equivalent to a 
prime minister), which was occupied at times by both Jewish and Christian individuals.   
The Fatimid example is thus relevant here to make the point that even with the unity of 
political (calpihal) and religious (imamat) authority in one individual, the absolute 
unification of din and dawla did not take place and that things were rather more plural.  
                                                 
254 On Ismaili history and thought see Daftary (1989) and on the system of governance see Vatikiosis 
(1957). 
  174Once again, therefore, it seems that it is modern arguments to limit this plurality and to 
impose absolute uniformity through political institutions that are inconsistent with 
Muslim heritage.
255 
 
So the nexus of din and dunya seems separable both in theory as well as in historical 
practice, from dawla:  theoretically, because it may be read to engender a social ethic or a 
civil religion with a political secularity; practically, because religious authority and 
normativity has largely proceeded from outside of, and in opposition to, the state.  This 
raises both an important theoretical vista as well as a practical challenge for the adoption 
of political values based on liberal outlooks with citizen participation qua citizens rather 
than qua Muslim, Jew, Christian etc.  We can engage with this by examining attitudes 
towards democracy among Muslim publics.  Democracy is the appropriate vehicle to test 
the issue because, while there may practically be different versions of liberal-democratic 
states (in terms of  different constitutional forms) democracy even at its most simple 
understanding  is based on the participation of citizens in public decision making.   
                                                 
255 To be fair, not all modern structures deny the existence of at least juridical plurality.  For example, 
Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution states (http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution-1.html): 
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in usual al-Din and 
fiqh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools, including 
the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to be accorded full respect, and their 
followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their 
religious rites. These schools enjoy official status in matters pertaining to religious 
education, affairs of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related 
litigation in courts of law. In regions of the country where Muslims following any one of 
these schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local regulations, within the bounds of the 
jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective school of fiqh, 
without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools. 
What is different, however, is the placement of state authority above and beyond that of the juridical 
traditions which is manifest even in the permitting, by the state, of some juridical plurality. 
  175Democracy, thus, entails wide participation and must be in this respect liberal to 
accommodate that wide participation.  That is to say that while there may be sham 
democracies that really have decision making made by a few, though with the pretence of 
democratic forms that are imperfectly or corruptly applied, a proper functioning 
democracy where citizen participation actually counts must not decide in advance what 
the state’s conception of the good should be, but rather allow this to come from the 
citizens.  In this sense, it would be liberal.   Moreover, citizens who are in favour of 
democracy will likewise understand that they are in favour of their fellow citizens 
participation in public decision-making and that it will not just be up to them (or those 
that they like or support) to make political decisions.  Democracy and liberal theory are 
thus close allies so by examining the receptivity to one we may gain insight into the 
receptivity of the other. 
 
4.3  Contemporary opinions in Muslim populations 
Empirical studies seem to reflect a welcoming of democratic ideas among contemporary 
Muslims.  In their detailed study based on empirical evidence from the World Values 
Survey, Pippa Norris and Ronald Ingelhart have drawn the following conclusions: 
 
1.  There were no significant differences between publics 
living in the West and in Muslim religious cultures in 
approval of how democracy works in practice, in support 
for democratic ideals and in approval for strong 
leadership. 
 
2.  Muslim publics did display greater support for a strong 
societal role by religious authorities than do Western 
publics.
256 
                                                 
256 Norris and Inglehart (2004) at 146-47 and 154. 
  176 
Hence, they continue that “…any claim of ‘clash of a civilisations’, especially of 
fundamentally different political values held by Western and Islamic societies, represents 
and oversimplification of the evidence” and that “Support for democracy is surprisingly 
widespread among Islamic publics, even among those who live in authoritarian societies.  
The most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam does not concern 
democracy…”
257   Values Surveys as reported by Mansoor Moadell which looked at 
attitudes in Muslim majority settings of Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey and compared these to the US suggest similarly robust rates of support for 
democracy.
258  Among those expressing an opinion about democracy (i.e., excluding 
‘don’t knows’), the percentage who agreed with the statement that “democracy is the best 
for of government” ranged from a low of 69% in Iran to a high of 99% in Egypt.
259  
Interestingly, however, the Values Survey reveals somewhat mixed results when it comes 
to how democracy might work practically with 69% of respondents saying that it was 
important (23%) or very important (46%) that ‘government implements laws according 
the people’s wishes’ but 88% agreeing as important (15%) or very important (73%) that 
‘a good government implements only the shari‘a’.  While seemingly pulling in different 
directions, what the expression of these opinions illustrates in part is that an appeal to the 
normative values of Islam as expressed in the shari‘a remains important among the 
populations in these Muslim majority settings.  Justice as discourse is particularly useful 
here because it would allow for such religious sentiments, and indeed for the potential 
                                                 
257 Norris and Inglehart (2004) at 154-55 (emphasis in original). 
258 Moadell (2004); accessible at http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/tmp/moaddel_capitol-hill-
may04.pdf. 
259 Turkey, 88%, Jordan, 90%, Morocco 96%, Saudi Arabia 71%. 
  177contradictions between the support for democracy on the one hand the shari‘a on the 
other, to be expressed. 
 
What other studies do suggest, however, consistent with Norris and Inglehart’s second 
conclusion about the support for a societal role for religious authorities is the importance 
of religion to the social conscience of Muslim peoples.  An ICM poll conducted for the 
BBC reported that 97% of Indonesians surveyed, 98% of Nigerians and 92% of Lebanese 
said that they have always believed in God.
260 Similarly, other data from the ‘Values 
Survey’ showed high levels of respondents in these countries of Muslim majority 
considering themselves to be religious persons, and considering themselves to be above 
all else Muslims.
261  Rates of religious practice (participation in religious services once or 
more a week) ranged from 27% in Iran as a low to 44% in Jordan as a high.
262  Finally, a 
survey done as part of the Pew Global attitudes research reveals high degrees of feeling 
that ‘Religion is Very Important’ in several countries of Muslim majority.
263  This survey 
notes that “More than nine-in-ten respondents in the predominantly Muslim nations of 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Mali and Senegal rate religion as personally very important [though] 
in Turkey and Uzbekistan people are more divided over religion’s importance” (65% in 
                                                 
260  See survey results at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/04/world_what_the_world_thinks_of_god/html/1.stm. The 
Programme ‘What the World thinks of God’ aired on BBC 2 on Thursday, 26
th February 2004 at 2100 
GMT and on the BBC World Service on Sunday, 29
th February 2004 at 1306 and 1806 GMT.  
Interestingly, in the same poll, 79% of Americans said that have always believed in God, 78% said they had 
studied religious texts and 71% said they would die for their beliefs (or God). 
261 The figures for those considering themselves to be religious persons were 62% in Saudi Arabia, 82% in 
Iran, 94% in Morocco, 80% in Turkey, 85% in Jordan, 99% in Egypt. Figures for those considering 
themselves to be ‘above all Muslims’ were: Iran, 61%, Turkey, 68%, Jordan, 72%, Saudi Arabia, 75% and 
Egypt, 79%.  These results were also reported in Moadell (2003).   The latter set of figures (the ‘above all 
Muslim’ figures) are found only in the presented paper. 
262 Saudi Arabia 28%, Turkey 38%, Morocco and Egypt 42%, 
263 Pew Research Centre for People and the Press (www.people-press.org), “Among Wealthy 
Nations…U.S. stands alone in its embrace of religion”, released 19
th December 2002.     
  178Turkey said it was very important, while only 35% in Uzbekistan said the same).
264   The 
report further notes that “secularism is particularly prevalent in Europe” and that 
“wealthier nations tend to place less importance on religion – with the exception of the 
United States”.  Thus, “In Africa, no fewer than eight-in-ten in any country see religion 
as very important personally.”  Even where poll support seems mixed, some qualitative 
assessment suggests that religious feeling cannot be eradicated even by state imposition 
of a strict secular framework as has been attempted in Ataturkist Turkey.  As M Hakan 
Yavuz notes “Although Turkey is a national and secular state, religion lies at the core of 
its political landscape and identity” such that “[t]he underlying Islamic vernacular of 
Turkish society will continue to play an important role in the future evolution of Turkey’s 
intrinsic character.”
265 
 
Another Pew report provides what seems a good conclusion to all of this data: 
Muslims surveyed in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey favour a 
prominent -- in many cases expanded – role for Islam and religious 
leaders in the political life of their countries.   Yet that opinion does 
not diminish support for a system of governance that ensures the same 
system of civil liberties and political rights enjoyed by democracies. 
 
Muslims in 14 countries – ranging from Turkey, Pakistan and other 
predominantly Muslim countries to Uganda and Ghana where Muslims 
are a relatively small minority were surveyed…In most of these 
countries support for freedom and a strong Islamic presence in politics 
go hand in hand.   
 
Support for a religious role in public life among Muslim publics does 
not necessarily carry the same implications that it might in a nation 
like the United States, where the separation of church and state has 
                                                 
264 Turkey is of course officially secular and Kemalism was positively laïc in its orientation.  The results for 
Uzbekistan n the other hand may reflect the effect of its decades as part of the Soviet Union and it may be 
that in the coming generations the feelings of Uzbeks will more closely approximate those of the other 
countries of Muslim majority noted above. 
265 Yavuz (2000) at 21 and  42 (emphasis added). 
  179been codified and reinforced over the years.  Most importantly, while 
many Muslim around the world would like to see more religion in 
politics, this view does not contradict widespread support for 
democratic ideals among these publics.  In fact, in a number of 
countries, Muslims who support a greater role for Islam in politics 
place the highest regard on freedom of speech, freedom of the press 
and the importance of free and contested elections.
266 
 
Similar conclusions come from the Gallup World Poll, Special Report: Muslim World in 
their report entitled ‘Islam & Democracy’ (2006).
267 The report states (at page one): 
A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries, 
representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population
268, shows that 
when asked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently 
mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of 
speech.  When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and 
inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances. 
 
However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political 
system, Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose 
between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside 
one functional government. 
 
And, continuing (at page two), 
 
Although many Muslims have favourable attitudes toward an inclusive 
political system, according to Gallup polling, their ideas of self-
determination do not require a separation of religion and the state.  Poll data 
show that significant percentages of Muslims cite the importance of the role 
of Islam in governance.  Muslims surveyed indicated widespread support for 
Sharia, Islamic principles that are widely seen as governing all aspects of 
life from the mundane to the most complex.   
 
Yet, the poll also indicated that support for Sharia does not mean that 
Muslims want a theocracy to be established in their countries.  Only 
minorities in each country say they want religious leaders to be directly in 
charge of drafting their country’s constitution, writing national legislation, 
drafting new laws, determining foreign policy and international affairs, and 
                                                 
266 Pew Research Centre for People and the Press, (www.people-press.org)  “Views of a Changing World, 
June 2003” (The Pew Global Attitudes Project). 
267 Accessible at www.gallup.com/press/109693/Islam-Democracy.aspx  
268 The countries polled were Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and 
Lebanon. 
  180deciding how women dress in public or what is televised or published in 
newspapers.  
  
As Pew and Gallup have noted, such attitudes among Muslims seem to hold not only in 
environments of Muslim majority but even among minority Muslim populations.   
Furthermore, these attitudes appear to be not just confined to Muslim populations living 
in the counties of the developing world.  On 30
th November 2004, The Guardian 
newspaper reported the results of survey of British Muslims conducted by ICM.  In this 
survey, 68% of Muslim women and 46% of men reported praying five times a day, 
everyday, with another 19% of women and 17% of men reporting that they prayed two or 
more times a day, most days (13% of women and 23% of men reported praying less of 
than once a week or never).
269  These figures suggest a high level of religiosity expressed 
by religious practice.   There was also support, among 61% of those surveyed for shari‘a 
courts being allowed to resolve civil cases within in the Muslim community, so long as 
the penalties would not contravene British law. So it seems that a role for, and of, Islam 
was important for British Muslims.  Adding in these results to those we have just seen 
suggests that among Muslims, religion has mattered and continues to matter. 
 
More interesting even than the headline poll results of the ICM survey in the Guardian, 
however, was the rich range of opinions expressed by participants within roundtable 
discussions – eight tables, eight subjects, 103 young Muslims – that were arranged as part 
of the Guardian story.  While it is not practical here to reproduce the entire article given 
its length, by way of example, one can note the following from page 19 of the article.   
First, from Table (discussion) 5 on ‘How the faithful live in a secular society’: 
                                                 
269 The Guardian, 30
th November 2004 at 17-20. 
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When Asif Dawood, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, declared that Islam and 
democracy were incompatible, there was an uproar at the table, with Mr 
Yousafazi [a member of Young Citizens in the West Midlands] rejecting 
the idea outright and insisting that the principles of democracy came out of 
Islam. 
 
There was an assumption, added Sohaib Saeed Bhutta from the Muslim 
Association of Britain, that there was such a thing as British Islam, when 
there were differences “within even Glaswegian Islam”. 
 
Second, from Table discussion 6 on ‘The widespread perception is that Islam 
discriminates against women.  Why is that so?’: 
Sultanah Parvin, a teacher and member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, picked up on 
this last point: “Islam is not compatible with Western concepts of freedom 
and choice – they would include the right to wear a miniskirt.  From an 
Islamic point of view we don’t agree with that.”  But Ayisha Ali sees this 
as a challenge of integration.  “You might not want to see people in 
miniskirts, but that’s the right of the country we live in, and it’s the law we 
have to yield to.  It is not up to us to come in and tell them how to live”. 
 
That there should be such a range of opinions expressed in these discussions is not 
surprising – it merely reflects what we have already noted about the diversity within 
‘Muslim contexts’.  What it does show, however, is the continued expression of this 
diversity within the framework of Muslim identity in a Western context. 
 
4.4 Prospects  for  democracy? 
In his examination of the prospects for democracy in the Muslim world, Noah Feldman, 
has noted the trend mentioned in the empirical studies namely that many contemporary 
Muslims find the combination of Islamic ideal and democratic values appealing and that, 
indeed, the hunger for Islamic democracy is growing.
270  Feldman makes a distinction 
between Islamic democracy and Islamist democracy – the former being a democracy in 
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  182which ‘Islam’ develops in tandem and resonates with democratic values; the latter being 
a usurpation by Islamists of democratic structures for their own ideological and theocratic 
ends.  Feldman sketches out a set of options for Islam in the public sphere in theoretical 
terms on the one hand, and in practical structures on the other hand. Options for Islam in 
public sphere include: (i) classical Islamic law; (ii) Islam as the official religion of a 
secular state; (iii) Islam being the bases for family or personal law only, and; (iv) Islam as 
the symbolic basis for personal legislation.  The point here is that the options are richer 
than a choice between a secular state and an Islamic state.
271  In terms of practical 
structures (or as he puts it ‘How to get an Islamic democracy’), Feldman posits the 
following practical structures could be used: (i) an Islamic state like Anglican Britain, 
where Islam is the religion of the state but with equal rights accorded to all citizens, 
Muslim and non-Muslim; (ii) classical Islamic law as a part of state law (for example in 
the way in both contemporary Pakistan and Egypt mention is made of the role of Islamic 
law in their constitutions).  This would be alright, he suggests, so long as the state 
protects non-Muslims and treats them equally; (iii) Islamic law as the exclusive state law 
in some codified system along the lines of what the Mejelle was attempting; (iv) a 
constitutional provision that Islamic law shall be the law of the land à la contemporary 
Saudi Arabia but in this sense making the invocation of Islamic law akin to an invocation 
of English Common Law, broad and diverse with many opinions being expressed and 
putting the power of interpreting it in the hands of the judges.
272 
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  183To this, Feldman adds the following principled arguments.  First, that a state that 
embraces religion can still be democratic in the way that Britain is or that the German 
state of Bavaria is.  Second, while it is necessary for a liberal democracy to respect an 
individual’s right to worship and to provide religious liberty for its inhabitants, this is not 
incompatible with support or even funding for a particular faith.  
 
Feldman adds that an Islamic state can fully respect the moral equality of all its citizens 
because Islam professes a commitment to equality as evidenced in theological statements 
about how all peoples are equal before God.  For this he cites the Qur’anic verse 49:13: 
O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you 
nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in 
the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.
273 
 
 
On Feldman’s examination the notion of the basic equality of all people before God, 
which he finds within Islam, can be used as the starting point for a political democracy 
that must also embrace basic equality.  He concludes by noting, consistent with what we 
have seen above, that the evidence shows that most Muslims do not want or need 
                                                 
273 Feldman (2003) at 62.  Holy Qur’an, translation of M M Pickthall.  Other translations of the verse are: 
 
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each 
other)). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most 
righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). 
(Translation of Yusuf Ali ) 
 
Or 
 
O you men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and 
families that you may know each other; surely the most honourable of you with Allah is 
the one among you most careful (of his duty); surely Allah is Knowing, Aware. 
(Translation of Shakir) 
 
  184religious enforcement by the state but rather want Islam as a moral guide to keep 
domestic and foreign polices ethical.
274 
 
Feldman’s analysis is interesting in a least two senses: first, because he theorises about 
how Islam and democracy can fit together and seeks to make an argument that they can 
indeed fit, and, second, because he confirms through his analysis some of what we have 
just seen, namely, that the range of possibilities in terms of democratic models and the 
‘responses’ of Islam to these models are rich and varied.  What is implicit in Feldman’s 
analysis, however, is that this fit, or the construction of ‘Islamic democracy’, is not yet 
achieved.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
At the end of the last chapter, L Carl Brown’s observation, based on his examination of 
the classical history and heritage of Muslim societies, was cited stating that Muslim 
history had “rocked along” with a certain indeterminacy in terms of the relationship 
between religion and politics, leaving this potentially explosive issue unresolved.  In 
looking at the situation in later history and into the contemporary period we can see that 
the same indeterminacy obtains inasmuch as there is still not a fixed answer.  But the 
indeterminacy that prevailed in the past that seemed stable is much less stable now.   
Whereas the past indeterminacy fit the socio-political structures that prevailed, and, 
indeed, could be seen to have been born out of them, any current indeterminacy is a poor 
fit for contemporary conditions.  What has changed is the nature of political order and 
institutional structure.  It is rather like a challenge to the ‘old regime’ in both theory and 
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  185practice.  The modern nation-state with all its extensive, controlling, regulating and 
managing functions is still the basic political unit in operation today, notwithstanding 
challenges from inside and outside that  challenge its hegemony.  And the political ideas 
that go along with the state, ideas of democracy and participation, are the paradigmatic 
principles for the organisation of political life.  These developments were not sui 
generis to Muslim societies.  Liberal democracy, of course, was born, painfully, out of a 
history in Western Europe that was different from the history, taken broadly, of areas of 
Muslim majority.  Yet, directly or indirectly, through colonial infiltration or intellectual 
adoption – or both – the legacy of Western liberal democracy found its way around the 
world.  In this it became both a challenge and an opportunity and is something with 
which Muslim, as other, contexts have had to grapple.  This grappling continues. 
 
What we have seen is that there is support both for democratic political principles, which 
are strongly linked to liberal theory, as well as for a place or role or meaning for Islam in 
politics among Muslims, but no one, and certainly no simple, answer as to how these 
desires can be harmonised.  There seems nothing immanent in Islam, given both the 
varied interpretations of the faith and its traditions and the history of how it has handled -
- with indeterminacy -- the relation of religion and politics, that either provides a system 
of harmonisation or, the other hand, posits an irresolvable conflict.  The interrelationship 
may be made to work but not in a simple fashion, since there is neither a settled blueprint 
from classical history nor an obvious conclusion from contemporary debates and 
viewpoints.  But there are debates and there is receptivity.  For contemporary Muslim 
contexts, as opposed to other contexts, these debates are taking place in situations in 
  186which both modern political ideas and institutions are known as well as where the 
heritage and history of Islam and its texts, models and law(s) are known.  And it is within 
these, thus unique, contexts that transition and liminality are prevailing as there is both 
the desire for democracy and for a role for Islam.  As Vali Nasr has put it: 
As the example of Iran suggests, the Muslim world is in the midst of a 
process of change, experimenting with models that, by balancing competing 
demands of religion and secularism, can create viable ways for these 
societies to modernize…These states will call upon the cultural resources of 
religion to address their social and economic needs – but not necessarily in 
the manner European history suggests.
275 
 
Having set up our understanding of Muslim contexts, both in historical terms as well as 
considering some of their contemporary contours what remains, therefore is the need for 
imagination and even a new ‘social imaginary’
276 for Muslim contexts that might make 
sense of the tensions, conflicts but also opportunities that come as the religio-legal and 
political heritage and history, with its indeterminate answer to the relationship of religion 
and politics, meets new political conditions and new political and legal frameworks, 
especially in the structure of the modern state. As the above discussion makes clear, 
however, is that there is much fertile ground for imagination based on a support for 
democracy and its cognates on the one hand, and of the importance of Islam on the other. 
                                                 
275 Nasr (2003) at 72.  Muslims outside of ‘the Muslim world’ will also have to deal with these same 
demands drawing as they will from the same well of cultural resources and ideas, albeit in different 
circumstances. 
276 I draw the idea of a ‘social imaginary’ from Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries (Taylor 
(2004)).  Taylor explains this as follows (at 23): 
 
By social imaginary…I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and 
images that underlie these expectations…the social imaginary is that common 
understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy. 
  187As part of this process the old(er) divide of religio-legal authority, on the one hand, and 
political authority on the other will need to be reworked. 
 
What I will propose below is a new alignment based on the normative usefulness of 
liberal theory, and in particular on the framework of justice as discourse, in providing 
fruitful terms for the interaction of religion, law, state and society in Muslim contexts.  
This new alignment will separate out religion, law and politics as three distinct concepts 
and reconnect them in a new manner in which they will all be ‘public’ in a liberal sense. 
  188Chapter 5.  Terms of engagement: (re)imagining religion, law, state and society 
for Muslim contexts 
 
 
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the 
business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England, conditions, 
some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The 
Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there 
are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars 
imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those 
days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no 
distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between 
one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental 
principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.
277 
 
 
Let’s be honest: religion can create community, and it can divide 
communities.  It can lead to searing self-criticism and it can promote a 
pompous self-satisfaction.  It can encourage dissent and conformity, 
generosity and narrow-mindedness.  It can engender both righteous 
behaviour and self-righteousness…Religion’s finest hours have been the 
times when intense belief led to social transformations, yet some of its 
darkest days have entailed the transformation of intense belief into the 
ruthless imposition of orthodoxy.
278 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I attempt to bring together the theoretical framework outlined in chapters 
one and two to the examination of and elaboration of Muslim contexts in chapters three 
and four.  In so doing, I seek to finalise the argument that I have been developing for the 
normative usefulness and appropriateness of liberal theory, and justice as discourse in 
particular, in Muslim contexts, and more specifically for the construction of a framework 
                                                 
277 Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, first Governor-
General and Head of State of Pakistan, on 11
th August 1947. Reproduced in Dawn (Karachi’s English-
language daily newspaper), Independence Day Supplement, 14
th August 1999.  What Jinnah, who died in 
1948, might think of the choices his ‘State of Pakistan’ has made since his address (including changing its 
name to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan) one may only wonder. 
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  189for relating law, religion, state and society in these contexts.  I proceed to do this in three 
sections.  First, I outline some challenges that arise out of liberal theory for Muslim 
contexts and discuss how these challenges may be addressed generally and within the 
framework of justice as discourse.   These challenges arise in two ways.  One set of 
challenges is, one might say, generic and would arise in any attempt to apply a variety of 
liberal theory to an environment in which a religious tradition is important.  Even though 
this set of challenges is thus not unique to Muslim contexts, I will address it particularly 
with these contexts in mind.  The second set of challenges is particular to Muslim 
contexts and arises from the fact that liberal theory did not emerge in these contexts.  In 
the second section, I propose an institutional model building from justice as discourse 
that I will argue is appropriate for a Muslim majority state, and envisage how these 
principles may be applied practically.  Finally, I offer a few thoughts by way of 
conclusion, noting especially that what I propose here (and the argument that runs 
throughout this study) calls for Muslim contexts to imagine new possibilities which, 
while consistent with their heritage, are not based on  seeking solutions that are immanent 
either in Islam as a faith (however so interpreted) or on a set ‘Islamic’ model from the 
past. 
 
5.1  Challenges to the uses of liberal theory 
5.1.1  Issues and challenges from the paradigm of liberal theory 
5.1.1.1 The problem of liberal neutrality 
In discussing Rawls and feminism, Elizabeth Brake outlines the heart of the familiar 
claim for liberal neutrality 
  190Liberal neutrality is the doctrine that the state remains neutral between 
competing conceptions of the good, where an individual’s conception of the 
good is whatever plan of life she has, subject to certain rational constraints.  
Such conceptions may include, for example, commitment to religious 
beliefs.
279 
 
She goes on to assert that the claim to neutrality might not sit well with some 
comprehensive doctrines, including, significantly, religious outlooks, noting that: 
For instance, a comprehensive doctrine might simply deny that the political 
sphere is separable [from our morally significant features]: examples of 
religions that would base law on religious teachings spring readily to mind.  
Thus the religious believer, who seeks unity of church and state, or a legal 
system based on the Old Testament, might respond to Rawls that his 
restriction of the scope of justice does not make the theory either neutral or 
acceptable to the believer.
280 
 
Brake identifies an important issue here, which though it has more general application, is 
salient for Muslim contexts.  Whatever Islam means to specific individuals, the key factor 
that distinguishes Muslim contexts is the reference point of Islam and like any other 
religious system Islam is not neutral inasmuch as it will have an outlook about what is 
morally significant and therefore what the best political choices may be.  Liberal 
neutrality may thus be a problem because it posits an uncommitted position in the face of 
a (potentially) committed outlook.  No religious culture or environment where religion is 
significant may thus readily accept liberal neutrality.  In the case of Muslim contexts, this 
may be felt especially because there has not been any sense of Islam disengaging from 
worldly affairs.  Born in a time of an expanding empire, early Muslim political leaders 
drew up their sense of the values of the faith to guide the community practically as well 
as spiritually, whether this was in the time of the Prophet (who combined the role of 
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  191political and religious leadership) or his successors who, while not being able to unify 
these authorities as seamlessly in practice, still sought guidance from the faith even for 
‘worldly’ affairs.  Additionally, like Jewish law, articulations of Muslim legal traditions 
dealt with guidance that applied, albeit not always comprehensively, to ritual matters 
(prayer, washing, dietary rules), to criminal law, to contract and even, inchoately, to 
administration.  In short, the religious law, the shari‘a, like the other religious values was 
engaged with the here and now as well as the hereafter. 
 
Thus the issue, as Michael Cook has noted, is that Islam (and the same may apply to any 
religion) within certain limits tells people what to believe and how to live, while 
liberalism, also within certain limits, is about leaving people to work this out for 
themselves.
281  Cook goes on to claim, however, that Western culture as broadly secular 
and liberal is not necessarily irreligious and in this sense seems readily compatible with a 
non-fundamentalist allegiance to Christianity, Judaism or Islam.
282  This is an important 
distinction.  What Cook helps us to realise is that it is one thing to feel that a faith 
tradition can speak to and guide an individual in her or his daily life, including in 
‘worldly’ matters, but quite another to think that it must be made to do so by being allied 
to political decision-making.  Some fundamentalists want to construct ‘God’s kingdom’ 
on earth and see their religious convictions reflected in political order but that is only one 
option even for those who might want to be guided by faith.  Thus, while there may be 
some Muslims (as some of other traditions) that would seek to impose fundamentalist 
interpretations on their faith, this does not make Islam incompatible with a liberal culture 
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  192per se.  Furthermore, as the history of Muslim contexts has shown, there is no clear 
meaning shared by all Muslims about what the Islamic commitments or attitudes on any 
particular public issue should be, so there is no simple or clear ‘Islamic’ alternative to the 
premise of liberal neutrality on public issues in any case.   
 
On the side of liberal theory, Cook’s insight that Western secular and liberal culture is not 
necessarily irreligious is borne out, theoretically, in the Rawlsian limitation of the 
commitments to political liberalism to ‘constitutional essentials’.  While, as mentioned 
earlier, it is not clear from Rawls exactly what is and is not a constitutional essential, the 
point to be noted here is that, in Rawls’ liberal formulation at least, liberal theory requires 
an uncommitted stance only up to these essentials; beyond this liberal neutrality would 
not be necessary.  Additionally, the commitment to neutrality does not have to mean that 
everything that the state does must be seen to be absolutely neutral.  Roger Trigg, for 
example, suggests that absolute neutrality is impossible to achieve in any case but all that 
is required to meet the ‘liberal neutrality’ test is respect for religious liberty and toleration 
of diversity.
283 Trigg’s point that we may never be able to get absolute neutrality is well 
taken but his requirements of what is required seem fine if, and only if, one adds to his 
criteria of respect and toleration a commitment to a type of ‘neutrality’ on the part of the 
state (albeit one that may never be completely realised) that Brake outlines. 
 
The idea of liberal neutrality does not, thus, seem to be an insurmountable problem for 
Muslim contexts.  The neutrality may be challenged by potential commitments but there is 
not a coherent ‘Islamic’ alternative that stands in opposition to it.  There may be the views 
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  193of Muslims but these inevitably will be highly divergent and perhaps even contradictory.  
As a political principle, then, state neutrality is an entirely reasonable and even desirable 
response to these situations. On the other hand, neutrality does not have to mean that 
religiously committed positions cannot legitimately be held on a wide spectrum of issues.  
It is only for those matters that will ensure participation that neutrality must apply, 
though, admittedly, where those lines are drawn is highly significant and may be highly 
controversial.  Justice as discourse may assist in determining where the lines are drawn; as 
a variant of liberal theory it shares the concern for, and commitment to, neutrality but also 
circumscribes this neutrality to accommodate the expression of non-neutral opinions and 
reasons and, in particular, religiously parochial reasons. 
 
5.1.1.2 The contours of secularity: 
A second and related issue is secularity.  As Jurgen Habermas pointed out, a liberal 
framework necessarily implies a type of state secularity.  This is so because it would 
violate the liberal principle of neutrality to have pre-set religious commitments on the 
part of the state.  Secularity, therefore, is potentially a challenge for Muslim contexts 
where levels of religious affiliation are fairly robust.   The issue is how the challenge of 
secularity can sit with religious commitments, and, moreover why those with religious 
commitments should accept state secularity.    
 
To address this issue, it is important to be clear, however, what the contours and demands 
of liberal secularity are.  Secularity, as we have just noted, need not encompass animosity 
to religious commitments -- which is easy enough -- nor need it entail that religious 
  194commitments cannot, subject to certain limitations, play a political role or that these 
commitments must be seen as entirely individual such that there cannot be any collective 
movement of religious believers.  Nor even does it mean, therefore, that religious ideas 
must be seen as having nothing to say to the issues of real life politics.  Unfortunately, 
however, liberal theory is often believed to require that religion keep silent on matters of 
public political importance.
284  In part, this impression arises because there are some 
liberal theorists who appear to support exactly this sort of position.  Robert Audi, for 
example, advocates not just that the state must act on secular rationales, but also out of 
secular motivations.
285   
 
As has been seen, however, this position is only one end of a liberal spectrum and other 
liberal theorists would disagree (including Nicholas Wolterstorff and indeed Habermas 
himself).  What does seem to be required by all liberal theorists is that the state not 
associate itself in a direct way with any particular religion or set of religious 
commitments.  As a locus for engaging discussion, however, this requirement need not 
extend, ipso facto, to society at large or to all political discussions.  An alternative sense 
of the secular will be necessary in Muslim contexts. 
 
Just as in the case of the general neutrality requirement, this secularity would require only 
that political decisions that would compel state action not be justified on religious 
grounds. This secularity seems consistent with the impossibility, within Muslim contexts, 
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  195of finding a single, agreed Muslim religious outlook in any case.  There will always be 
contested and debated grounds.  The issue arises for those who hold religiously inspired 
positions to accept that the state should not act explicitly on or out of these grounds, or 
religious grounds more generally, and in this sense be secular. Of course, there may be 
many Muslims who are perfectly happy to be privately religious and politically secular 
and for this group accepting this requirement would not be controversial.
286  T h e  
challenge is for those whose religious convictions may compel political action and 
commitments.  It is here that liberal theory will demand that they accept the limited 
secularity that precludes state action based on religious principles, while still allowing for 
religious influence in broader political discussions.  It is this space that justice as 
discourse seeks to carve out.  By insisting on a capacious zone of public discourse and by 
allowing religious reasons to be expressed in it, justice as discourse is permissive of both 
non-secular discourses and non-secular reasons in public debate, but it keeps these within 
the bounds of liberal secularity.  Those who would seek to act politically out of their 
Muslim faith need only embrace the idea that theirs is not the only legitimate voice 
within Muslim contexts, nor the only legitimate Muslim voice. 
 
5.1.1.3 The challenge of democracy 
The third major challenge arises from decision making through a democratic form of 
government.  Democracy and liberal theory run together in part because of liberal 
neutrality and in part because of the liberal embrace of diversity.  Neutrality links to 
democracy because when the state has no pre-determined commitments it must seek these 
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  196from its citizenry and to do this it must hear their views through the mechanisms of 
democratic participation.  The liberal embrace of diversity links to democracy because 
broad and widespread democratic participation is required actually to capture the diverse 
views, opinions and outlooks of citizens.  Additionally, and crucially, democracy links to 
liberal theory because it vests sovereignty in the people rather than in any other source of 
authority and thus does not ground itself on pre-determined or defined set of values.   
Herein lies the challenge: can democracy and truth-claiming traditions like religion co-
exist?  If they cannot, this would raise a serious problem for liberal theory in Muslim 
contexts. 
 
At first thought, truth-claiming traditions like religion would seemingly be opposed to 
democratic forms of decision making because these could lead to decisions that do not 
accord with the religious ‘truth’.  In essence, the problem is that democratic decisions 
may be ‘wrong’ in the sense of being religious truth violating.  Democracy would only be 
problematic on these grounds, however, if the religious convictions were to be seen as 
compelling adherents to reject the moral standing of others as legitimate; that is to say, if 
the religious tradition was interpreted as providing a truth claim that said that others, 
whether other Muslims or non-Muslims or those of no religious faith, cannot be tolerated.  
If, on the other hand, the religious tradition engenders a perspective that others are to be 
respected, even if they are not correct, then democratic decision-making does not seem 
problematic.  It is thus that Feldman distinguished between ‘Islamic democracy’ 
(accepting of the idea of moral equality) and ‘Islamist democracy’ (convinced of its 
  197correctness and not willing to tolerate others).
287  There is, however, a lingering, generic 
sense of an uncomfortable fit between religious traditions qua truth-claiming systems and 
liberal democracy, which is opposed to accepting any such claim.  For liberal democracy 
to be viable, those of religious convictions must either see their traditions as mandating 
respect for the opinions of others (say, as part of a common ‘Creation’) or, at least, of 
leaving open the possibility that their own truth-claims may be open to question and not 
something that they can know for sure to be right. 
 
The empirical support for democracy as a system and for democratic values that was 
noted in the previous chapter, coupled with the discomfort for the enforcement of Islam 
by the state, demonstrates that within contemporary Muslim contexts some (indeed, 
most) populations do not see democracy as necessarily incompatible with their religious 
faith.  Whether this is because they recognise the diversity of Muslim interpretations or 
are simply uncomfortable with the state believing undertaking to define and enforce 
Islam is not clear.  But it does not matter.   It may be that both of these are relevant 
factors given that both are trends link to the religio-legal heritage of Muslim contexts.  
Moreover, empirical support for democratic decision-making also suggests that there is 
willingness within these contexts to accept and vest political sovereignty in the people 
themselves.  
 
It is not clear if these empirical findings also mean an acceptance of the idea that ‘Islam’, 
in some essential way, need not be the political master.  Yet, justice as discourse would 
need this demand to be met.  It would require that in addition to support for democratic 
                                                 
287 Feldman (2003) at 15-22. 
  198politics as a method for political decision-making, that there should also be support for 
democracy epistemologically, namely a genuine willingness to allow others with their 
different views to have a say in decisions affecting one’s life.  Some observers have noted 
that a certain ‘creative’ tension exists between support for ‘democracy’ as the basis for 
decision making on the one hand and support for ‘religious values’ (associated with 
Islam, of course) to have a guiding role setting policy on the other hand. Additionally, 
they point out that what these terms mean when they are invoked is not entirely clear: 
support for democracy seems really to be a vote for ‘not autocracy’, while the support for 
religious values/Islam seems to be a desire for ‘virtue’ (honesty, integrity etc) in 
politics.
288 Thus, whether support for democracy can be read to include a genuine support 
for popular decision-making including seeing others (i.e., other Muslims and non-
Muslims) as moral equals who thereby have a legitimate right to participate in political 
decision-making is not clear.  The expressed support for democracy in opinion surveys 
and public polls does not conclusively tells us this but it does open the possibility.  It does 
tell us, however, first, that these populations struggle with a connection between ‘din’ and 
‘dawla’ and, second, that there are at least elements of liberalism present in their political 
outlooks.  Justice as discourse is particularly well suited to contexts where such a range 
of opinions, even if potentially conflicting, exists because, unlike other varieties of liberal 
theory that are more constraining of any appeal to religious ideas in public discourse, it is 
open to the full range of these outlooks.  Justice as discourse would thus allow both the 
‘we support democracy’ and ‘we want Islam/the shari‘a’ opinions to be advanced.  In 
other words, justice as discourse offers a political theory that better fits contexts in which 
people may wish to rely upon religions ideas and, most significantly, it offers a political 
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  199theory  in which the contradictions, complications and implications of such ideas can be 
worked out in public discussion. 
 
5.1.2  Challenges arising out of the heritage of Muslim contexts 
5.1.2.1 An ‘Islamic’ imperative? 
At the beginning of his The Spirit of Islamic Law, Bernard Weiss asserts that: 
Law, it seems, is integral to monotheistic religion.  The world’s sole creator 
is necessarily by right its sole ultimate ruler, legislator and judge.  All law 
worthy of that name must therefore originate with him.  The human lawgiver 
is, despite his exalted position within the monotheistic scheme of things, 
only the mediator of the divine law to mankind…[Such that] Government, 
too, becomes part of the ideal monotheistic order, for the law is understood 
to be the embodiment of a social vision that can be realised in this world 
only if power…is placed in the law’s service.  Accordingly, monotheistic 
communities inevitably acquire or seek to acquire the character of 
monotheistic polities.
289 
 
Weiss’ analysis suggests a type of monotheistic imperative that runs from the basic 
premise of monotheism (that there is one God) through to law and government.  Weiss 
contends that this pattern was classically represented in Judaism, with its most recent 
manifestation being Islam.
290  If Weiss is correct about the classical pattern and its 
political imperative, it seems basically impossible to reconcile this model with the three 
requirements of liberal theory just presented.  This pattern is not neutral because it would 
be based on realising the divine will, it is not secular as its source would be 
unapologetically religious and sacred, and it is not democratic, both in terms of citizen 
participation, which would be essentially irrelevant, and in terms of the source of political 
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  200sovereignty, which would lie with God not the people.  In short, if the classical pattern 
represents the practical political imperative of monotheism, then any environment that 
draws its inspiration or values from a monotheistic tradition such as Islam, or even more 
generally where the monotheistic tradition is inherently important, could not really accept 
a liberal system without admitting stark inconsistency. 
 
There are two issues with Weiss’ classical pattern: first, a theoretical concern about his 
reading of what an Islamic imperative would be; and second that history has evidenced a 
more complex situation than he describes.  Interestingly, Weiss himself acknowledges 
these complexities.  Although he says that “…Muslim history places the revelation of 
Islam’s law in the context of a polity based in Medina and portrays Muhammad as, like 
Moses, both prophet and ruler”
291 he goes on to note that:  
Though the seeds of the new Islamic order were planted in the time of the 
prophet Muhammad, its full maturation required the labors of subsequent 
generations of Muslims.  The building up of the Islamic polity was largely 
the achievement of the first caliphal dynasty, that of the Umayyads…
292  
 
And, moreover,  
Without denying the rootedness of the Islamic polity in the time of 
Muhammad, modern Western scholarship has come to see the period after 
Muhammad and the first conquests as more decisive for the building up of 
the polity and the law…the Umayyad caliphate and its successor, the 
Abbasid caliphate…would do for Islam what the Davidic kingdom had done 
for the religion of Israel, that is, provide the political context necessary for 
the development of genuine law.
293   
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suggest, contains within it a certain political imperative, but then recognises, albeit in a 
somewhat hesitant way, that the real driver for the development of the law was not the 
imperative of the classical pattern alone but rather the practical requirements of the 
political system of the early dynasties (and so we might reasonably extrapolate, the 
political systems after these early dynasties).  While Weiss would like to see a consistent 
theoretical thread in the classical pattern that just gets worked out later on, the events of 
history have shown that this is too simplified an account.   The way in which both 
political and legal principles were established does not suggest that there was a single 
master narrative or pattern – certainly not at a conscious level – that animated the actors 
involved in establishing the political order, on the one hand, or articulating the shari‘a on 
the other.  Indeed, while the Muslim polities may have been the sites for the development 
of the legal rules of the shari‘a, the legal elaboration proceeded largely outside of, and 
was not linked to, political authority.  Thus, Weiss’ neat connection from a monotheistic 
premise through law into government and the political order might seem to make sense in 
theory but it was not lived practice in any such clear cut way.  This may be as much the 
case for Islam as other monotheistic traditions.  In any case, the result is that the lived 
experience of these traditions, Islam included, appears open to greater political 
arrangements than the theoretical imperative contained in Weiss’ argument seems to 
admit. 
 
  202Weiss’ historical analyses have also been challenged by other scholars such as Abdulaziz 
Sachedina,
294 Asma Asfaruddin
295 and L Carl Brown.
296  Sachedina’s investigation is an 
attempt to mine the sources of Muslim tradition for a greater range of theoretical 
possibilities than Weiss’ classical pattern admits.  Sachedina acknowledges the pattern of 
the prophet being sent as both a lawgiver and an organiser, and thus that in the prophetic 
order political and religious authority were united as a matter of principle and of fact.  He 
further asserts that among the Abrahamic traditions, Islam has been in his view that most 
conscious of its earthly agenda, or as he puts it, “Islam has been a faith in the realm of the 
public.”
297 The medium for realising this agenda was the shari‘a, which could be called 
upon to regulate human affairs through its comprehensive reach.  However, as we saw, 
Sachedina further posits that the shari‘a provides the paradigm of a civil religion by a 
separation of jurisdictions on all its laws, a principle he calls ‘secularity’ (sifa 
madaniyya). This separation of jurisdictions is found in a division of topics within the 
classic texts of Islamic law (the fiqh) between those regulating the relationship of humans 
and God (ibadat), on the one hand, and those regulating the relationship of humans to 
other humans (muamalat), on the other.  Sachedina finds that the human-God relationship 
is beyond the state for here only God can judge and demand explanations for behaviour.  
Thus, worldly political authority has no role to play in enforcing these aspects of shari‘a 
and,  a fortiori, for imposing sanctions or penalties upon people for breaches of an 
individual’s responsibilities to God.   At the human-human level the state and its courts 
may, however, become involved but here the requirements for justice, Sachedina 
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  203contends, generate an ethic of civic equality and mutual responsibilities.  His overall 
conclusion, therefore, is that Islamic heritage must guide rather than govern, because 
Islam recognises humans as equal in creation and, in their relationships with each other, in 
need of guidance, not governance, from religion.   
 
The significance of recalling Sachedina’s analysis here is that we can see in it a markedly 
different reading of the requirements of the ‘Islamic tradition’ at a theoretical level.   
While recognising much of the same heritage as Weiss, Sachedina’s conclusion about 
what this heritage must result in practically is substantially different.  Gone is the strict 
logic from the premise of monotheism to a monotheistic polity with religion seeking 
dominion over government.  Instead, we have a (potential) zone of civic equality and 
mutual responsibility with the state stepping out of the enforcement of religious norms 
that exist to regulate the relationship between the individual and God, where Islam guides 
but does not govern.  Sachedina’s model therefore seems compatible with liberal 
perspectives, even though it is not quite fully satisfying.  Nonetheless, it opens up a sense 
of ‘Islamic heritage’ that is not locked in Weiss’ imperative and through an ethic of civic 
equality and mutual responsibility offers real liberal possibilities.  
 
What Sachedina’s distinction between guidance and governance appears to amount to is 
this: Islam, and in particular its articulation through the shari‘a, cannot provide all the 
political principles or all the public policy needed for a Muslim society and perhaps was 
never meant to do so but it can provide a moral and ethical direction that can guide 
Muslims both in asserting an ethic of civic equality and mutual responsibilities and in 
  204working out politically what this ethic means.  Justice as discourse can help give meaning 
to this conception of the role of Islam.  It eschews the idea that Islam in any interpretation 
should be called upon to furnish a framework of governing principles, indeed, it explicitly 
denies that any such principles should be justified on the basis of their ‘Islamic 
credibility.’ However, it also allows religious ideas to enter into public political debate 
and therefore to influence, shape and even guide public policy, so long as no religious 
conception is permitted, by itself, to dictate or determine public policy. 
 
Asma Asfaruddin, through an examination of early texts provides a different challenge to 
Weiss’ outlook.  She states that: 
None of the pre-modern sources – the Qur’an, hadith, historical works, 
exegeses – refers to the recurrent fundamental Islamist terms of ‘al-Dawla 
al-Islamiyya’ (the Islamic state), ‘al-Hukma al-Islamiyya’ (the Islamic 
Government) or ‘al-hakimiyya’.
298 
 
Instead of these terms, the early discourses used the term ‘ummah’ for the community of 
Muslims and their polity, though, importantly, Jews and Christians were also themselves 
ummahs.  The term dawla or state, she claims, was first used for the Abbasids and 
Fatimids to justify their particular polities.  Moreover, she states that: 
There is no evidence at all in the early sources that the Companions [of the 
Prophet] invoked a supposedly divinely mandated blueprint for an ‘Islamic 
Government’ or an ‘Islamic State’ in the election of the Prophet’s first 
successor.
299 
 
In a similar vein, L Carl Brown points out a difference in practice that followed after the 
early years.  While Christianity, he argues, chose to wrestle with the problem of political 
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  205loyalty (“…of what to render unto Caesar and what to God, of who is entitled to speak for 
Christendom, who decides on religious orthodoxy, and who enforces that orthodoxy.”):
300 
Islam largely abstained from this effort, clung consistently to the model of 
the God-ordained early ummah, accepted implicitly that later government 
did not live up to this standard (but largely avoided asking either why or 
what could be done) and bridged the gap between ideal and reality by 
accepting the bleak necessity for government however bad…but at the same 
regarding that government as largely irrelevant to the individual believer’s 
task of living according to God’s plan…
301 
 
It was thus that there resulted a separation between political ideal and political reality and 
a de facto (though never idealised) compartmentalisation between politics and religion. 
 
Considering these different analyses makes clear that it is not possible to present a 
simplified notion of an Islamic political pattern or an Islamic political alternative – 
whether  constructed on idealised terms or out of historical experience.  Furthermore, it is 
not possible to present an ‘Islamic’ tradition that is inevitably in opposition to liberalism 
and, specifically, to justice as discourse as a liberal framework. 
 
5.1.2.2 A Western conceit? 
Might liberal theory, however, as something that developed in the West, be too alien and 
too much of a misplaced cultural import to work in Muslim contexts given their different 
heritages, such that any member of the liberal family would be either inappropriate, or 
rejected outright, simply because of its Western progeny? 
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essential about the categories ‘the West’ and ‘Muslim contexts’.  As was argued above, 
however, this is a false premise.  Not only has there been much interaction in general but, 
more importantly for our purposes, the political ideas that underpin liberal theory have 
also been present within Muslim contexts for a long time. A contemporary call, therefore, 
for the normative usefulness of liberal theory in Muslim contexts would not be 
introducing ideas or concepts that are completely alien, unknown or unrecognisable.   
Indeed, the quotation from Muhammad Ali Jinnah with which this chapter begins 
evidences a familiarity with both Western history and liberal ideas.  Liberal theory may 
not have originated in Muslim contexts but to say that it would be so alien as to be 
irrelevant overstates the consequences of this fact.  It also fails to recognise that through 
colonisation and the spread of intellectual ideas, liberalism has had a long standing 
presence in Muslim contexts.
 302   Finally, such a position seems to suggest that majority 
Muslim environments are incapable of being liberal and thereby to limit these 
populations to being at most, in the words of Rawls, a decent, non-liberal people.
303  Why 
this must be accepted is not clear.
304  In proposing justice as discourse for Muslim 
contexts, therefore, one is able to draw upon Muslim contexts’ existing familiarity with,  
and at least early reception of, liberal ideas.  Moreover, one is further able to participate 
and advance discussions within these contexts that have sought to mine liberal theory to 
meet the needs of Muslim contexts.  For example, within Muslim history there have been 
thinkers that have taken up what could be characterised as liberal arguments.  A notable 
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  207example is Ali Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966), the Azharite shaykh who in his work al-Islam wa 
Usul al-Hukm (‘Islam and the Principles of Government’), argued that religious and 
political authority could be and should be separated.  Abd al-Raziq, and others like him, 
was a Muslim, indeed a shaykh, speaking about secularism, but the idea he was 
advocating was still not organic to his society. For his views, Abd al-Raziq was severely 
criticized, cast out of the ulama, removed from his position as a judge and ended up 
living his remaining days in seclusion.
305  Does Abd al-Raziq’s fate mark not just a 
personal tragedy but also the death of an idea?  To reach this conclusion would mean that 
the type of thoughts Abd al-Raziq had ended with him.  But this is not the case because 
one can look at the contemporary work ideas of An-Na’im or Sajoo, discussed above, to 
see the continuation of this line of thought.
306 
 
5.1.2.3 Islamically unredeemed? 
To say that some form of liberalism is familiar enough in Muslim contexts is one thing; it 
may still lack cultural credibility.  One objection to using any variety of liberal theory, 
therefore, is that it does not have an ‘Islamic’ pedigree and that, as such, it will not have 
standing as a viable option among Muslim populations. 
 
Frank Vogel has elucidated this point in his study of Egypt’s legal structure when he 
noted that there is: 
…a common enough impression among believing Egyptians that their laws 
are Islamically unredeemed, and, even if theoretically acceptable as siyasa 
[roughly ‘political’] measures, are in this case merely taken from the West 
and wholly inspired by secular considerations…[L]aws that do not conflict 
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that apply God’s law.
307 
 
Vogel’s notion of things being ‘Islamically unredeemed’ is important in two ways.   First, 
it is important practically since being Islamically unredeemed might be said to mean that 
liberal ideas would not be accepted ‘on the Muslim street’.  Second, being Islamically 
unredeemed might result in a principled rejection of the possibility of drawing upon 
liberal theory because it would be associated with an outlook and political programme 
that is perceived as being hostile to the heritage of Muslim contexts.  Edward Kessler, 
discussing dialogue between Muslims and Jews, has articulated this issue noting: 
Today we face not so much a clash of civilizations as a clash of ignorance.  
The downward spiral is obvious.  Inaccurate or incomplete knowledge about 
the ‘other’ allows room for prejudice and sets off a cycle of mistrust, 
suspicion and anger.  Consequent insularity, and an exclusivism in turn, 
causes boundaries to be drawn closer and tighter so we are left with an ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ tension.
308 
 
Thus, the questions are whether liberal theory is, in fact, ‘Islamically unredeemed’ 
because it lacks an Islamic pedigree and, if it is, what are the consequences of this 
situation for the usefulness of liberal theory in Muslim contexts? 
 
In discussing Islamic law and human rights, Mohammed Fadel says: “While liberalism 
and Islam are philosophically incompatible as comprehensive theories of the 
good…Elsewhere I have argued that [Rawlsian] public reason is legitimate from the 
perspective of Islamic theology, ethics and law.”
309  Fadel proceeds in his argument both 
to outline “accepted doctrines of Islamic law” that are compatible with public reason 
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  209while also noting that some of these doctrines still seem to be up for debate, at least 
among contemporary scholars.  For example, he notes that “Numerous modern Muslims 
have proposed theories that would justify departing from classical [i.e., fiqh-based] 
doctrine regarding the necessity of the obligation of hudud [strong criminal] penalties”
310 
and later notes that, for example, 
 …prominent figures such as Selim el-Awa -- widely recognised to be an 
important Islamist legal scholar – have rejected the traditional 
criminalisation of apostasy, arguing that it is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Islam’s commitment to free acceptance of religious truth based on rational 
conviction.
311 
 
What Fadel’s analysis shows is that: (i) there continues to be debate and diversity of 
opinion about the content of the ‘classical heritage’ here represented by the “classical 
doctrines of Islamic law”; and, (ii) contemporary scholars, like Fadel himself, are 
struggling to generate new, and possibly Islamically redeemed, answers in light of 
contemporary developments and theories (such as, in his particular case, the norms of 
international human rights).   
 
Justice as discourse offers itself as another such response.  Like Fadel’s approach it 
embraces liberal theory (though not just of the Rawlsian variety like Fadel) and in 
addition it embraces, indeed relies upon, the variety of opinions about the ‘classical 
heritage’.  Unlike Fadel, however, it does not seek to justify the appropriateness of   
liberal theory (whether in the form of Rawls’ ‘public reason’ or in other formulations) 
against the perspectives of ‘Islamic theology, ethics and law’, but rather in light of the 
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  210diversity of opinions amongst Muslims today and in the history of Muslim contexts and 
encourages debate and discussion about precisely what these perspectives are.  It is a 
‘liberal’ idea that does not impose any one variety of ‘liberalism’ upon Muslim contexts. 
 
An answer to the challenge that liberalism is unacceptable as a framework for political 
decision-making because it is not Islamically redeemed, then, is that neither liberalism 
nor what it means to be Islamically redeemed is always clear.  Liberal theory, as we have 
seen, encompasses a variety of perspectives in its different versions.  To be Islamically 
redeemed is similarly unclear both because of the continued debate over the classical 
Islamic tradition, something that is expressed, for better or worse, par excellence in the 
varied schools and doctrines of Islamic law; and it is not clear because the terms of what 
would therefore constitute a redemption are not certain. In short, to reject the role that 
liberal theory may usefully play for Muslim contexts because it is ‘not Islamic’ begs 
fixed definitions of fluid concepts.  This conclusion does not, however, enable us to judge 
the practical applicability of any aspect of liberal theory on the ‘Muslim street’ – 
assessing this would ultimately be an empirical exercise -- but it does allow us to answer 
the objection that liberal theory would necessarily be useless because it is, or at least 
might be characterised as, ‘Islamically unredeemed’. 
 
5.1.2.4 Liberal individualism vs. the Ummah 
One of the strongest critiques of what we might call the ‘classical’ theory of liberalism 
has been the communitarian critique.  Communitarians (such as Michael Sandel, Alasdair 
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312 charge that liberalism is a 
conception of social life that cut us off from our ‘life in common’ and in communities 
leaving us individually isolated and, thus, atomised.  Classical liberalism is criticised for 
conceiving of us as individuals who construe ourselves independently when in truth we 
are socially and communally constituted and our group identities matter, both in an 
ontological sense and in terms of practical politics.  The communitarian critique of 
classical liberal theory has also informed critical legal theory, including feminist and 
critical race theories and queer theory which have emphasised socially connected 
perspectives taking into account our positions as being embedded within social  groups 
(whether chosen or not) that may be defined by socio-economic circumstances, 
sex/gender, race or sexual orientation.  Thus, classical liberalism is held to be both 
descriptively inaccurate because we are not completely self-constituting and 
philosophically undesirable because it impoverishes our social and political lives and 
hampers our self actualisation by undermining what we get from our life in community.  
A liberalism premised on an (atomised) individualism, therefore, will be particularly 
inappropriate for Muslim contexts which are characterised by a rich, though ill-defined, 
sense of community namely the ummah, which links all Muslims. 
 
This conflict, however, is not as irreducible as it first appears.  The first of the 
possibilities for resolving it comes from within liberal theory itself.  The communitarian 
critique has, as we have seen, shaped contemporary liberal theory.  The new ‘form’ of 
liberal theory now takes more seriously the claims of community and the role of 
                                                 
312 Sandel (1984) and Sandel (1988) are good representations of the liberal-communitarian debate and the 
communitarian critique of liberalism, respectively.  One can also see MacIntyre (1985), Taylor (1989) or 
Putnam (2000) for communitarian perspectives.   
  212communities in helping to shape the individual.  In short, the sharp divide between 
‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ outlooks has been moderated and nuanced within the 
‘liberal family’.   While liberalism still is concerned that community life not suppress the 
needs and aspirations of the individual, it does broadly acknowledge that individual needs 
may be at least partially shaped by community. 
 
Second, since liberal theory is open to change, the rich notion of the ummah may 
engender more evolution of its perspectives.  The unifying sense of community in the 
concept of the ummah may enrich further those aspects of the existing of liberal theory 
and liberal politics that take community life seriously.   Justice as discourse, by 
permitting public discourses to be initiated by groups that have a religious character, 
whether organised as political parties or in other forms of civil society associations, may 
contribute to this reassessment.  At the same time, liberalism’s concern not to override 
the individual may also, in turn, challenge a too heavy reliance on the community in 
Muslim contexts. The commitments of justice as discourse, therefore, aim to provide 
maximal space for discussions about both the political values of liberalism and the 
requirements of religion including what the political implications, if any, of the notion of 
the ummah may be. Thus, if undertaken sincerely, dialogue on these lines might develop 
a further bridge between liberalism and the ummah, enriching an understanding of both.  
Justice as discourse seeks to be facilitative of this dialogue.  It only insists that no one 
group, even if, for example, it calls itself ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim,’ be taken to be 
representative of the opinions of all Muslims. 
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5.1.3  The macro challenges: pluralism and sovereignty  
All of the challenges raised above can be resolved into two key macro issues.  The first is 
pluralism.  The existence of religious, ethnic or cultural plurality itself is not pluralism; 
the former may be a fact, but the latter is an attitude and hence an option both for any 
society at large and for its institutions.  Liberalism does not demand simply admitting 
plurality but rather accepting pluralism. Any religious tradition that would squelch 
religious plurality by imposing orthodoxy and orthopraxy could not be ‘liberal’.  As we 
noted in earlier chapters, the lived experience of most of Muslim history, demonstrates its 
‘liberal’ credentials on this test because of the irrepressible plurality which has prevailed.  
But these liberal credentials do not necessarily lead to an ethic of pluralism more broadly 
within Muslim majority contexts.  To find pluralism compatible with Muslim contexts, we 
can note, first, that while there may be some Muslims who would seek to impose rigid 
interpretations on their faith there are also Muslims who would not make these claims and 
in fact accept and support the diversity of Muslim outlooks.  This is because, as Carl Ernst 
pointed out, it is not possible to speak about what Islam (Christianity, Judaism etc) ‘says’ 
in an essential way but rather we must understand it through the voices of Muslims 
(Christians, Jews etc).
  313  Second, and relatedly, we must recall that since there is 
virtually no one ‘Islamic’ answer to any question, a plurality-enhancing choice is 
available in Muslim contexts.  And it is precisely the diversity that has existed through 
history that would make plurality-limiting choices appear to wrong-step the history of 
Muslim contexts. 
                                                 
313 This is why the emphasis in this study has been on the thoughts, opinions and the historical legacy of 
Muslims as defining the nature of Muslim contexts. 
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Be this as it may, however, the challenge to embrace and adopt pluralism positively as a 
value still remains.  In his assessment of the prospects of Rawlsian political liberalism in 
non-western societies, M F Bilgin has concluded that 
…in these [Western] countries the political culture has taken a certain form 
that might be branded as reasonable pluralism.  Therefore, if the political 
establishments in non-Western societies act in similar fashion, it should be 
possible to expect similar consequences.  Political liberalism is the 
normative source at hand that could guide those societies to this ideal.
314 
   
Bilgin’s analysis is not specific to Muslim contexts (he considers non-Western societies 
generally) but one may argue that it provides good reasons for coming to a similar 
conclusion specifically for Muslim contexts.  If the political establishments in Muslim 
contexts ‘act in similar fashion’ liberal theory becomes an available and possible 
normative source for their acts, and a reading of the heritage of Muslim contexts has real 
pluralism-enhancing choices waiting to be seized.  In both a theoretical sense as well 
more practically, therefore, Muslim heritage has elements that seem to open it up to 
choices that can indeed be pluralism-enhancing.  A recognition of authentic religious 
diversity and the validity of other communities of belief (at least amongst the ahl al-
kitab), the tradition of diffused religious authority in the absence of a church, the 
acceptance of some range of legal diversity and the separate jurisdictions of political and 
religious authority were aspects that developed in the heritage of Muslim contexts over 
time as part of its own, fluid, evolution and there is no reason to believe this development 
has stopped.  In essence, therefore, Muslim schools of thought are organised 
amorphously and organically and with rather diffuse structures of authority.   Indeed, 
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  215embracing pluralism would appear to be the option best suited to the realties of this 
history and to the on-going diversity of interpretation of Muslim contexts.  Justice as 
discourse seeks to safeguard against any limitation of the diversity of Muslim voices by 
asserting that no one voice be allowed to claim exclusive ‘Islamic’ authenticity or be 
recognised by state structures, such as legislatures, courts and state bureaucracies, as 
having any such authenticity.  In addition, justice as discourse is specifically open to the 
promotion of multiple expressions of Muslim opinion and to have these compete for 
popular support.  Finally, justice as discourse is committed to facilitating these 
expressions by leaving discursive politics open to hearing religious (and, of course, non-
religious) voices on their own terms. 
 
The second macro issue is the question of political sovereignty.  In embracing democratic 
politics, liberal theory also embraces the idea that political sovereignty rests with the 
people within a polity, primarily in their role as citizens.  What Weiss asserted, however, 
was that a monotheistic tradition like Islam would see ultimate sovereignty vested in the 
divine, with the human lawmaker simply exercising a derivative role.  Doing what God 
wants would of course commit our political order to determining the divine will, which is 
an effort that has taken various forms in the three great monotheistic traditions of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam.  While Christianity developed its structures of corporate 
churches, in the cases of Judaism and Islam understanding the divine will fell mainly, and 
normatively, to the religio-legal scholars who did not operate under a church.
315  For 
                                                 
315 Though of course the case of Shia Islam was somewhat different historically because of the roles of the 
Imams.  That said, there is only one Shia communitiy today that has its living Imam present, namely the 
Nizari Shia Ismaili Muslims who hold that His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan is their 49th Imam in 
direct lineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad.  Other Shia communities either  draw their leadership 
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has meant a set of traditions that has been characterised by, to revive Hallaq’s phrase, 
‘ubiquitous plurality’.  In turn, this means that there has been no way of definitively 
determining or explaining the divine writ, such that an appeal to divine sovereignty has 
needed to be mediated through the diverse voices that have been recognised as expressing 
– though never absolutely – the divine will.  The precise nature of the divine will has thus 
always remained ineffable even to those apparently most qualified to determine it and 
who have made its understanding their vocation; it is a moving referent rather than a 
fixed trope, engendering not a seamless outlook but rather variant options of the nature of 
Islam. 
 
As a result, any appeal to divine sovereignty has always had to mean, in fact, an appeal to 
opinions that could not even be secured by an overriding corporate authority which could 
pronounce canonically.  It is thus that, until today, opinions and even schools of thought 
are associated with individual scholars themselves and even when these scholars occupy 
certain offices (like the Shaykh of the Al-Azhar in Egypt, a position that is considered 
one of the most senior among the Sunni ulama) their opinions are still challengeable both 
by other scholars as well as by ordinary, ‘lay’, Muslims.  A good practical example of 
this comes from the ‘Munir Report’
316, which states: 
Therefore the question immediately arises: What is Islam and who is a 
momin or Muslim? We put this question to the ulama and we shall presently 
refer to their answers to this question.  But we cannot refrain from saying 
                                                                                                                                                 
from religious scholars or from heriditary leaders who do not have the status of Imams and who are 
themselves usually expected to be learned in religious matters and so follow a pattern that is akin to the 
Sunni traditions. 
316 Officially: Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire 
into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Lahore, 1954. 
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duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were hopelessly 
disagreed among themselves.
317 
 
Picking up this point later, the Report continues: 
 
…the claim that a certain person or community is not within the pale of 
Islam implies on the part of the claimant an exact conception of what a 
Muslim is.  The result of this part of the inquiry, however, has been anything 
but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our 
ulama on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the difference 
on more complicated matters will be.
318 
 
Which leads to the report writes to the following conclusion: 
 
Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make 
any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this 
fundamental.  If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has 
done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we 
unanimously go out of the fold of Islam.  And if we adopt the definition 
given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of 
that alim [sing. of ulama] but kafirs [unbelievers] according to the definition 
of every one else.
319 
 
In the face of this long standing historical reality there is no ‘Islam’ to which political 
sovereignty can be given outside of the thoughts and conceptions of Muslims, which can 
shape and reshape the collective ethos of Muslim contexts.  Once this is recognised, the 
liberal option of vesting political authority in the people becomes not just possible but 
compelling.  Islam’s meaning would best be plumbed by considering the various points 
of views of its adherents under political principles that are premised on securing broad 
participation -- precisely the perspective of liberal theory.  It is only in this way, after all, 
that anything like a broadly shared view of an Islamic way might be determined.   
Necessarily then political sovereignty would lie with the people, as Muslims, rather than 
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  218with an abstracted Islam because the latter would inevitably have to reflect only a small 
slice of the diversity that has characterised the former, and it would be a slice that could 
not in any sense be held to reflect an authentic or correct Islam in any case. 
 
5.1.4  Transitional character of Muslim contexts 
Emphasising their continuing development, Amyn Sajoo calls Muslim societies 
‘transitional’ in that they are going through a phase of tremendous change and 
rearticulating their values in both a post-colonial context and one in which theoretical 
structures that had been developed in pre-modern social orders have now to face the 
reality of new structures such as the modern nation-state.
320 
 
Abdou Filali’s analysis helps to draw out the point when he says: 
What happened in the nineteenth century was the transformation of the 
medieval settlement into a system in the modern sense of the word.  The 
duality of fact and norm was inverted, as sharia-bound societies were 
confused with fully legitimate Muslim communities and deemed to be fully 
realisable through voluntary political action…We therefore see how the 
confusion between a ‘model’ and a historical system could arise and spread 
among Muslims at a time when they were confronted by the challenge of 
modern ideas.
321 
 
Filali’s argument then is about a lost sense of actual history (facts) and the replacement of 
these facts by an Islamic norm, which was not the actual lived experience.  As a result, a 
Muslim political ethic was defined, epistemologically, through the construction of an 
idealised model developed in response to modern conditions.  In this, Filali’s observation 
reiterates the point made by Sami Zubaida about the new environment ushered in by the 
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  219modern state structure.  This new environment extended to the incorporation of law, 
whereby the broad shari‘a with its moral and ethical nature was codified by the new 
states. 
 
The upshot of these processes has been the formulation of an Islamist alternative that sits 
in real tension, both theoretically as well as practically, with liberalism and the principles  
of neutrality, democracy and secularity.
 322  The broader, and more specifically Muslim, 
context of the challenges of liberal theory may thus be understood in light of the 
development of this alternative norm.  Critically, though, this Islamist alternative must not 
be understood as representing an inherent Muslim (or, indeed, Islamic) rival structure or 
set of principles stemming out of the history of Muslim societies.  It is only one choice 
available in a situation where there is no one coherent and universal set of principles that 
emerges as the ‘Muslim model’.   Moreover, such a perspective rejects the historical 
heritage because the lived experience of Muslim contexts has witnessed diverse 
alternative structures in fact including, as we have seen, in the substantial plurality of 
legal outlooks that emerged in these contexts over time such  
 
As a result, there remains the possibility of arguing for a framework for Muslim contexts 
that is in harmony with the principles of liberal theory.  To do this more concretely, we 
need to add to the response to the theoretical challenges of neutrality, secularity and 
democracy a formulation in practical political terms how Muslim contexts may be 
                                                 
322 As Filali-Ansary has also noted, the idea of secularism did not develop in Muslim societies internally, or 
autonomously.  Muslim societies did not go thorough the same historical trajectory that lead to the 
development of the doctrine of secularism organically.  On the contrary, this idea has often either been 
imposed (through colonial administration), or imported by the state (Turkey is a paradigm example). See 
Filali-Ansary (1996). 
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have developed over time.  It is to this that we may now turn. 
 
5.2  Defining a practical political model 
In undertaking to define justice as discourse as a practical political model of liberal theory 
for Muslim contexts, I have in mind a country of Muslim majority.  Real life examples 
could include Pakistan, Indonesia, Tunisia or Morocco.  While I imagine this model for a 
notional state keeping in mind these real world examples is useful.  I outline what I think 
justice as discourse would offer at the level of constitutional law, at the level of non-
constitutional law, and finally at the level of discursive political debate. 
 
5.2.1  Constitutional law 
The requirement of liberal neutrality vis-à-vis religious convictions is, at a minimum, 
expressed in the need to be free from what John Keane referred to as “ecclesiastical 
diktat”, namely the capacity of any religious organisation or officials to dictate matters of 
policy.  This in turn, seems to have at least two implications.  The first would be the 
absence of any state established religion in constitutional terms.  This means more 
specifically that the state should have no express faith commitment or, at least, that no 
such commitment becomes a defining source for policy or the action taken in the name of 
the states by executive, bureaucratic and judicial officials.  Some might see this as a 
principle whose absence is not, in fact, an impediment to a liberal model and cite the 
example of the UK, with its established churches of England and of Scotland.  Other 
Western European examples of – the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark etc – all functioning 
  221liberal states but with established churches might also be cited.  Taking the UK as an 
working example, the reason that the presence of the established churches, though 
upsetting to some, does not inhibit the functioning of the liberal state is because the 
representatives of the churches do not get to decide matters of public policy.  The British 
case is perhaps particularly ‘messy’ because senior bishops of the Church of England still 
sit, qua bishops, in the House of Lords and thus are part of the Parliamentary decision 
making process.  Nonetheless, neither of the established churches can settle a matter of 
public policy through internal church discussions and in this way Britain may still be said 
– albeit not uncontroversially – to be ‘secular’ in a manner that is consistent with 
liberalism.  Justice as discourse demands more than this, however, especially for Muslim 
contexts.  It seeks to prevent any constitutional establishment of religion for two reasons.  
The first is absent the system of churches it is not possible to choose corporate bodies that 
can realistically act as constitutional representatives for Muslims.  The second reason is 
that any reference to Islam as an established tradition would beg the question of which 
interpretation(s) of the faith are being invoked.  Asking the state to choose an 
interpretation would undermine the diversity that has been ubiquitous in Muslim history 
and thereby undermine the heritage of Muslim contexts. 
 
Second, and allied to the question of established churches, justice as discourse would 
permit no reference to religious texts, doctrines or sources as the bases for laws.  This 
means that there should not be constitutional references to Islam, the Qur’an or Islamic 
law (in any of its versions) as being the bases for the laws of the land in any general way.  
So, for example, the invocation of premises such as that “the Injunctions of Islam as laid 
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legislation to be administered through laws enacted by the Parliament and Provincial 
Assemblies, and for policy making by the Government”, found in the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
323 or that “Islam is the Religion of the State. Arabic is its 
official language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia)” 
as found in the Constitution of Egypt,
324 must be avoided.  The reasons for this are two-
fold and emerge out of liberal theory and Muslim contexts themselves: first, provisions 
like this would require a determination of what Islam (or the injunctions of the Qur’an and 
Sunna or the meaning and content of the Islamic Shari’a etc) means, requires and demand, 
even thought there exists no process or tradition to define the tenets of Islam, in any 
determinative way.  Indeed, provisions that would compel such definition would run afoul 
of the interpretive diversity that has been an irresolutely obstinate fact of both liberal 
theory and the history of Muslim contexts, including of the history of Muslim legal 
traditions.  Second, if such limiting definitions were offered, the shaping and re-shaping 
of both liberalism and the contours of Muslim values in changing political conditions 
would be stifled. 
 
If we are to take seriously, as we must, the importance of religious convictions in Muslim 
contexts and the conception of religion as not being separable from worldly life, 
however, then as a corollary to a constitutional system that does not seek to impose 
Islam, there must also be guarantees that the state will not seek to do the alternative, that 
                                                 
323  (Part I, Article 2).  See http://www.nrb.gov.pk/constitutional_and_legal/constitution/ for the text of the 
Constitution. 
324 Being Chapter One, Article 2 of the Constitution.  See 
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/Constitution/chp_one/part_one.asp for the text of the Constitution.  
Several other examples could be given of similar types of provisions. 
  223is to impose an areligious or anti-religious orthodoxy.
  This would also, in its own way, 
require restrictive definitions that raise a no less problematic an issue.  The secular space 
liberal theory demands cannot be allowed to become so radically laic that it allows no 
room for the expression of religious ideas.  That, too, would compromise liberalism’s 
commitment to diversity.  To guarantee this balance, one might rely upon the type of 
language found in the US Constitution, requiring a ‘free exercise’ clause – a provision to 
prevent the state from restricting the exercise of religion by its citizens.
325  In Muslim 
contexts, this sort of provision would embrace the idea that liberal theory, and certainly 
justice as discourse, need not be linked to a radical secularity and that it can 
accommodate and allow the expression of religious convictions and in addition embrace 
the importance of these sorts of expressions in the nexus of din and dunya.  This also 
decouples the normative aspects of liberal theory, so conceived, from the predictive 
aspects of secularisation theory. 
 
 
5.2.2 Non-constitutional  law 
Keeping out references to Islam or Islamic law at the constitutional level alone will not, 
however, be sufficient to establish justice as discourse and guarantee that the diversity of 
normative positions within Muslim contexts can be expressed.  Reference in non-
constitutional law is equally a concern. In personal law, some states – like contemporary 
Pakistan – have allowed for legal diversity between the different schools of Islamic law.  
Thus, in applying Islamic law they make two concessions: (i) that it should apply only to 
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them.  Such provisions may seem to provide an acceptable application of Islamic law on 
the one hand while allowing the state to avoid having to define it on the other.  In 
addition, this sort of provision may have the merit in the eyes of some observers of 
embracing a vision of legal pluralism.   
 
But there is, for justice as discourse, an inherent problem with these arrangements.  For 
example, we can imagine that, within certain limits, we might have different rules for 
inheritance or for capacity to marry or for the grounds and terms of divorce and allow 
particular juridical traditions and interpretations to define these rules.  If it turns out that 
these differences continue to rest on judges needing to choose amongst the schools or 
opinions of Islamic law – e.g., to determine shares of inheritance, capacity to marry, the 
right to divorce or similar issues, we would once again be in the position of state officials 
having to decide what Islam, in some version, says.  Thus, divorce granted in accordance 
with Islamic law, though a non-constitutional provision, would lead to similarly 
problematic decisions needing to be made. 
 
W h e n  w e  t u r n  t o  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  l a w ,  s u c h  diversity appears even more problematic.   
Criminal law is an obvious example.  Different definitions of what constitutes a crime, 
what evidence must be provided to prove it or what punishments it will attract if proved 
are difficult to maintain within one legal system.   Even if some crimes were considered 
only to be so if committed by Muslims (here seeking to make into state crime what in 
other language we might call sins), it would be rather ridiculous to have a patchwork of 
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other areas of law as well in, for example, insurance law or contracts.  If one school of 
Islamic law recognised a certain type of contract as valid and another did not, or if one 
school found certain types of insurance arrangements to be acceptable and other did not – 
and these sorts of differences do exist – the allowing of some and not others would not 
only mean a confusing array of contract options but also require the state to decide what 
an authentic reading of Islamic law, or the Islamic law of some school, would require.  
Provisions invoking Islam, its texts, sources or its laws thus would lead us back to the 
same dilemma: a doctrinaire definition of ‘Islamic’ requirements would be necessary.   
 
To be clear, this is different from judges who may be Muslim having a sense of ‘Islam’ as 
part of their personal moral makeup and therefore informing their decision-making.  We 
argued earlier that in such situations judges would be required to provide non-religiously 
based reasons for their judgments.  Here we encounter a different issue, namely, judges 
being  compelled to interpret legislative language that invokes Islam or some form of 
Islamic law.  It is thus that justice as discourse limits religious reasoning in legislative 
language (and, as we will be discussed below, in judicial pronouncements) but would 
welcome this reasoning in broader political discussion, as elaborated below. 
 
 
5.2.3 Political  debate 
With the above caveats, religious voices, that is to say those who might be inspired even 
in part by their religious convictions, should be allowed to express themselves in public 
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society.  Thus, religiously-grounded or affiliated political parties could exist and express 
themselves publicly as representing a normative position that is linked (though likely in 
diverse ways) to their religious convictions.  So too could religiously affiliated 
institutions of civil society such as NGOs and advocacy groups or newspapers.  In 
addition, legislative representatives should be permitted to argue in deliberations from 
positions coming from religious convictions, and would always bear in mind that 
speaking too parochially may be more or less politically efficacious, depending on the 
issues and context.  Indeed, justice as discourse encourages this plurality of debate. 
 
In providing this extensive space for religious voices in political discussions broadly 
defined, justice as discourse distinguishes itself from Rawls’ and, to a lesser extent, 
Habermas’ theories.  It is much more in line with the principles espoused by Weithman 
and the outlook advanced by Levison.  Moreover, justice as discourse will allow for the 
desire that Islam have a public political role – that is, that it may be deliberated in the 
public sphere -- which as we noted in the survey reports is expressed by many Muslims in 
different locales, to be expressed, though it will insist that this desire and the sense of 
‘Islam’ that may be invoked be expressed in all of its diversity.  Finally, justice as 
discourse embraces the possibility (perhaps better, the likelihood) that permitting political 
debate on these lines will result in a constantly ‘hot’ politics of the type envisaged by 
Unger. 
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While plurality of debate is to be encouraged in all spheres limits would have to be in 
place for those occupying state offices, be these in the executive or judicial branches of 
government (though less so in the legislative as has just been discussed).  Persons in these 
offices may have religious convictions of course, but should not justify decisions taken 
qua public office holder.  This would mean, as was noted above, that judges could not 
justify decisions on reasons derived from their individual religious convictions (or any 
religious convictions) and that state officials, whether in the executive or civil service 
could not justify actions on these same grounds.  If a state official justified her or his 
actions on a religious grounding it would be tantamount to declaring that a religious 
tradition required certain state action and this declaration would be anathema to both 
justice as discourse and the heritage of Islam.  It is important to note that this is a 
different reason for this restriction from that which was offered for a similar restriction in 
the political theory of Rawls and Habermas discussed above.  Both Rawls and Habermas, 
the latter more clearly, place limits or requirements on what state officials can do. These 
requirements seemed to have in mind a particular concern for comprehensibility.  Thus, 
Rawls and Habermas both envisaged a requirement that in public political debate 
religious reasons must be translated to be comprehensible to those from outside the 
particular religious tradition.  These requirements (found in Rawls’ proviso and in 
Habermas theory generally) would then make some religious speech politically 
acceptable.  The position articulated here is not persuaded that religious speech would 
necessarily be so incomprehensible and thus that we need have the same concern for its 
translatability or that that religious speech should necessarily be more obtuse than other 
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Habermasian liberalism in where and how it limits religious speech and the invocation of 
religious reasons.   
  
It is also different from some liberal ideas of secularity in being willing to allow political 
speech within public debate to be ‘unsecular.’  The secularity envisaged by justice as 
discourse, however, stands in opposition to the phenomenon of etatization noted in Sami 
Zubaida’s work.  Unlike the contemporary realities of some countries of Muslim majority 
that have sought to incorporate ‘Islamic law’ into their constitutions (we looked at 
Pakistan and Egypt as examples, though the new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan do 
the same)
326, justice as discourse demands an anti-etatization of Islam or of Islamic law, 
precisely because etatization will inevitably require the state to choose which version of 
Islam or Islamic law to apply and, in so doing, will counteract the heritage of diverse 
interpretations of the faith and of the shari‘a.  While this stance may be at variance from 
                                                 
326 For instance, for Afghanistan see http://www.mfa.gov.af/Documents/The%20Constitution.pdf 
Extracts are as follows: 
Preamble 
We the people of Afghanistan: 
1. With firm faith in God Almighty and relying on His mercy, and Believing in the 
Sacred religion of Islam… 
Article One 
Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic independent, unitary and indivisible state. 
Article Two 
The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. 
Followers of other religions are free to perform their religious rites within the limits of 
the provisions of law. 
Article Three 
In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam and the values of 
this Constitution. 
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which the state was not the locus – at least not the main locus -- and not a locus in any 
sort of authoritative way of either Islam or its laws. 
 
 
5.2.5  Bader’s models re-visited 
Veit Bader made practical, institutional, suggestions about methods by which religious 
diversity can be accommodated within a structure that respects liberal tenets and it thus 
useful to revisit Bader’s model and compare it to justice as discourse.  To recall, Bader’s 
preferred model was nonconstitutional pluralism (NCP)
327 and this model included 
disestablishment with some measure of legal pluralism (e.g. in family law) and the 
institutionalisation of organised religions.  The advantage of this model in Bader’s view 
was that it better allows for the religious pluralisation of society as compared to an 
alternative nonestablishment and private pluralism (NEEP), which “declares a strict legal 
separation of the state from all religions as well as a strict administrative and political 
separation”.
328 
 
Bader’s favoured NCP model and his NEEP alternative show that part of the evolution of 
liberal theory has meant that liberal principles may work with different institutional 
models including those that recognise a religious heritage.   Indeed, justice as discourse 
demonstrates this as well but while NCP would depend on some sort of corporate 
structure of organised religion(s) with which the state could interact, justice as discourse 
                                                 
327 Bader (2003). 
328 Bader (2003) at 271. 
  230does not.  An NCP model would falter in precisely the conditions in which justice as 
discourse would flourish: a society without an institutionalised religious body to act as a 
representative, in a tradition, like that of Muslim contexts, that has never known a sort of 
church structure and in which, on the contrary, religious authority has never rested 
unambiguously with a hierarchical clerical establishment but rather with diffuse 
theologian-jurist-scholars who have been respected for their learning, rather that their 
position.  For Muslim majority environments an NCP model does not, therefore, much 
improve the situation from a state determination of the religious tradition.  Representative 
corporate bodies may add some diversity but would still invite selected individuals to 
make problematic decisions about what Islam means. 
 
Justice as discourse may in fact be closer to the NEEP model that Bader rejects in 
insisting in legal and administrative separation of the state from religion.  Where it differs 
from NEEP is in embracing the participation of religious voices in the broader context of 
political discussions and allowing these voices to influence public policy in this way.  
NEEP seems at best agnostic on the role of religious reasons in general political debate 
and at worst deeply suspicious of these influences as having the potential to breach, to 
use the language of American constitutional writings, the ‘wall of separation’ between 
church and state.   Justice as discourse has no such qualms, subject to the limitations 
expressed above.  Finally, while justice as discourse shares the Bader’s priority for 
democracy concern it emphasises that in Muslim contexts mediating this priority through 
organised religious groups or representatives is unworkable and detrimental. 
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5.3  The bridge from politics to law: Menski’s  legal triad 
One question that still requires elaboration is how the political model just discussed will 
sit with the heritage of Muslim legal traditions.  To address this question of the bridge 
between politics and law we can turn to the analysis of different legal regimes and the 
nature of law offered by Werner Menski after his review of various ‘non-Western’ legal 
systems. 
 
Menski posits that: 
 …law as a global phenomenon is only the same all over the world in that it 
is everywhere composed of the same basic constituents of ethical values, 
social norms and state made rules but appears in myriad culture-specific 
variations.
329 
 
From this, he develops a graphical triad in with religion/ethic/morality at one corner of 
the triangle, the state at another corner of the triangle and society at the third corner – 
hence laws are created by the state, by society and through values and ethics.
330   For our 
purposes, the reason why this triangle is interesting is that it both helps to explain a 
Muslim legal culture in which, as we have seen, legal norms were formulated through a 
discourse of values and ethics coming from the faith and grounded in a practice of 
(largely) non-state social actors, and by the state itself: sometimes in a manner consistent 
with these values and ethics; sometimes in areas where the norms of the faith were 
seemingly absent; and sometimes in an attempt to shape these values and ethical norms to 
                                                 
329 Menski (2006) at 610. 
330 Menski (2006) at 610-612. 
  232meet state needs.  Secondly, and even more importantly, the image of the triangle 
outlines the lines of relationship that we have to be concerned with, namely the 
relationship of religion to the state and to society.  While Menski appears to offer his 
triangle as descriptive
331 we can now see that its values for Muslim contexts may also be 
normative.  The triad keeps law a fluid developing system, something which is consistent 
with the historical traditions of Muslim legal developments and also faithful to these 
traditions normatively by keeping the law separated, though not disconnected, from the 
state.  The space within Menski’s triangle would capture a public domain informed by 
ethics/religion/morality, encompassing society (and I would add civil society) and linked 
to but not circumscribed by the state, and with law generated out if it.  The triad thus 
conceived also offers a conceptual framework upon which we can rest justice as 
discourse.  While all versions of liberal theory are concerned to allow ethics and values to 
be expressed, some versions, as we have seen, limit expressions which have a religious 
basis.  Menski’s triad, however, recognises religion as part and parcel of the corner of 
ethics and morality; a conception that justice as discourse shares.  As such, justice as 
discourse wants to allow religion, as much as other sources of ethics and values, to be 
expressed politically.   Furthermore, and again like Menski’s triad, justice as discourse 
recognises, and more importantly allows, the law to be formed at least in part by religious 
values.  Other versions of liberalism are very concerned about religious arguments and 
reasoning affecting the law seeking to keep these away from ‘constitutional essentials’ or 
at least requiring ‘translation’.  Menski’s model, however, embraces this influence as 
does justice as discourse. 
                                                 
331 I would venture to say, however, that Menski’s triad is not meant just as descriptive model but also as a 
model with which he finds normative comfort. 
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5.4  The overall argument and conclusion 
While there is nothing immanent that connects liberal theory and Muslim contexts there 
are strong arguments for the normative usefulness of liberal theory in those contexts and 
particularly of justice as discourse as a variety of that liberal theory.  The first of these is 
that liberal theory asks how we can deal with diversity and posits a possible answer. 
Second, in dealing with this question, liberal theory takes religion and religious diversity 
seriously, neither ignoring nor denigrating religious belief.  Both of these factors are, 
thirdly, relevant to Muslim contexts because these contexts exhibit diversity and are 
contexts in which religious sentiments are salient.  Fourth, given its relevance, the use of 
some form of liberal theory to deal with issues around the role of Islam in public and 
political discourse and in the shaping of law is something that can be imagined, 
notwithstanding the different social and historical developments in the West (where 
liberal theory emerged) and Muslim contexts. 
 
This exercise will need to be imaginative in a rich sense of the term: to consider 
possibilities without adopting an attitude that we have necessarily to look for either 
sources of liberalism in Muslim heritage or to find an ‘Islamic’ answer that will justify, or 
fully redeem, liberal theory.  While not minimising the cultural importance of things 
being ‘Islamically redeemed’ in Muslim contexts, the content of what an Islamic 
redemption would entail is not clear, and the long standing but also on-going diversity of 
‘Islamic’ answers within Muslim heritage means that searching for one answer simply 
  234will not be a viable option.  This in turn means that a key challenge is for this diversity to 
be embraced by Muslims.  One way of achieving this end would be for Islam to have a 
role in the politics of Muslim contexts but not in the formal mechanisms and structures of 
the state or in the justifications of the decisions of its officials.  Such a secular – in the 
sense of denominationally uncommitted -- space could be described as both thin or 
thick:
332 it would be a thin space because it would sheath only the formal structures of the 
state and the justifications of state officials acting as such; and it would be thick because 
it would allow, outside of these limits, a large space to be filled by individuals, groups 
and civil society organisations and even legislative fora (with possibly religious 
motivated political parties).  Justice as discourse is proposed as a framework to achieve 
this end.  Unlike other varieties of liberal theory, justice as discourse aims to provide the 
broadest possible space for discourses of value and in particular of religious values in 
public political discussions.  This is especially important in Muslim contexts because of 
the significance of the religious heritage in these contexts.  This framework would mean 
that politics was always kept ‘hot’ and agitated by contentious normative claims that 
would come from religious diversity, including intra-Muslim religious diversity.  This, 
however, is no bad thing.  As Roberto Unger has argued it is only in this way that we can 
constantly throw open new institutional possibilities and new means of our own self-
understanding.
333  Too often in the analysis of religious communities and their 
relationship with liberalism intra-religious diversity appears to get missed.  This leads 
either to a conception that religious communities cannot be liberal, even if they can be 
                                                 
332 I am indebted to Professor David Little of Harvard Divinity School for an engaging conversation in 
2004 during which he helped me to see these perspectives of  secular ‘thinness’ and ‘thickness’. 
333 See Unger (2007) and in particular the section entitled ‘Religion: the self awakened’.  Similarly, one can 
see Unger (1986) and Unger (1996), which are more specifically legal. 
  235decent (as in Rawls’ The Law of Peoples) or to arguments that worry that liberalism 
carries with it its own autocracy which, if imposed on religious traditions, can do 
violence to the practices and worldviews of these traditions.
334  In both cases, however, 
the value and advantage of a form of liberal theory to meet the needs of religious contexts 
which have been characterised by internal diversity, like Muslim contexts, is missed in a 
constructed opposition between liberal values on the one hand and religious values on the 
other.
335  It is precisely in the face of this dichotomy that a more nuanced understanding 
of the interaction between religious commitments and liberal theory is required, sensitive 
to the diversities that both contain, and especially to the great value that plurality-
sensitive and pluralism-enhancing liberal theory has for religious contexts that have been 
and are interpretationally diverse, like Muslim contexts. 
 
It is this space that justice as discourse fills.  Justice as discourse recognises that the 
language and culture of ‘Islam’ has been and continues to be a salient trope in Muslim 
contexts and it recognises that while the pre-modern Islamic state was justified by and 
operated through law
336, the shari‘a is not some “brooding omnipresence” that can be 
                                                 
334 See Spinner-Halev’s  (2008) in which he claims (at 554) that: 
 
Rawls worries that advocates of comprehensive views of religion will want to impose their 
views on others, but in fact it is his comprehensive view of justice that is in danger of 
imposing itself on religion. Liberal views of justice are much more imperialistic than most 
religions.  
 
335 Some scholarship is recognising the problem with these overly neat dichotomies.  For example, writing 
in the same journal and same issue as Spinner-Halev, Ayelet Shachar has argued that we must recognise the 
multiple affiliations of those with religious communities, for instance, as religious believers and women, 
and how these multiple afflictions challenge an understanding of ourselves as undifferentiated citizens 
(e.g., just belonging to a religious community or just being women, rather than having both affiliations 
simultaneously).  See Shachar (2008). 
336 Feldman (2008) at 7. 
  236invoked in a word.
337  In short, justice as discourse recognises that, especially for Muslim 
contexts, the range of influences and factors highlighted by Menski’s triad is important.  
Unlike other varieties of liberal theory – and, in particular, Rawls’ political liberalism – 
justice as discourse thus responds to this broader Menskian conception of the sources of 
law by allowing a greater role for ethical values and social norms in political decision 
making and as sources of political authority.  Since in Muslim contexts much of the basis 
of these values and norms is likely to be derived from or developed in dialogue with 
conceptions of ‘Islam’ and its legal expressions, justice as discourse affords religious 
reasons an enhanced position in political processes and in the influence of these processes 
on the development of legal outcomes and vice versa.  At the same time, justice as 
discourse emphasises that the content of ethics, values and social norms in Muslim 
contexts has always been contested and subject to myriad expressions.  As such, the state 
cannot presume formally to adopt any one articulation of these values.  Justice as 
discourse thus posits political arrangements of the kind that Anver Emon has described as 
follows:  “No single Muslim voices will be empowered by the state; rather the state will 
provide an equal playing field for all voices to be heard, thereby contributing to debate 
and dialogue…”
338 
 
At first thought, there may be in the minds of many no obvious fit and much tension in the 
invocation of liberal theory to meet the needs of Muslim contexts.  This chapter has 
sought to address key tensions that might exist from liberalism’s demands for neutrality, 
secularity and democratic politics as they relate to environments in which religion in 
general has a significant influence and more particularly for Muslim contexts.  It has been 
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  237argued that these seeming conflicts can be resolved and, moreover, that these factors, 
which are important elements in liberal theory, offer much to Muslim contexts because by 
embracing and adopting these principles, the long-standing plurality inherent within 
Muslim contexts can be drawn upon in political decision-making. 
 
The second major goal of this chapter has been to suggest how – as a more practical 
political exercise – justice as discourse as a particular version of liberal theory might be 
applied for the benefit of Muslim contexts.  In this effort, the argument has been that both 
constitutional and non-constitutional law must be kept apart from the explicit invocation 
of any religious principles, as must the reasoning of courts.  However, in broader zones of 
public discourse at further length from the ‘state’, such as in civil society organisations, 
media debates, political party discussions and electoral politics (where such exist) 
religious expressions and religious reasons should be given broad room to operate, though 
recognising that any attempt to mediate these expressions through representative 
corporate bodies is problematic and antithetical.   
 
Finally, drawing upon Menski’s analysis of how law is influenced and constructed in 
(primarily) ‘non-Western contexts’, this chapter has reasserted the framework of justice as 
discourse to argue that this particular version of liberal theory is appropriate for Muslim 
contexts because it allows for the ethics, values and norms of ‘Islam’ -- in their varied 
expressions – to inform the great challenge of drawing upon Muslim heritage(s) to meet 
present needs. 
  238Conclusion 
 
 
This study began with the hope of addressing a particular challenge which faces Muslim 
contexts.  This challenge emerges as Muslims attempt to relate their heritage, and in 
particular the conceptions of political, religious and legal authority, to contemporary 
conditions.   
 
As we noted, on the one hand, there is view that Islam speaks in terms that require 
obedience and enforcement and which dictate how Muslim societies should be arranged.  
While this position is often associated with Islamist/fundamentalist groups, it is a view 
that can be derived from some academic analyses as well.  Noel Coulson, for example, 
stated the following: 
[Islamic] Law, therefore, does not grow out of, and is not moulded by, 
society as is the case with Western systems.  Human thought, unaided, 
cannot discern true values and standards of conduct; such knowledge can 
only be attained through divine revelation, and acts are good or evil 
exclusively because God has attributed this quality to them.  In the Islamic 
concept, law precedes and moulds society; to its eternally valid dictates the 
structure of State and society must, ideally, conform.
339 
 
 
Opposing this outlook are positions which question the desirability or practicality of an 
‘Islamic polity’.  As part of this questioning, these alternative perspectives also seek to 
debate the ‘dictates’ of Islam (or more specifically Islamic law), thus throwing open the 
whole issue of establishing an ‘Islamic normativity’. 
 
                                                 
339 Coulson (1964) at 85. 
  239In entering into this debate and the search for principles by which Muslims might bring 
their heritage to bear on their current political circumstances, this study has noted the 
importance of the establishment of the modern state as the basic unit of political 
organisation for Muslim societies.  Within the pre-modern empires, the sultanates, 
emirates, etc Muslims mainly lived in a de facto separation between political authority on 
the one part and religio-legal authority on the other part.  This separation allowed for 
‘state’ and religion to interact without the latter, in particular, losing its independent 
authority or the variety of its voices.  However, the relationship between political and 
religio-legal authority waxed and waned and never achieved either an institutional or, 
more significantly, a normative stability such that ‘furry edges’ usefully accommodated 
not only different institutional arrangements but different normative interpretations, 
reflected, for example in the different schools of law and the variety of opinions within 
and between these schools.  With the advent of the modern state the indeterminacy of this 
sort (which characterised Muslim history) became a serious issue.  In many cases, as 
states have asserted themselves in the face of this indeterminacy, the interpretational and 
normative diversity which existed within the religio-legal heritage, while not entirely 
extinguished, has been marginalised through attempts at control and codification.  This, 
however, is a relatively new phenomenon in Muslim experience and represents a 
departure from a religo-legal tradition that has been, in the main, tremendously plural.  
The situation of the modern state, therefore, requires Muslims to think about how to draw 
upon their traditions in new contexts and this reality has informed the analysis in this 
study. 
 
  240In developing the idea of justice as discourse as a way to address this challenge, this study 
has deliberately posited that a broadly liberal framework provides the appropriate 
philosophical perspective for Muslim contexts despite the concerns that may be raised 
about the appropriateness of relying on theoretical perspectives that developed largely 
outside of Muslim contexts.  To some, relying on liberal theory in Muslim contexts may 
seem not just inappropriate but positively unwise; indeed, it may seem to insult the 
heritage of these contexts to import a framework which developed within a markedly 
different political, legal and religious context.  Moreover, liberal theory may seem a 
particularly bad fit for contexts in which (i) there is a vital sense community – i.e., the 
ummah – given the association of liberal theory with an emphasis on individual versus 
communal identities, and; (ii) where religious outlooks are important given the 
association of liberal theory with ‘secularism’ (and, in the minds of some perhaps, a 
hostility to religious belief). 
 
I have attempted to answer these concerns in the preceding chapters by making a series of 
points.  First, while one must indeed acknowledge that liberalism did not grow from 
Muslim contexts it does not follow from this that it cannot be normatively useful for these 
contexts.  In fact, many of the conditions out of which a liberal perspective did emerge in 
Western Europe were stimulated by the issues of how to deal with religious disagreements 
and religion’s role in public life.  One might thus see liberal theory as addressing 
precisely the questions that are being encountered in Muslim contexts today.   
Additionally, as has been discussed, it is not as if liberal ideas have not been received to 
some extent in Muslim contexts so the idea that they are entirely ‘alien’ is historically 
  241inaccurate.  Second, as has been noted, liberal theory is really a family of positions within 
which there are different views about the appropriate role for religious reasoning.  All of 
these positions, even ones that would be most restrictive of the role of religious 
sentiments in public life, take the question of religion seriously.  This perspective too is 
appropriate for Muslim contexts where religious belief is a significant factor.  Third, and 
more importantly, the answers that justice as discourse offers to the question of religion’s 
appropriate place in public life are also highly relevant to Muslims.  As we have seen, 
Muslim contexts are, and have been, very diverse and in particular for our purposes 
diverse in their understandings of norms of Islam.  Thus, while these environments share 
common sources of inspiration, these have been interpreted in myriad ways over 
centuries.  As a result, the ummah has never represented a monolith of normative opinion.  
Justice as discourse qua liberal theory embraces this plurality and fosters an ethic of 
pluralism – that is to say, a commitment to allowing the expression of the diversity of 
opinions in Muslim contexts.  It is thus that justice as discourse allows no claim to be 
promoted as more ‘Islamic’ than another.   Moreover, justice as discourse also recognises 
that historically part of what allowed the diversity of Muslim opinions to be expressed 
was their organic development within a social milieu which the political authorities of the 
time were denied the legitimacy of prescribing normative orthodoxy.  It is because of this 
that justice as discourse, like other varieties of liberal theory, emphasises the necessity of 
a secular, but normatively porous, state.  Fourth, contemporary information about 
opinions in Muslim contexts emphasises and confirms that while people in these societies 
continue to hold religious beliefs to a significant degree and to see these as important, 
they are hesitant to see them enforced by the state.  Thus, justice as discourse which 
  242insists that the state remain formally neutral to religious beliefs (by, inter alia, not 
declaring itself a religiously-orientated state, not justifying legislation or judicial decisions 
on religious grounds or not invoking religious conceptions as part of its positive law), 
balances the desire that religious views can speak to, but not dictate, public policy.    It is 
here also that justice as discourse departs from the Rawlsian and Habermasian versions of 
liberal theory, which would, in their own ways, impose certain fetters on the expression of 
religious sentiments in public discourse.  Drawing on the critiques of these approaches 
(by Elshtain, Weithman and others), justice as discourse abandons these constraints in 
favour of allowing broad expression of religious sentiments and religious reasons in 
public discussion.  Finally, while the notion of the ummah provides Muslims with a 
notional sense of collective identity and fraternity, it does not and has not ever provided a 
shared interpretation of the ‘Islamic impulse’.  Carl Ernst’s point that Islam (or Judaism or 
Christianity etc) per se does not speak but that only Muslims speak is crucial to bear in 
mind.  Opinions about what Islam means have been not only diverse and varied among 
Muslims but they have also been, by and large, individual because Muslim communities 
(albeit with some notable exceptions in some interpretations and at some times in history) 
have no church-like institutions of normative orthodoxy, or at least not those that have 
been able to act with the same type of authority as Christian churches.  Norman Calder 
has put this point succinctly: 
Islam, by contrast, does not have such a system of authority.  There has 
never been a council in Islam and there are no clearly articulated 
hierarchies.  In fact, we cannot find a single Muslim (or Sunni) creed 
that is believed in by all Muslims.  There are probably hundreds of 
Muslim creeds; certainly dozens can be found in, for example, the 
university library at Manchester.
340 
 
                                                 
340 Calder (2001) at 68. 
  243Hence, situating individual versus corporate opinion at the heart of public discourse in 
Muslim contexts is not to destroy the ummah but to affirm its pluri-vocality and to 
recognise that this is not new.   
 
It remains to acknowledge what this study leaves undone.  Political principles of the type 
articulated here can only be useful if they are applied.  There are a variety of existing 
liberal regimes in the world today, which express their liberalism in ways that vary 
considerably.  This is, of course, the result of the choices made by these societies in light 
of their particular historical, cultural and social circumstances; and such choices are 
constantly being re-considered and adjusted.  If the ideas expressed in this study are to be 
applied in Muslim contexts they too will have to be thought of in the light of specific 
national circumstances.  Furthermore, this study cannot pretend to be the final word on 
political principles for how Muslim contexts address the ‘challenge of pluralism’.  At 
best, what is presented here might be an initial offering though, it is hoped, one on novel 
terms.  It might cause reflection on at least three questions: (i), is liberal theory 
compatible in any sense with Muslim contexts (though this is an old debate among 
Muslims, scholars and otherwise)?; (ii), does justice as discourse represent a version of 
liberal theory that is normatively useful in and for Muslim contexts?; and, (iii), if justice 
as discourse is to be used as a principled framework in Muslim contexts, in what specific 
institutional forms should it be implemented? If the terms of any future debate are, 
however, enriched because of this study and, in particular, if the viability of a form of 
liberal theory for Muslim contexts is taken seriously as something that is valuable in light 
  244of the heritage of these contexts themselves, then the work presented here will have some 
value – and it invites the discussion to continue. 
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